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The Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT found that the neutral first instance process established by the IMO, i.e., the SAB, was properly constituted and met the requirements of Article 2(10) of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT Statute. The Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT rejected the argument that the SAB lacked neutrality. The Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT also found that the SAB produced a sufficient written record of its Decision.

The Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT found that the SAB acted within the bounds of its jurisdiction and competence when it reviewed the decision of the Secretary-General on the recommendation of the ABCC. The SAB had close regard to the fact that the ABCC reached its determination on the medical...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the summary dismissal decision was unlawful because the due process rights under IMO¡¯s Staff Regulations and Staff Rules were substantially violated. The Appellant had been charged with misconduct in the form of fraudulent activities undertaken to gain diplomatic accreditation, namely giving instructions to append an electronic signature to an official IMO communication without authorization or instruction by that colleague and misrepresenting his contractual status as internationally recruited in that communication. Noting that the Secretary-General of IMO considered the...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered the Appellants¡¯ consolidated appeals against the rejection of their requests to be upgraded to a higher level. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that it was not satisfied that the essential elements were present to enable the IMO SAB to take a decision within the meaning of Article 2(10) of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT Statute. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that, even if the SAB issuance was a decision, it was nevertheless only advisory or recommendatory. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that SAB gave advice to the Secretary-General of IMO, who could not be regarded as a neutral part of the process as he was both the employer¡¯s representative and the original...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT was not satisfied that the essential elements were present to enable the IMO SAB to take a decision within the meaning of Article 2(10) of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT Statute. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that, even if the SAB issuance was a decision, it was only advisory or recommendatory. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that the SAB gave advice to the Secretary-General of IMO, who could not be regarded as a neutral part of the process as he is both the employer¡¯s representative and the original decision-maker. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that it was the Secretary-General of IMO, who was not neutral in the first instance process, who took the final decision. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that it was not satisfied that the essential elements were present to enable Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT to exercise its jurisdiction within the meaning of Article 2(10) of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT Statute in regard to the decision of IMO SAB. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that in this case, even if the SAB issued decision, it was nevertheless only advisory or recommendatory. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that the SAB gave advice to the Secretary-General of IMO, who could not be regarded as a neutral part of the process as he is both the employer¡¯s representative and the original decision-maker. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that it was the Secretary-General of IMO, who was not a...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Appellant did not contest the decision to separate her from the Organisation, thus the SAB was not seized with her separation and her appeal on that issue was not receivable. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Appellant¡¯s claims for compensation for pain, suffering, and medical expenses were beyond the scope of the case and therefore not receivable. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the IMO Secretary-General¡¯s decision to place the Appellant on sick leave was based on sound medical evidence which was not rebutted at the time and that there was no basis to set aside that decision. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held there was no basis...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT remanded the case to the SAB, directing that the appeal be reconsidered by a neutral first instance process that issues a final decision. Citing Dispert & Hoe, Spinardi, Sheffer, Fogarty, and Fogarty et al., the Tribunal explained that the SAB must satisfy the requirement under Article 2 (10) of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT Statute, which requires that the first instance process produce a final decision on the appeal and not a recommendation to the Secretary-General, as was the case under the then IMO Staff Regulations and Staff Rules (SRSR). The Tribunal also called into question whether the IMO Secretary...

The Secretary-General of IMO is essentially seeking comments on the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT judgment under the guise of an application for interpretation, something Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT expressly proscribed in Kasmani. The Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT¡¯s Fogarty Judgment clearly and unambiguously explicates the nature of the difficulty in a manner that requires no further interpretation. There is no ambiguity, uncertainty or irreconcilable conflict on the question remanded or the reasons for the remand or in the comments in paragraph 25 of the Fogarty Judgment that justifies an application for interpretation. While the applications for...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that while the SAB may satisfy the requirements of a neutral first instance process, its decision is only advisory or recommendatory. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the facts did not disclose whether the Secretary-General of IMO had the power to amend the powers of the SAB retrospectively to permit the SAB to make a decision rather than a recommendation or, more pertinently, by subsequent fiat, to convert a recommendation of SAB into a decision. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the source of the Secretary-General¡¯s power to introduce interim measures was not clear and that there may be other constraints upon his...