\n| \n \t<\/span><\/span>Summary<\/i><\/span><\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n\n\n\n\t\t\t\t \t<\/span>This report examines developments related to human rights in the Occupied Palestinian Territories from the period from July through December 2009. The Special Rapporteur gives primary attention to the establishment, activities and main findings of the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict. Reactions to the Mission report, including criticisms and objections from the international community, are also reviewed.\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\n\t\t\t\t \t<\/span>The Special Rapporteur considers the question of Israeli settlements and their impact on the enjoyment of human rights. In this regard, the current initiatives of the Government of Israel in relation to the settlements are discussed, and reactions at the local and international levels are examined. Recent efforts to demonstrate against the construction of a wall in the West Bank by the Government of Israel are also discussed.\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\n\t\t\t\t \t<\/span>The report gives considerable attention to the ongoing blockade of Gaza by the Government of Israel. In this context, the implications of the blockade for efforts to rebuild following Operation Cast Lead are highlighted, as well as persistent calls from the international community for Israel to lift the blockade. The Special Rapporteur recalls the situation of Palestinian refugees, and emphasizes the need to keep their plight on the agenda of any effort to establish peace. Finally, the report welcomes a civil society-led campaign to boycott, divest from and sanction Israel for its occupation of Palestinian territories.\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table>\n<\/p>\n \n _____________<\/p><\/div>\n \n *Late submission.<\/p><\/div>\n \n \n
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\n<\/p><\/div>\n \n \t<\/span>I.\t<\/span>Introduction<\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n<\/p>\n \n\t\t\t\t1. \t<\/span>The Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967 has again been compelled to prepare this report without the benefit of the cooperation of the State of Israel. In practical terms, this has meant a continuing refusal to grant access to the Occupied Palestinian Territories to a representative of the United Nations. This violates Israel’s obligations as a Member State, it impairs the capacity of the Human Rights Council to serve the international community, and denies the people living under occupation a critical outlet to convey grievances regarding violations of international humanitarian law or international human rights law, thus interfering with the ability of the United Nations and Member States to exercise their responsibilities to stop these violations. This report, then, is based on the best efforts of the Special Rapporteur to gain reliable information bearing on the range of issues arising from the continuing occupation, including from secondary sources and the testimony of witnesses. In the future an effort will be made to visit the Gaza Strip in a formal mission facilitated by the Government of Egypt. The Special Rapporteur has been given assurances that the Government of Egypt intends to grant him permission to enter Gaza by way of the Rafah Crossing.\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\n\t\t\t\t2. \t<\/span>This report covers developments related to human rights in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT) from July through December 2009. Most developments are connected to issues discussed in prior reports of the Special Rapporteur. New concerns addressed in the present report include the treatment, by the Human Rights Council and other organs of the United Nations, of the report of the United Nations Fact-finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, and the role of civil society initiatives that seek to protect human rights in the OPT, in particular given the inability or unwillingness of the United Nations and other international actors to uphold human rights and the severity of the deprivations confronting Palestinians, who have been living for so long under the burdens of a harsh occupation. This harshness has long been flagged as being of an emergency character with respect to the 1.5 million residents of the Gaza Strip, especially since the imposition of the unlawful Israeli blockade, beginning in June 2007, which has been widely condemned as a flagrant and serious violation of the prohibition on collective punishment expressed in article 33 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, which unconditionally condemns collective punishment. There are also some new concerns that have been prompted by the announcement by the Government of Israel of a temporary and partial 10-month freeze on settlement expansion in the West Bank and the resultant resistance to this ban by settlers and their settler organizations, often taking the form of recourse to violence against Palestinians, their persons, their property and their public facilities. Israel has not displayed due diligence in discharging its primary responsibility as occupying Power to protect the occupied civilian population.\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\n \t<\/span><\/strong><\/span>II.\t<\/span>Ä¢¹½ÊÓÆµ Fact-finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict<\/strong><\/span><\/p><\/div>\n\n\t\t\t\t 3.