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The Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems, a body established within the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) bringing together government representatives, international organizations, civil society, academia and other experts, has characterized a lethal autonomous weapon system as "a combination of one or more weapons and technological components operating together, that is capable of identifying, selecting, and engaging a target in a way that results in loss of life, without intervention by a human being operating the system."

Put simply, it is a weapon system capable of identifying, selecting and engaging a target without human intervention in those functions.

This characterization also includes the understanding that a system is not excluded if a human being programs or otherwise determines a set of potential targets or characteristics thereof. At the same time a system is not included when the personnel planning, deciding upon, or carrying out the attack determine the specific target or specific group of targets and the timing of the attack.

In addition, the Group clarified that the characterization also covers systems that can be used in a way that does not result in loss of life, such as to damage or destroy objects or to cause injury.

In public debate, autonomous weapon systems are sometimes referred to as "killer robots". However, this is an informal expression rather than an established technical or legal designation.

Sophisticated weapon systems, including systems with autonomous functions, are increasingly being used in contemporary conflicts and are affecting the way military operations are conducted. However, it is not always possible, from publicly available information, to determine the precise configuration of a system or the degree of autonomy involved in a particular operation. This makes it difficult to isolate and assess the specific battlefield impact of autonomous functions.

What can be said is that autonomous capabilities are no longer simply a future prospect; they are part of the evolving military environment.

There is no single type of weapon that defines autonomous weapons. It is important to understand autonomy as a function rather than as a particular type of vehicle or platform. Drones, including armed uncrewed aircraft systems (UAS), are therefore not synonymous with autonomous weapon systems. While some drones are equipped with autonomy, an armed drone may also be remotely controlled by a human operator who selects the target and decides to attack.

In 2026, the Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems, under the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, agreed on a working description to help frame the discussion on these weapons. The description focuses on weapon systems that can identify, select and engage a target without intervention by a human operator in the execution of those tasks.

The discussion on lethal autonomous weapon systems considers a weapon's capabilities and how they are configured and employed, and the control and human judgement exercised over its use. It therefore focuses on the functions performed and the degree of human involvement, rather than on a particular type of platform.

Not all autonomous weapon systems use AI. The integration of AI is not a prerequisite to the functioning of autonomous weapon systems, nor does it determine whether a system is autonomous.

However, when AI is used to identify, select and engage targets, it can amplify the serious legal, ethical, humanitarian and security concerns associated with autonomous weapon systems. Depending on how it is designed, deployed and used, AI may make a weapon's behaviour harder to predict or explain, with implications for human judgement, control and accountability.

Addressing the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵ General Assembly in 2026, the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵ Secretary-General warned that: "humans are increasingly handing power to machines" with Artificial Intelligence agents going rogue, and lethal autonomous weapons going from science fiction to military reality", stressing that the danger is not technology but technology without accountability, capability without oversight, and decision-making without transparency.

Preserving human involvement in the use of autonomous weapon systems, particularly in decisions concerning the use of force, lies at the heart of international discussions on these weapon systems. While States have long differed over the terminology used to describe the nature and degree of human involvement required, there is broad recognition of its importance, including in ensuring compliance with international humanitarian law.

Within the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), States have most recently reached an understanding that control may take different forms, including direct or indirect control, and may be exercised at different stages, including before or during the use of a weapon system.

However, States also agreed that while the form and timing of control may vary, human judgement must be exercised, regardless of the type of control, and be implemented to ensure compliance with international humanitarian law.

This understanding recognizes that human involvement does not necessarily require continuous human intervention. Rather, the central consideration is whether the human judgement that is exercised, and the manner in which it is implemented, are sufficient to ensure that the use of the weapon system complies with international humanitarian law.

Put simply, an autonomous weapon system may perform certain tasks without further human intervention, but this does not remove the need for human judgement. People must still exercise judgement, for example, about how and under what circumstances the system can be used, as well as to predict, anticipate and limit the effects of the weapon. In addition, this judgement must then take effect in its use to ensure compliance with international law.

The Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵ Secretary-General has also been clear on this point and called for prohibiting autonomous weapon systems that function without human judgement and control, and which cannot be used in compliance with international humanitarian law.

There is currently no specific legally binding instrument regulating autonomous weapon systems. However, existing international law fully applies to their development and use.

As also recognized by the Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems, international humanitarian law, which governs the conduct of armed conflict, applies to all weapons, means and methods of warfare, those of the past, those of the present, and those of the future including those incorporating autonomy.

States have also affirmed, through resolutions at the , that international law, including the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵ Charter, international humanitarian law and international human rights law, applies in relation to autonomous weapons systems.

The key legal question is therefore not whether autonomous weapon systems are inherently lawful or unlawful, but whether their development, functioning, and use can comply with applicable international law. In the absence of a specific treaty regulating these systems, their lawfulness must be assessed against existing legal rules and obligations.

For example, international humanitarian law requires parties to an armed conflict to distinguish between civilians and combatants, and between civilian objects and military objectives. It also prohibits attacks that are expected to cause excessive civilian harm and requires feasible precautions to reduce that harm. These obligations continue to apply when autonomous weapon systems are used. The challenge is to ensure that these rules can be respected, including when a weapon system selects and engages targets on its own.

Accordingly, while certain uses may be prohibited under existing rules, States also continue to discuss how these rules apply to autonomous weapon systems in practice and whether additional, specific rules are needed to address the novel challenges they pose.

Within the Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems, States have affirmed that States, parties to armed conflict, and individuals remain at all times responsible under applicable international law for their decisions with regard to the use of lethal autonomous weapon systems and that measures are needed to ensure individual accountability for their use, since accountability cannot be transferred to machines.

This means that the use of autonomy does not remove or diminish existing legal obligations. States remain responsible for conduct attributable to them that violates international law, while individuals may be held accountable for violations for which they bear personal responsibility.

How that works in practice is still being discussed. While the principle that responsibility and accountability must be preserved is widely accepted, States continue to discuss how to ensure this in practice, particularly where autonomous systems operate with limited human intervention and decisions are distributed across different actors and stages of a weapon's life cycle.

Autonomous weapon systems raise serious legal, ethical, humanitarian and security concerns.

The central concern is not simply that weapons are becoming more technologically advanced, but that human intervention, through judgement and control, is progressively removed from the use of force, which is particularly concerning when decisions have life-and-death consequences.

As weapon systems become increasingly autonomous, and with the potential integration of artificial intelligence, their behaviour and effects may become more difficult to understand, predict, and constrain, particularly in complex and rapidly changing environments. This raises questions about whether such systems can be used in compliance with international humanitarian law, including whether they can reliably distinguish between combatants and civilians and adequately account for the circumstances relevant to determining the lawfulness of an attack.

There are also fundamental ethical concerns. Systems do not possess conscience or moral agency and cannot make the necessary human judgement about whether an action that is technically possible, or even legally permissible, is the right course of action. Delegating decisions over life and death to sensors, software and machine processes raises fundamental concerns for human dignity and responsibility.

In addition, autonomous weapon systems may create broader security risks. Increasing speed and autonomy can compress decision-making timeframes, reducing opportunities for human intervention and increasing the risk of unintended or inadvertent escalation. Competition to develop increasingly autonomous capabilities could also contribute to arms-race dynamics and lower the threshold for the use of force.

The Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵ Secretary-General has been clear about the need to address the risks posed by autonomous weapon systems. He has long stressed that machines should never have the power and discretion to take human lives and called for urgent negotiations of a legally binding instrument containing prohibitions and regulations. In his New Agenda for Peace, he recommended that States conclude a legally binding instrument by 2026, based on a two-tier approach:

- Prohibit: autonomous weapon systems that function without human judgement and control, and which cannot be used in compliance with international humanitarian law.

