{"id":313592,"date":"2025-01-01T16:26:24","date_gmt":"2025-01-01T21:26:24","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/?post_type=document&p=313592"},"modified":"2026-03-07T21:36:18","modified_gmt":"2026-03-08T03:36:18","slug":"unrwa-annual-report-2024-01jan25","status":"publish","type":"document","link":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/document\/unrwa-annual-report-2024-01jan25\/","title":{"rendered":"Report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA) to the General Assembly: 1 January – 31 December 2024 (A\/80\/13)"},"content":{"rendered":"

 <\/p>\n

11 August 2025<\/p>\n

Chapter I<\/strong><\/p>\n

Overview of key developments<\/strong><\/p>\n

    \n
  1. In 2024, Palestine refugees endured extraordinary hardship due to the devastating war in the Gaza Strip; renewed war between Israel and Lebanon; levels of violence, displacement and destruction in the occupied West Bank, including East Jerusalem,[1]<\/a> unlike anything seen since the second intifada; and a volatile economic and security context in the Syrian Arab Republic following 13 years of civil war, which culminated in the fall of the Assad regime. These developments created harrowing humanitarian crises, bringing death, injury, displacement, hunger and despair to millions of Palestine refugees. The situation in Gaza throughout 2024 was catastrophic and inhumane. The turmoil brought transformative changes to the region and renewed uncertainty for the future of Palestine refugees.<\/li>\n
  2. Despite immense financial and operational difficulties, as well as an increasingly hostile political environment, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA) provided critical support to millions of Palestine refugees, reaffirming its indispensable role in protecting and assisting one of the most vulnerable communities in the Middle East and in contributing to regional stability.<\/li>\n
  3. The Agency played a core role in emergency services. In Gaza, it leveraged its expansive footprint, expertise and community acceptance to deliver life-saving assistance at scale, providing food, water, shelter, psychosocial support, protection services and primary healthcare to the entire population of over 2.2 million. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA has been the largest provider of humanitarian assistance in Gaza and the backbone of the overall aid response, hosting partner agencies, disbursing aid on behalf of others and providing logistical support and the fuel needed to sustain humanitarian operations, including to hospitals, bakeries and communications and water networks. This was done despite severe restrictions on the entry of aid, the regular denial of humanitarian movement and the breakdown of law and order. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA continued to speak out on the systematic dehumanization of people in Gaza and the blatant disregard for international humanitarian law and the rules-based order, becoming a major global voice for the many victims.<\/li>\n
  4. In the occupied West Bank, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA was the primary responder to violence and destruction across refugee camps in the north, providing aid to those displaced. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA also played a critical role as part of the United Nations response to the conflict in Lebanon, providing protection and assistance to thousands of displaced civilians, including non-Palestine refugees, in Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA-run shelters and supporting Palestine refugees who had fled the violence to the Syrian Arab Republic. In the Syrian Arab Republic, the Agency continued to provide emergency support to Palestine refugees affected by the prolonged civil conflict and dire socioeconomic situation.<\/li>\n
  5. The Agency also sustained its core human development services across the region, including critical services in Gaza. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA provided over 10.4 million primary healthcare consultations to over 2.4 million patients across the region, including in Gaza. More than 240,000 girls and boys accessed education in Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA schools in Lebanon, Jordan, the Syrian Arab Republic and the West Bank, while, by the end of 2024, nearly 260,000 children in Gaza were registered with the Agency\u2019s remote learning programme. Nearly 7,700 young people received technical and vocational education and teacher training in the region. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA social safety net assistance supported over 330,000 persons, and microfinance loans were provided to nearly 22,700 clients. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA also continued to provide infrastructure and camp improvement support across the region.<\/li>\n
  6. In early 2024, the Government of Israel alleged that 19 of the more than 30,000 Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA personnel had been involved in the atrocious attack on Israel launched by Hamas and other armed groups on 7 October 2023. The Secretary-General and the Commissioner-General took swift action in response to these serious claims. An independent investigation by the Office of Internal Oversight Services was immediately launched. As a result, cases against 10 staff were dropped as there was insufficient evidence to support the allegations. One of those cases was agreed to have involved a misidentification of the individual concerned. In cases against the remaining nine staff, it was concluded that, if authenticated and corroborated, the evidence might indicate misconduct. Although the threshold of proof was not reached, all nine were separated in the interest of the Agency. To date, there remains insufficient evidence to support the allegations, and the Agency continues to request evidence from the Government of Israel.<\/li>\n
  7. The Secretary-General also commissioned the Independent Review of Mechanisms and Procedures to Ensure Adherence by Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA to the Humanitarian Principle of Neutrality (Colonna Report),[2]<\/a> which concluded that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA had a more robust neutrality framework than any other United Nations entity or international non\u2011governmental organization. It also underlined that, as with all United Nations entities globally, protecting the neutrality of Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA was a responsibility shared with Member States, particularly host countries and Israel, as the Occupying Power, and with the intelligence, military, police and other authorities and capacities upon which the United Nations relies.<\/li>\n