\t<\/span>Ä¢¹½ÊÓÆµ Fact-finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict released its report (FFM report)<\/span>1<\/sup><\/span> on 15 September 2009. It was discussed by the Human Rights Council on 29 September 2009. The Mission undertook a comprehensive investigation of allegations of war crimes committed by both Israel and Hamas during Operation Cast Lead, which was carried out by Israel in the Gaza Strip from 27 December 2008 to 18 January 2009 and resulted in the death of 1,434 Palestinians (960 of whom were civilians), injuries to 5,303 Palestinians, and the death of 13 Israelis (3 of whom were civilians). The mandate of the Fact-finding Mission was as follows: “To investigate all violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law that might have been committed at any time in the context of the military operations that were conducted in Gaza during the period from 27 December 2008 and 18 January 2009, whether before, after or during.”<\/span>2<\/sup><\/span> The investigation was carried out over a period of three months by a four-person mission led by Justice Richard Goldstone, former member of the South African Constitutional Court and former Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. The other members of the mission were Hina Jilani, Advocate of the Supreme Court of Pakistan; Christine Chinkin of the London School of Economics and Political Science; and Desmond Travers, formerly an officer in the Irish Defence Forces. <\/span>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\n\t\t\t\t 4. \t<\/span>The main findings of the FFM report reinforced conclusions reached earlier by an Arab League fact-finding mission<\/span>3<\/sup><\/span> headed by John Dugard, former Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967, and by a range of respected international, Israeli and Palestinian human rights organizations.<\/span>4 <\/sup><\/span>The most significant general conclusion reached was that during Operation Cast Lead the attacks by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) were aimed at the population of the Gaza Strip as a whole and, as such, constituted collective punishment that violated Israel’s obligations arising out of its “effective occupation”<\/span>5<\/sup><\/span> of Gaza.<\/span>6<\/sup><\/span>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\n\t\t\t\t 5.\t<\/span>This main finding of collective punishment, together with a series of specific abuses in incidents where the IDF was found to have deliberately targeted civilians and civilian structures, led the Fact-Finding Mission to conclude that crimes against humanity might have been committed by Israel.<\/span>7 <\/sup><\/span>The FFM report also concluded that the rockets fired from Gaza into Israeli territory were indiscriminate, and as such their use constituted war crimes that amounted to crimes against humanity.<\/span>8 <\/sup><\/span>Given the asymmetric casualty totals and Israel’s initiation of Operation Cast Lead, far more attention was given in the FFM report to the allegations of IDF criminality than to that of Hamas. <\/span>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\n\t\t\t\t6. \t<\/span>The rather elaborate recommendations in the FFM report were preoccupied with the challenge of overcoming “the culture of impunity” that had immunized similar criminality in the past, and sought mechanisms of accountability that would result in the prosecution of perpetrators. At the same time, the FFM report, in recognition of the general international policy of allowing political actors to establish their own domestic procedures of accountability, recommended that Israel and the appropriate authorities in Gaza be given six months to establish their own independent, credible investigations of allegations and put in place procedures to assess accountability.\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\n\t\t\t\t 7.\t<\/span>This process is supposed to have been monitored by a body of independent experts appointed by the Human Rights Council, and, if the Council deems the results unsatisfactory, then it is to refer the report to the Security Council for transfer to the International Criminal Court for appropriate action.<\/span>9 <\/sup><\/span> Further, the FFM report recommended that countries with laws conferring universal jurisdiction on national criminal courts pursue investigation, detention and indictment of alleged perpetrators, as appropriate.<\/span>10<\/sup><\/span>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\n\t\t\t\t 8.\t<\/span>The FFM report was discussed in the Human Rights Council and resolution S-12\/1 was adopted on 16 October 2009 by a vote of 25 in favour,<\/span>6 <\/sup><\/span>opposed, and 11 abstaining. On 15 October 2009, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights told the Human Rights Council of her support for the FFM report and its recommendations, urging action to counter impunity by investigating and prosecuting those against whom substantial evidence existed to support war crimes accusations. Significantly, the High Commissioner asserted that holding war criminals accountable should not be considered as an obstacle to a peace process, which is the position taken by leading Member States of the United Nations in response to similar allegations regarding criminal charges directed at Sudanese officials responsible for Darfur.