Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵ

In accordance with former staff rule 104.12(b)(i) and provisional staff rule 4.13(c), the Applicant cannot claim a right to the renewal of her fixed-term appointment. The Applicant claims that the difficult working relationship she had with her supervisor led the latter, with the objective of getting rid of the former, to seek the reclassification of her post at a higher level. However, the Applicant does not prove that the non-extension of her appointment results solely from the desire of her supervisor to remove her from the service, nor that, consequently, the contested decision appears...

Outcome: Appeal upheld. Decision held to be a breach of staff regulation 2.1 and the principle of equal pay for work of equal value. Respondent ordered to pay compensation of the difference in salary, allowances and other entitlements between the applicant¡¯s current level and the level at which she should have been classified since the date she made her request. Respondent ordered to pay compensation for non-material damage due to frustration and humiliation compounded by delays at six months¡¯ net base salary.

The Secretary-General¡¯s decision to allow the applicants to resubmit their cases to the CAC within 90 days was reasonable and fair. The CAC is the legitimate and appropriate body to hear the applicants¡¯ request for a review of a reclassification decision. In view of the JAB¡¯s report, the lack of information provided during the period in question and the respondent¡¯s silence in explaining the delays in the period from 2000-04, the Tribunal finds that compensation for the excessive delay in responding to the original request for reclassification is warranted, as is compensation for the breach of...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT found the application receivable and determined that the post number provided by the ICSC for reclassification purposes was that of a Compensation Officer with functions distinct from those performed by the applicant. Therefore, in the absence of a properly budgeted post, the request of the ICSC was a request for classification advice prior to a budgetary submission, which required General-Assembly approval. The reclassification proposal was not included in the budgetary submission to the General Assembly, and, accordingly, the General Assembly did not approve the proposed...

1998 reclassification: The issue of the 1998 reclassification exercise is long out of time and no circumstances justify the review of it now. 2005 reclassification: Examining the 2005 reclassification exercise is moot as the post was abolished and the applicant did not challenge the abolition. Withdrawal of SPA: In relation to the period for which the applicant¡¯s SPA was withdrawn, it would be reasonable to expect a notation of a change in functions in the e-PAS records as there was a crossover between two cycles. However, there was none and the SPA should thus be retroactively paid...

It is not the function of the Tribunal to review the prior JAB report, but to consider whether the respondent acted properly and with due regard to the applicant¡¯s due process rights in deciding to appoint the applicant at the G-3 level. It is incumbent upon any party making serious allegations to produce supporting evidence. It was for the applicant, as a freely contracting person, to decide whether or not to accept the appointment and she did so on the basis of the clear oral and written conditions governing her appointment.Outcome: Application dismissed in its entirety.

The Tribunal does not sit as an expert review body on the classification of posts. The Tribunal has the power and a duty to consider whether the Committee acted unfairly or in anyway improperly or whether there was any failure, omission or deliberate failure by the ASG to give effect to the substance of the report and recommendations of the Committee. If there is no evidence of this, the Tribunal will not overturn a decision of the Committee. Where the applicant raises general complaints of unfairness and denial of due process, it is incumbent upon the applicant to provide sufficient detail...

In declaring the Applicant¡¯s appeal time-barred on the issue of the reclassification of her post, the Secretary-General wrongfully considered that the Administration¡¯s failure to take action on the Applicant¡¯s appeal of a classification decision was an implicit decision of refusal that she should have contested within the time limits set forth in former staff rule 111.2 (a). ST/AI/1998/9 sets out special procedures for contesting a post classification or reclassification. In particular, it provides for the referral of the appeal to a Classification Appeals Committee. When an appeal is referred...

The Administration, on three separate occasions in 2000, determined that his post would remain classifiable at the P-3 level. In 2006, the Applicant made another request to have his post reclassified and a desk audit of the post was performed under ST/AI/1998/9, but the post remained classified at the P-3 level. The Applicant contended that the Respondent failed to comply with the established procedures as set out in ST/AI/1998/9, including that the Applicant was not provided with available documentation to justify the decisions and that this effectively deprived him from filing a meaningful...

Receivability/administrative decision: Preliminary decisions such as the choice of an appropriate basis for a staff member¡¯s performance appraisal do not have direct legal effects on his/her rights. They can only be reviewed within the context of the assessment of the final decision, that is, the outcome of the staff member¡¯s performance appraisal.Delegation of authority: A delegation of authority should not be guessed at or presumed. It must precede the taking of a decision and is not synonymous with retrospective rubberstamping.Classification of posts/generic job profiles: Section 2.2 of ST...