  8. Sixteen donors suspended funding within 48 hours of the Agency\u2019s statement on 26 January on the allegations, amounting to $438 million in lost funding, or roughly 51 per cent of expected income. However, the decisive action of the United Nations and the Agency\u2019s commitment to implementing the Colonna Report recommendations helped to re-establish donor confidence. As a result, all but one donor resumed support. Separately, another donor announced in December 2024 that it was ending its support to the Agency. Contributions to the Agency have continued to be subject to major additional conditionality from donors, straining limited human resources.<\/li>\n
  9. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA concluded 2024 with a programme budget deficit of $35 million. This was an improvement over previous years, which was driven by an expanded public donor base and increased private contributions, reflecting global solidarity with civilians suffering in Gaza. Despite the severely underfunded programme budget, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA was able to sustain its core services across the region only by maintaining strict cost control and austerity measures, as well as by using emergency funding to cover the salaries of core staff involved in the humanitarian response in Gaza.<\/li>\n
  10. For years, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA has been affected by the conflicts and political dynamics shaping the region. However, in 2024, the Agency became a target of the war in Gaza, with the underlying aim of changing the long-standing political parameters for peace in the Occupied Palestinian Territory set by the General Assembly and the Security Council. Attacks on the Agency are not about its neutrality, but rather are aimed at eliminating the Agency\u2019s role in protecting the rights of Palestine refugees, in enabling Palestinian refugees to remain in the Occupied Palestinian Territory and in acting as a witness to their ongoing plight. Israel has called for Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA to be replaced, as it perceives its mandate as perpetuating the Palestine refugee issue.[3]<\/a> A massive global disinformation campaign has been spearheaded by the Government of Israel, using diplomatic means and commercial advertisements, to discredit the Agency.<\/li>\n
  11. Throughout 2024, the Government of Israel made allegations accusing hundreds of Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA staff of being affiliated with armed groups in Gaza without supporting evidence and without recognizing that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA acts upon all allegations supported by evidence and applies a strict neutrality policy. These allegations blur the line between alleged individual staff wrongdoing and the Agency\u2019s role in enforcing workplace standards of staff conduct and fail to recognize the high-risk environment in which Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA has been mandated by the General Assembly to operate. In addition, these allegations fail to recognize the core responsibility of Israel, as the Occupying Power, to protect Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA and other United Nations entities from such neutrality risks. It is Israel that is responsible for the investigation and prosecution of criminal acts, not Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA. The allegations have not been supported by evidence, despite repeated requests by Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA and the United Nations. They have also not been addressed through criminal investigations by Israel.<\/li>\n
  12. Despite being unsubstantiated, these allegations significantly damaged the Agency\u2019s reputation and the predictability of donor funding, placing the Agency\u2019s existence at risk. They further undermined the Agency\u2019s financial model \u2013 where the delivery of public-like services relies on voluntary funding \u2013 requiring urgent action to avoid a financial collapse. On two occasions in 2024, the Commissioner-General wrote to the General Assembly that the Agency\u2019s ability to implement its mandate was under threat and might become impossible without decisive intervention by Member States.<\/li>\n
  13. It is unacceptable that, in addition to the serious breaches of the Agency\u2019s neutrality by Hamas and other armed Palestinian militant groups in Gaza and elsewhere, including the failure to respect the inviolability of Agency premises, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA also experienced grave violations of the protections afforded to it under international law by Israel, including the killing of Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA staff, the destruction of Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA premises and the frequent use of Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA premises for military purposes by the Israeli security forces. Between the start of the war in October 2023 and the end of 2024, 263 Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA personnel had been killed in Gaza. In addition, many Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA staff have been detained by Israeli authorities, and many reported that they had been tortured before being released. Hundreds of incidents affected Agency installations in Gaza and the internally displaced persons sheltering inside them, leading to significant casualties.<\/li>\n
  14. The number and frequency of breaches of the Agency\u2019s privileges and immunities in the Occupied Palestinian Territory was unprecedented. In response, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA has issued over 200 protests, repeatedly calling for respect for its status, privileges and immunities. On 28 October, two laws were adopted by the Israeli Knesset in violation of the Charter of the United Nations and international humanitarian law. These laws, inter alia, prohibit Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA operations in what Israel considers its sovereign territory, including occupied East Jerusalem, and enforce a no-contact policy between Israeli officials and Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA, making the Agency\u2019s operations throughout the Occupied Palestinian Territory increasingly difficult and unsafe.<\/li>\n
  15. Despite the existential crisis that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA is confronting, a large majority of Member States remain committed to the Agency\u2019s mandate and have repeatedly recognized its vital role in regional stability, post-conflict transition in Gaza and the quest for peace. In December 2024, the General Assembly adopted resolution ES-\u200d10\/25<\/a> in support of the Agency\u2019s mandate by a vote of 159 in favour, 9 against and 11 abstentions. This support must be translated into tangible actions to avoid a collapse of the Agency and to protect the rights of Palestine refugees.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