<\/span>11<\/sup><\/span> On 5 November 2009, the General Assembly adopted resolution 64\/10 by a vote of 144 in favour, 18 opposed, and 44 abstaining, calling upon Israel and the Palestinian side to undertake, within a period of three months, independent, credible investigations, with provision for referral to the Security Council in the event that the parties do not carry out satisfactory self-investigations. The Secretary-General has been tasked with the responsibility of monitoring the process and reporting to the General Assembly as to whether there has been compliance. To date there has been no appointment of a panel of international law experts to evaluate the assessment process as recommended by the FFM.<\/span>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\n \t<\/span><\/strong><\/span>A.\t<\/span>Criticisms of the report of the United Nations Fact-finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict<\/strong><\/span><\/p><\/div>\n\n\t\t\t\t 9.\t<\/span>As the United Nations Fact-finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict has framed the discussion of Israeli accountability under international humanitarian law during Operation Cast Lead, the Special Rapporteur considers it important to discuss the status of the report and criticisms directed at it. Israel and the United States of America both levelled heavy criticism at the report, contending that it was biased and one-sided. On a more technical level there was a suggestion that United Nations rules on fact finding were not adhered to, as Professor Chinkin, a member of the mission, had already been on record as supporting the allegations prior to her appointment. <\/span>12<\/sup><\/span> Justice Goldstone explained that if the mission had been a strictly judicial undertaking, then Professor Chinkin would have been disqualified, but given the framework of inquiry, the qualifications for membership were competence and objectivity in the discharge of the inquiry.<\/span>13 <\/sup><\/span> There were a variety of highly emotional attacks on the FFM report made by top Israeli political leaders, among other persons associated with the Government of Israel. The former Israeli Ambassador to the United Nations, Dore Gold, contended that the Goldstone report was the “most serious and vicious indictment of the State of Israel bearing the seal of the United Nations” since the anti-Zionist resolution of 1975. <\/span>14<\/sup><\/span>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\n\t\t\t\t 10.\t<\/span>The more substantive argument against the approach taken in the report was that it neglected to take into account the actuality of a conflict in which Israel, as a democratic State, was entitled to defend itself by all effective means against Hamas, which is officially listed internationally as a terrorist organization. The implication of this argument seemed to be that the nature of the parties, in this instance, suspends the normal application of the rules of international humanitarian law. The representative of Israel to the General Assembly attacked the text of the report as disregarding Israel’s right to self-defence and that as such it amounted to a gift to terrorism. In fact, the FFM report affirmed Israel’s right to use force to defend itself, limiting its findings to the widely-supported conclusion that it was criminally unlawful to use force against the Gazan population as a whole, and also criminally unlawful to target civilians deliberately or to strike intentionally at protected buildings, including a variety of lethal attacks on United Nations facilities in Gaza that were lending shelter to Gazan civilians. There were also objections made by the United States representative to the call for the involvement of the Security Council or General Assembly in securing implementation of the report, claiming that the Human Rights Council was the appropriate forum. That argument was set forth despite — or possibly because of — the lack of any enforcement role or capability. Such efforts to steer subsequent action relating to the report away from implementation procedures seems designed to preserve Israeli impunity, and prompted the respected Gazan human rights leader and recipient of the Robert F. Kennedy Award, Raji Sourani, to remark: “We hope the Goldstone Report doesn’t end as piles of paper.”<\/span>15<\/sup><\/span>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n<\/p>\n \n\t\t\t\t B.\t<\/span>Objections from Palestinians to the report of the United Nations Fact-finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict<\/strong>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\n\t\t\t\t11. \t<\/span>Most attention has been paid to Israeli complaints directed at the FFM report. Virtually no attention has been paid to Palestinian complaints, and in truth, the representatives of the Palestinian Authority have devoted themselves to the implementation of the recommendations contained in the report without expressing objections. Yet there are objections that should be considered as part of a comprehensive effort to gain a clearer understanding of the issues, as well as of the debate.\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\n\t\t\t\t 12.