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Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT affirmed the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judgment. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that OIOS operates under the ¡°authority¡± of the Secretary-General but has ¡°operational independence¡±. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT further noted that, insofar as the contents and procedures of an individual report are concerned, the Secretary-General has no power to influence or interfere with OIOS. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT also has no jurisdiction to do so, as it can only review the Secretary-General¡¯s administrative decisions. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT, however, noted that to the extent that any OIOS decisions are used to affect staff members¡¯ terms or contract of employment, OIOS¡¯ reports may be...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered the application for revision of judgment No. 2010-Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT-014 by Mr Luvai. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered the allegation that the Legal Officer who was assigned to the case before Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT was a Facebook ¡°friend¡± of Judge Boolell, the then Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT President, and of a few other people who could have been tangentially involved in the issues of the underlying dispute and that Judge Boolell somehow influenced the judge sitting on the instant case to rule improperly. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Mr Luvai offered not a shred of proof of anything improper. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT denied the application.

The Appellant appealed the amount of compensation awarded for loss of chance. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that there was no set way for the trial court to set damages for loss of chance of promotion and that each case turned on its facts. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that it would generally defer to the trial court¡¯s discretion. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT did not accept the Appellant¡¯s argument that the trial court was required to assess the percentage chances that he would have been selected: Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that while it had approved that procedure as one method of assessing damages, it respected the opinion of the trial judge as to how to determine...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an appeal by the Secretary-General and a cross-appeal by Ms Chen. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the principle that everyone, without any discrimination, has the right to equal pay for equal work (Article 23(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights) applies to Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵ staff. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that budgetary considerations could not trump the requirement of equal treatment. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT declined to grant the relief sought by Ms Chen in her cross-appeal on the basis that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT awarded damages from the correct date. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Administration¡¯s allegation that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT usurped the Secretary-General¡¯s...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT found that there was no evidence of damages or injuries in this case. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT reaffirmed the principle that an award for moral damages must be supported by specific evidence.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT had before it: an application for interpretation of judgment No. 2010-Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT-043 on the issue of to which Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT Registry Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT remanded Ms Mezoui¡¯s case; two appeals from Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT Order Nos. 71 (GVA/2010) and 73 (GVA/2010); and a motion for joinder and fast-track hearing. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the application for interpretation was a ruse to have Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT interfere with Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s assignment of venue. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that venue was a matter for the trial court¡¯s discretion, with which it would not interfere. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that it would not, generally, entertain interlocutory appeals. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT denied the application for...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT has the power to, as it did, refer a matter to the Secretary-General for investigation under Article 10(8) of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT Statute. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the appeal and held that all language in the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judgment was obiter dictum or surplusage, except for the order itself, which Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT affirmed in its entirety.

Accountability Referral: The Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT affirmed the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT referral for possible action to enforce accountability.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an appeal by the Secretary-General. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that it would not approve the award of compensation when absolutely no harm had been suffered. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT agreed with the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT that a staff member had the right to be informed of administrative decisions affecting them, however, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that a few days lapse was inconsequential and, in the matter before it, had no consequences. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT vacated the part of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judgment awarding compensation.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held, in agreement with Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT, that: the Appellant was properly subjected to a disciplinary hearing; the disciplinary procedures operated fairly; the Appellant disclosed his part in the events at a time when he had no option but to do so; the Appellant did not report the fact he received the hospitality from a vendor; the Appellant substantially admitted the allegations; the Appellant put at risk the reputation and standing of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵ Procurement Division; there was sufficient material before the Secretary-General, after a fair and impartial investigation, and having regard to the Appellant...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that, even though it found the case non-receivable, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT undertook a final review of the Appellant¡¯s allegations and that the case failed on the facts. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT did not err in finding that the decisions contested in the application, namely that the matters contested did not constitute administrative decisions and therefore her application was not receivable. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held there was no basis to disagree with Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the appeal.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that none of the reasons for the delay asserted by the Appellant justified a 17-month late appeal. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that it would consider only the time issues because the case was so clearly out of time. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that any alleged error by Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT in considering the merits was moot. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the appeal and affirmed the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judgment.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Appellant filed her claim against the wrong entity (the Secretary-General) when her case was, in actual fact, against Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the claim was time-barred. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the appeal to JAB was also out of time. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the appeal.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT referenced the Shanks jurisprudence (judgment No. 2010-Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT-026bis) where it held that the authority of a final judgment - res judicata - cannot be so readily set aside. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that there are only limited grounds as enumerated in Article 11 of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT Statute for review of a final judgment and an allegation of an error in law is not one of them. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the application to set aside and remand the previous judgment.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that there was no dispute that the Appellant had a fixed-term appointment, which had no expectancy of renewal or of conversion to any other type of appointment. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT had correctly dismissed most of the allegations brought by the Appellant since he had failed to raise them in a request for administrative review or management evaluation. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the appeal and affirmed the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judgment.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT concurred with Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT that the case was time-barred and not receivable. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that, while the Appellant referred to an accident that prevented her from filing on time, she did not mention this to Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT and raised it for the first time before Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that, while Article 2. 5 of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT Statute allows it to admit further evidence in exceptional circumstances, it would not admit evidence that was known to the party and could have been presented to Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the appeal and affirmed the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judgment.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Appellant was caught in the transition between the old and new internal justice systems. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that the Appellant had requested an extension of the time limit to file an application with the former Administrative Tribunal and that it was questionable if anyone could have granted an extension since the new Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT had not officially started and the former Administrative Tribunal was winding down. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT, therefore, held that the case should be remanded to Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT for consideration on merits. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT upheld the appeal, vacated the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judgment, and remanded the case to Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT for a...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held, noting that the Appellant relied on the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT Rosca jurisprudence (judgment No. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT/2009/052) in her request for Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT to waive the time limits for management evaluation, that the plain language of Article 8. 3 of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT Statute could not be disregarded. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT approved judgment No. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT/2009/051 as the law on this issue and disapproved the interpretation of Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT in Rosca. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the appeal and affirmed the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judgment.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the appeal as time-barred.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that (1) the Commissioner-General has broad discretionary authority in disciplinary matters; (2) the facts on which the Appellant¡¯s termination was based were established; (3) the established facts legally amounted to serious misconduct; and (4) there was no substantive or procedural irregularity. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT further held that the Appellant¡¯s termination was legal and not disproportionate to the offenses. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the appeal and affirmed the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA decision.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered the appeal and affirmed Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵJSPF¡¯s decision. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT found that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵJSPF submitted credible evidence that demonstrated that the Cameroon divorce decree was invalid and that the deceased at no time commenced proceedings to dissolve his marriage to his first wife apart from the USA divorce proceedings, which were terminated by his death. In drawing this conclusion, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT found it unnecessary to address the additional reliefs sought by the Appellant. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT accordingly affirmed Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵJSPF¡¯s decision to award the widow¡¯s benefit to the former staff member¡¯s first wife and denied all reliefs...