    Chapter II<\/strong><\/p>\n

    Political, economic and security developments affecting Palestine refugees<\/strong><\/p>\n

    A. Gaza Strip<\/strong><\/p>\n

      \n
    1. By the end of 2024, 15 months of relentless bombardment, repeated displacement and acute food insecurity had devastated the lives of people in Gaza, including close to 1.6 million registered Palestine refugees. By the end of 2024, over 45,000 Gazans had been reported killed, including over 13,300 children and 7,200 women.[4]<\/a> In addition, an estimated 17,000 children had been left unaccompanied and\/or separated from their caregivers.[5]<\/a> The risk of a lost generation emerged, with 650,000 children deeply traumatized and out of school for almost two school years.[6]<\/a><\/li>\n
    2. Cyclical and prolonged displacement orders covered over 80 per cent of the entire territory in Gaza, and 1.9 million people were displaced, some more than 10 times. In 2024, over 1 million internally displaced persons sought refuge in 150 Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA installations that had been converted into massively overcrowded emergency shelters, many of which were also subjected to forced evacuation. The decimation of civilian infrastructure set back development by nearly seven decades.[7]<\/a> Around 69 per cent of all structures were destroyed or damaged,[8]<\/a> generating over 50 million tons of debris,[9]<\/a> much of it contaminated. Approximately 94 per cent of health facilities were damaged or destroyed,[10]<\/a> and disastrous hygiene conditions in overcrowded shelters and encampments led to multiple outbreaks of disease, including polio.<\/li>\n
    3. The entry of food, fuel, medicine, shelter and hygiene items remained tightly restricted by Israeli authorities. On 7 May, the Israeli security forces launched an offensive in Rafah that rendered the adjacent crossing point \u2013 one of only two points of entry for aid \u2013 inaccessible for the remainder of 2024, leading to a sharp drop in humanitarian supplies. The number of trucks entering Gaza decreased from an average of 153 per day before the Rafah offensive to 101 afterward, well below the pre-conflict daily average of 500 trucks entering under a blockade.[11]<\/a> Aid distribution was further hindered by extensive movement restrictions, as 38 per cent of the Agency\u2019s planned humanitarian missions were denied by the Israeli authorities. Some areas, especially in the north of Gaza, were completely cut off from life-saving supplies for weeks. Lastly, large-scale lootings were organized by armed groups emerging from the lawlessness in Gaza.<\/li>\n
    4. By the end of the year, the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification classified over 130,000 people as experiencing acute food insecurity[12]<\/a> and recorded 60,000 cases of acute malnutrition among children under 5 years of age.[13]<\/a> Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵ urged action from Member States to prevent famine.[14]<\/a><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

      B. Occupied West Bank, including East Jerusalem<\/strong><\/p>\n

        \n
      1. Palestine refugees living in the West Bank endured a significant increase in security operations, rampant settler violence and widespread movement restrictions, and accounted for over half of the 516 Palestinians killed in conflict-related incidents.[15]<\/a><\/li>\n
      2. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA recorded 1,224 Israeli security forces operations inside Palestine refugee camps across the West Bank, the highest number since the second intifada.[16]<\/a> These included the use of heavy weaponry and air strikes and involved mass casualties and arrests, internal displacement and widespread damage to civilian property and infrastructure, including Agency installations. Palestinian armed actors also increased their operations in some refugee camps, imposing roadblocks and using improvised explosive devices within civilian areas. The violence had a significant impact on Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA services, including through the cumulative loss of 1,422 school days across the Agency\u2019s 96 schools in the West Bank.<\/li>\n
      3. On 27 August, Israeli security forces launched the largest and longest incursion in the West Bank since the second intifada, Operation Summer Camps, which reportedly targeted Palestinian armed actors in Jenin, Tulkarm, Nur Shams and Far\u2019a camps and lasted until 6 September. During this incursion, roads, water, electricity and sewerage networks were destroyed and homes demolished. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA services across the northern West Bank were severely affected, and hundreds of families were displaced.<\/li>\n
      4. Settlement expansion continued unabated, and settler violence reached record levels, with 1,420 incidents being recorded. Settler violence also targeted Palestinian Bedouin communities, many of whom are Palestine refugees, causing the displacement of over 300 families, including 850 children.[17]<\/a><\/li>\n
      5. Socioeconomic development suffered, gross domestic product shrank by 19 per cent[18]<\/a> and unemployment surged to 35 per cent,[19]<\/a> aggravated by the ongoing restriction of work permits by Israel. Tax revenue to the Palestinian Authority therefore declined, exacerbated by the withholding of clearance revenues by Israel, which jeopardized the delivery of public services and social welfare payments.[20]<\/a><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