\t<\/span>First of all, the FFM report pays no attention to the surrounding circumstances of a temporary Israel-Hamas ceasefire that had been put in place in June 2008, with notable success in reducing cross-border violence, especially as regards rockets. It also ignores the provocative violence of Israel during the ceasefire, especially the incident of 4 November 2008 in which Israel killed six Palestinians inside Gaza, as well as the frequent attempts by Hamas representatives to extend the ceasefire for as long as 10 years if Israel would lift the blockade and open the crossings. It is notable that these overtures by Hamas were made notwithstanding the failure by Israel to fulfil its commitments during the temporary ceasefire by easing, if not lifting, the blockade, which was in any event intrinsically unlawful under the Fourth Geneva Convention. The Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs acknowledges that the number of rockets fired from Gaza into Israel declined by 80 per cent during the ceasefire. <\/span>16<\/sup><\/span>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\n\t\t\t\t13. \t<\/span>From the perspective of international law, these elements raise serious questions as to whether Israel was entitled to act “defensively” under the circumstances, especially as it refused to explore the relevance of a diplomatic alternative to unbridled military force against an impoverished and crowded Gazan society, force that lacked clear military targets or even an opposing military. Also notable is the failure of the FFM report to take account of the refusal of Israel to allow civilians, including women and children, as well as the disabled, to exit Gaza and become refugees. This policy of locking civilians into a combat zone during sustained military attacks, denying them the right to seek refuge, is not explicitly prohibited in any existing human rights treaty or covenant, but seems clearly inconsistent with the prohibition of customary international law on cruel and inhumane tactics, and appears to be at odds with the fundamental duty of Israel, under the Fourth Geneva Convention, to provide protection to an occupied population. Finally, it is notable that the FFM report devotes considerable sympathetic attention to the captivity of the single Israeli soldier, Gilad Shalit, but no comparable concern is expressed in the report for the thousands of Palestinians being held in detention (estimated to be between 8,000 and 10,000, many without charge).\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\n\t\t\t\t14. \t<\/span>These serious gaps in the FFM report suggest that the contention of an anti-Israeli bias is without foundation. In fact, despite the refusal of Israel to cooperate with the Mission, the report indicates incredibly diligent efforts to meet with witnesses sympathetic to the arguments of the Israeli Government, including paying expenses associated with providing testimony received from the mayor of Sderot and from Israelis directly involved in Operation Cast Lead. Given the credibility of the members of the Mission, and in particular of Justice Goldstone himself, who insisted on including allegations of Palestinian war crimes within the FFM undertaking, it would seem irresponsible and frivolous to mount an argument against the findings and recommendations built around either the claim that anything emanating from the Human Rights Council is bound to be biased, or that the report, by finding the IDF responsible for the commission of war crimes, is by the very nature of its conclusions exhibiting an anti-Israeli, or in some dramatically-inflamed claims, even an anti-Semitic bias.\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\n \t<\/span><\/strong><\/span>C.\t<\/span>Intrinsic unlawfulness<\/strong><\/span><\/p><\/div>\n\n\t\t\t\t 15.\t<\/span>The FFM report was based on a fact-finding mission. It was probably correct for this reason to overlook the underlying concern as to whether the rather restrictive legal framing of the FFM inquiry is suitable for this kind of asymmetric encounter, in which the Palestinian side lacked any weaponry to defend itself against a modern military machine and Israel defined its war aims as extending to the civilian infrastructure of the Gaza Strip. The ratio of casualties on both sides, even leaving aside the widespread trauma induced among the civilian population (estimated by some psychologists as being as high as 90 per cent), exhibits clearly the one-sided character of the encounter. <\/span>17 <\/sup><\/span> In addition, the property damage caused by Operation Cast Lead was entirely inside Gaza.<\/span>18 <\/sup><\/span> Is reliance on such a blunt instrument of destruction, particularly under circumstances of effective occupation, ever capable of being reconciled with the values and principles embodied in international humanitarian law? At the very least, the character of Operation Cast Lead suggests the importance of raising such a question within the setting of the Human Rights Council or, as an alternative, encouraging or formally requesting the International Committee of the Red Cross to examine the topic. <\/span>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\n \t<\/span><\/strong><\/span>D.\t<\/span>Implementing the report of the United Nations Fact-finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict: universal jurisdiction<\/strong><\/span><\/p><\/div>\n\n\t\t\t\t 16.