- Regulate: all other types of autonomous weapon systems.

In 2026, the for States to urgently negotiate and adopt a legally binding instrument establishing clear prohibitions and restrictions on autonomous weapon systems, warning of the growing risks to civilians, compliance with international humanitarian law, and human accountability.

They identified the 2026 CCW Review Conference as a critical opportunity for States to make tangible progress towards the negotiation of such an international instrument.

The issue has been discussed within the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵ for more than a decade. A Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵ Special Rapporteur first raised the alarm on autonomous weapon systems in a 2013 report to the Human Rights Council.

- 2013 The then Secretary-General raises concerns over the potentially grave humanitarian impact of autonomous weapon systems and calls on States to consider their implications in the context of international humanitarian law and the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW).

- 2014 Countries that have joined the CCW start holding substantive expert discussions on the issue.

- 2016 The Fifth CCW Review Conference establishes the Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems (GGE on LAWS), which has met annually since 2017.

- 2018 The Secretary-General begins calling for human control over the use of force and states that weapons capable of taking human life without human involvement should be prohibited by international law.

- 2019 Countries that have joined the CCW endorse , established by the GGE on LAWS.

- 2023 The Secretary-General's New Agenda for Peace recommends that States conclude a legally binding instrument on autonomous weapon systems by 2026. The Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵ General Assembly also takes up the issue for the first time in its First Committee, which addresses disarmament and international security, adopting a requesting the Secretary-General to seek the views of Member States and observer States on lethal autonomous weapons systems.

- 2024 World leaders adopt the and decide to advance the expert group's discussions with urgency, aiming to develop an instrument and recognizing that international humanitarian law continues to apply fully to all weapons systems. The , reiterating his recommendation that States adopt a legally binding instrument to prohibit certain autonomous weapons and regulate others.

- 2025 The Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵ General Assembly holds informal consultations to consider the , pursuant to resolution 78/241.

- 2026 The GGE on LAWS adopts .

The Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), adopted in 1980, is a key international humanitarian law instrument. Its purpose is to ban or restrict the use of specific types of weapons that are considered to cause unnecessary or unjustifiable suffering to combatants or to affect civilians indiscriminately. It currently has a total of . The unique structure of the CCW aims to ensure flexibility in dealing with new developments in armed conflicts and weapon technologies. Its structure contains:

- Framework Convention contains general provisions on how the Convention operates, including rules on joining the regime and the possibility to negotiate and adopt new protocols;

- Protocols annexed to the Convention contain the substantive prohibitions and restrictions on certain types of weapons;

This regime makes it possible to negotiate and add new protocols. Currently, five Protocols set out specific prohibitions, restrictions and other provisions on: non-detectable fragments (I), mines, booby-traps and other devices (Amended Protocol II), incendiary weapons (III), blinding laser weapons (IV), and explosive remnants of war (V).

High Contracting Parties may propose additional protocols relating to other categories of conventional weapons not covered by the existing annexed Protocols at any time.

No protocol under the CCW currently specifically regulates autonomous weapon systems, but the CCW and its Group of Governmental Experts remain the principal multilateral forum for discussions on this issue. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵ Secretary-General has identified the upcoming Review Conference as a key opportunity for States to move to negotiations on a legally binding instrument containing clear prohibitions and restrictions on autonomous weapon systems.

The CCW Review Conference is held every five years to assess the implementation and operation of the Convention and its Protocols, review progress on issues under consideration, and determine the direction of future work. The Seventh Review Conference will take place in Geneva from 16 to 20 November 2026. It offers a key opportunity for States to consider developments across the Convention's areas of work and establish priorities for the next review cycle.

For autonomous weapon systems, the Conference will be particularly significant. It will consider the outcome of the Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems and provide an opportunity for States to decide on the next steps, including the possible launch of negotiations on an instrument addressing these weapon systems.

Updates on the Conference can be found on the .