        C. Lebanon<\/strong><\/p>\n

          \n
        1. The conflict in Lebanon resulted in the reported killing of 4,000 people, inflicted significant damage on civilian infrastructure and triggered widespread displacement, with around 560,000 people forced to seek safety in the Syrian Arab Republic,[21]<\/a> including thousands of Palestine refugees in Lebanon and Palestine refugees from the Syrian Arab Republic.<\/li>\n
        2. The hostilities led to a sharp economic contraction, intensifying the complex socioeconomic crisis prevailing since 2019. Individual and community resilience was stretched to a breaking point, with Palestine refugees being especially vulnerable, given the structural marginalization they face, including as a result of the inability to access public services and severe restrictions on access to the job market. The nearly 24,000 Palestine refugees from the Syrian Arab Republic displaced to Lebanon also endured hardship, as the renewal of their residency permits was halted in May 2024.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

          D. Syrian Arab Republic<\/strong><\/p>\n

            \n
          1. On 8 December, after 13 years of civil war, the regime of Bashar al-Assad fell following a 10-day offensive carried out by a coalition of opposition forces that formed an interim Government.<\/li>\n
          2. The economic situation remained dire, with Palestine refugees, estimated at around 438,000, particularly affected. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA estimates that, in March 2024, 63 per cent of Palestine refugees were food insecure and 32 per cent were severely food insecure, much higher levels than among the general population.[22]<\/a><\/li>\n
          3. Because of the conflict in Lebanon, around 560,000 individuals entered the country over an eight-week period between September and November, including many Palestine refugees.[23]<\/a><\/li>\n
          4. Very few Palestine refugees from the Syrian Arab Republic had returned to the Syrian Arab Republic by the end of 2024. Inside the Syrian Arab Republic, an estimated 40 per cent of Palestine refugees remained internally displaced, although approximately 8,000 had returned to Yarmouk Camp, 700 to Ein el Tal camp and 3,600 to Dera\u2019a Camp, despite limited infrastructure and hazards posed by explosive remnants of war.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

            E. Jordan<\/strong><\/p>\n

              \n
            1. The context for Palestine refugees remained stable. The majority of the 2.3 million Palestine refugees registered with the Agency in the country hold Jordanian citizenship and enjoy the same rights as other Jordanians.<\/li>\n
            2. The 180,000 Palestine refugees who fled Gaza to Jordan in 1967 do not possess Jordanian citizenship and face challenges in accessing some public services and livelihood opportunities, despite some improvements in recent years. In addition, 20,000 Palestine refugees from the Syrian Arab Republic were registered with Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA in Jordan as of the end of 2024. Nearly 12 per cent of them have no legal status and thus remain vulnerable, with restricted access to the labour market, courts, civil status and registration, and humanitarian assistance. Some face the threat of detention and forcible return. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA continued to work with the Government of Jordan to uphold the principle of equal treatment of all persons, including refugees, in accordance with international law.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

              Chapter III<\/strong><\/p>\n

              Overview of strategic results<\/strong><\/p>\n

                \n
              1. The Agency\u2019s ability to implement its mandate fully across the Occupied Palestinian Territory was severely hampered in 2024 due to conflicts, attacks on its premises and operations, violations of its privileges and immunities, restrictions on humanitarian access and aid imports, and shrinking operational space. Moreover, the Agency continued to suffer from inadequate funding to meet growing needs, resulting in the erosion of services, including through overcrowded classrooms, overreliance on daily paid workers, overloaded doctors, the inability to assist all vulnerable Palestine refugees through the Agency\u2019s social safety net programme, and depleted assets.<\/li>\n
              2. Despite these challenges, the Agency continued to make every effort to maintain its services across the region, in line with its strategic plan for the period 2023\u20132028, while recognizing that the drastic change in its operational environment necessitates a review of the strategic plan \u2013 an exercise planned for 2025. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA services enhanced the lives of millions of Palestine refugees across the region, and the present section highlights some key achievements of 2024. The full scope of the results of the work of the Agency is detailed in the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA Annual Operational Report<\/em> for 2024.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

                A. Objective 1: Palestine refugees are protected through the realization of their rights under international law<\/strong><\/p>\n

                  \n
                1. The Agency responded to the alarming and widespread deterioration in the protection environment by adapting its programme and response to address emerging priority needs, with psychosocial support figuring prominently to address the severe trauma experienced by many Palestine refugees.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

                  Output highlights:<\/strong><\/p>\n