\t<\/span>Among the most controversial, yet consequential, recommendations of the FFM report, is its endorsement of seeking accountability by way of “universal jurisdiction” through national judicial systems that contain such legislative authorization. The recommendation is formulated as follows: “In the context of increasing unwillingness on the part of Israel to open criminal investigations that comply with international standards, the Mission supports the reliance on universal jurisdiction as an avenue for States to investigate violations of the grave breach provisions of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, prevent impunity and promote international accountability.”<\/span>19<\/sup><\/span>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\n\t\t\t\t17. \t<\/span>In addressing ordinary international crimes, such as piracy or counterfeiting, it has long been the case that national courts exercise their authority to attach legal consequences, including for crimes, to behaviour that takes place beyond territorial jurisdiction. What is new is the assertion of this authority in relation to war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide and torture. Most countries do not have such an authorization or do not exercise their authority in relation to war crimes committed outside national territory. For those that do, it is possible to pursue allegations of war crimes in relation to those who acted on behalf of either Israel or Hamas during Operation Cast Lead, to arrest, indict, prosecute, and punish.\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\n\t\t\t\t 18.\t<\/span>Although there are political ways to insulate potential defendants from such a legal process, in national courts reliance on universal jurisdiction is not subject to the sorts of constraints that block efforts to achieve accountability within the United Nations system. As indicated in the FFM recommendation, recourse to universal jurisdiction is only deemed appropriate in those situations where there are substantial grounds to believe that a government cannot or will not take advantage of its own prerogative (and duty) to investigate authoritatively on its own. That is, the first line of defence against impunity is through the governmental procedures of the State whose nationals are suspected to be perpetrators. Some Israeli journalists and public figures have called on the Israeli Government to fulfil this obligation, arguing that even if the FFM report can be set aside because of its supposed bias and the auspices under which it was produced, this does not mean that the IDF acted in full accordance with international humanitarian law during Operation Cast Lead.<\/span>20<\/sup><\/span>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\n\t\t\t\t 19.\t<\/span>It has been reported that the Israeli Foreign Minister at the time of Operation Cast Lead and currently an opposition leader, Tzipi Livni, cancelled a visit to London in December 2009, because of the expectation that she would be arrested and charged with war crimes.<\/span>21 <\/sup><\/span>A spokesperson for the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs has confirmed that an arrest warrant had been issued in Britain charging Ms. Livni with orchestrating the attacks in Gaza.<\/span>22 <\/sup><\/span> Some confusion exists, as Ms. Livni’s office released a statement indicating that her trip was cancelled due to a scheduling conflict two weeks prior to her departure date.<\/span>23 <\/sup><\/span> The issuance of this arrest warrant, although later withdrawn, has prompted efforts to amend British law as a matter of urgency to ensure that diplomatic contact with Israeli officials will not be threatened.<\/span>24<\/sup><\/span>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\n\t\t\t\t 20.\t<\/span>It is important to remember that there have been other situations involving controversial foreign public figures in which concerns about their possible detention and arrest has arisen. The most famous British case involved the detention of the former Chilean head of State, Augusto Pinochet, in 1998 in response to a Spanish request for extradition to face torture and other criminal charges associated with his years as head of State in Chile. There have also been some recent problems faced by Israeli officials who were considering a visit to Britain. The Minister of Defence, Ehud Barak, was granted immunity from the legal process by the British Government while on a visit to London to deliver a speech.<\/span>25<\/sup><\/span> <\/span> In October 2009, Deputy Prime Minister Moshe Ya’alon, was apparently advised by the Israeli Government to cancel a speaking engagement in London because he might be arrested.<\/span>26<\/sup><\/span>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\n \t<\/span><\/strong><\/span>III.\t<\/span>Settlements in the Palestinian territories and their impact on the enjoyment of human rights<\/strong><\/span><\/p><\/div>\n\n \t<\/span><\/strong><\/span>A.\t<\/span>Settlement freeze<\/strong><\/span><\/p><\/div>\n\n\t\t\t\t 21.\t<\/span>On 25 November 2009, Prime Minister Netanyahu proposed a 10-month freeze on settlement growth in the West Bank, which was approved by Israel’s security cabinet by a vote of 11–1.<\/span>27 <\/sup><\/span> Mr. Netanyahu described the initiative as following from the urging of “our friends” that once Israel takes “the first meaningful step” towards peace “the Arab world and the Palestinians will follow”.<\/span>28<\/sup><\/span> The Prime Minister described the freeze as “a policy of restraint regarding the settlements which will include a suspension of new permits and new construction in Judea and Samaria” reassuring the settlers with “a promise to enable a normal life to continue for three hundred thousand Israeli citizens, our brothers and sisters”.<\/span>29 <\/sup><\/span> The announcement was viewed positively by the Government of the United States, but encountered criticism from both the Palestinian Authority and the leadership of the settler movement.<\/span>30<\/sup><\/span>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\n\t\t\t\t 22.\t<\/span>Palestinian criticism centred on the fact that the freeze did not include public buildings in the West Bank settlements, several thousand residential units under construction, or any building in occupied East Jerusalem. The original call for a freeze, by President Barack Obama, did call for a temporary freeze to be extended to the whole of the OPT, including East Jerusalem. The disappointing response of the United States to the Israeli initiative was articulated by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton: “Today’s announcement by the Government of Israel helps move forward towards resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. We believe that through good-faith negotiations the parties can mutually agree on an outcome which ends the conflict and reconciles the Palestinian goal of an independent and viable state based on the 1967 lines, with agreed swaps, and the Israeli goal of a Jewish state with secure and recognized borders that reflect subsequent developments and meet Israeli security requirements”.<\/span>31 <\/sup><\/span> One can only wonder about how big a departure from 1967 borders are envisaged to “reflect subsequent developments” and “meet Israeli security requirements”. Such an assertion by a senior official of the United States Government seems to be a virtual invitation to Israel to continue creating facts on the ground, presumably even if these facts occur in violation of international humanitarian law. It is also notable that, in his statement announcing the freeze, the Israeli Prime Minister twice used the settler terminology of Greater Israel, that is, “Judea and Samaria”, rather than the language adopted by the United Nations and the international community, that is, “the occupied West Bank” or simply “the West Bank”, which could be interpreted as staking an implicit claim for the eventual annexation of the West Bank, and not as a step towards the establishment of a viable Palestinian state.<\/span>32<\/sup><\/span>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\n\t\t\t\t 23.\t<\/span>The settlement movement, represented by Danny Dayan, chair of the main settler body, defiantly expressed objections: “We are 300,000 citizens living in 150 communities. It is impossible to freeze us. I don’t know how it will happen, but we will break this freeze.”<\/span>33<\/sup><\/span> A variety of legal and non-violent settler initiatives have reinforced the Dayan statement, as well as an array of unlawful violent expressions of opposition to the freeze. The scope of the freeze is definitely less than meets the eye. Despite the freeze, construction will continue on 3,000 housing units in West Bank settlements for which permits have already been issued, and the freeze does not apply to public facilities such as schools, shops, meeting and administrative halls. It will, however, delay the construction of 18,000 housing units for which permits have been issued, but will not be built during the freeze. In addition, it has been reported that hundreds of construction permits were obtained by various settlements just prior to the announcement of the freeze. A Likud minister, Benny Begin, has said that the settlement population could grow by 10,000 even during the period of the freeze. To further diminish the impact of the freeze, after a large settler demonstration in Tel Aviv, the Prime Minister offered settlements some new tax breaks and other economic benefits, as well as reassuring settlers that after the freeze period “my government will revert to the policies of previous governments in relation to construction”.<\/span>34<\/sup><\/span>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\n\t\t\t\t 24.\t<\/span>As has been pointed out many times in past reports of the Special Rapporteur and his predecessors, the settlements are all unlawful due to the prohibition in article 49 (6) of the Fourth Geneva Convention. This provision prohibits the transfer of the population of an occupying Power to the occupied territory, particularly in this case where Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 borders — as legally prescribed by Security Council resolution 242 — is gravely compromised by the extensive settlement development, its related network of Israeli-only roads, the ongoing construction of the separation barrier, and the sustained effort to establish favourable facts on the ground, which would ultimately be relied upon by Israel as the basis for negotiating some agreed outcome. Finally, there have been hints by Mr. Netanyahu that if the Palestinian Authority does not soon reciprocate to the extent of agreeing to start peace talks, Israel may suspend the partial freeze.<\/span>35<\/sup><\/span> Whether such a suspension would be significant beyond the atmospherics of pre-negotiation give and take is questionable, considering the large gap between what Israel seems to regard as its best offer and what the Palestinians are seeking as an acceptable outcome.<\/span>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n | |