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Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT observed that the Appellant did not challenge the reasoning of Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT, but appealed on the ground that the administrative policy in place should be changed because she was promoted but her gross income was reduced. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that the Appellant¡¯s pay calculations also took into account other deductions and increases such that her net income increased. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the real issue before it was whether Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT made a reversible error in fact or law such that it must allow the appeal. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that the Appellant did not disagree that, on its face, the calculations of her salary were made...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that, even though it found the case non-receivable, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT undertook a final review of the Appellant¡¯s allegations and that the case failed on the facts. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT did not err in finding that the decisions contested in the application, namely that the matters contested did not constitute administrative decisions and therefore her application was not receivable. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held there was no basis to disagree with Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the appeal.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT affirmed that the circumstances of the allegation of unsatisfactory conduct in the present case created the obligation to initiate a preliminary investigation. However, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT erred in awarding damages to Mr Abboud while finding that he had not suffered any economic loss and that no actual damage existed. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT rescinded the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s judgment to the extent that it awarded damages to Mr Abboud.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an appeal by the Secretary-General limited to the question of compensation. On the issue of the Secretary-General¡¯s appeal being time-barred, as raised by Mr. Kasyanov, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s judgment on merits for the case was not a final judgment; while it made substantive findings, it left the issue of remedy to be resolved in the future. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judgment on merits only became final when Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT issued the judgment on compensation. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that, when the judgment on merits was appealed, a party could challenge the judgment on compensation and the judgment on...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an appeal by the Secretary-General appealed against the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judgment to seek a clarification of the ratio of the judgment with regard to the way in which Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT had applied the principle of preponderance of evidence and ignored the Secretary-General¡¯s submissions on the basis of ¡°minimal showing¡± that the Applicant had been fairly considered. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that it would not examine the legal submissions in the appeal since the case had been decided in favour of the Secretary-General. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that none of the grounds of appeal pleaded was valid under Article 2.1 of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT Statute...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that the language on overtime was interpreted for around 50 years in one way and then was changed and that there was some ambiguity in the provision. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that it was still unclear on some issues surrounding whether it was proper for Staff Rules to apply differently in different duty stations and that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT should hear evidence on the issue, including on potential differences in application amongst departments in New York. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT vacated the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judgment and remanded it to Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT for further proceedings.

The staff member appealed on the ground that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT had made errors of fact in the judgment. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT recalled that in order to overturn a finding of fact, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT must be satisfied that the finding is not supported by the evidence or that it is unreasonable. Some degree of deference should be given to the factual findings by Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT as the court of first instance, particularly where oral evidence is heard. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the appeal finding that there were no grounds for overturning the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s findings of fact and that no other reversible errors were made.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an appeal by the Secretary-General and a cross-appeal by Ms Chen. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the principle that everyone, without any discrimination, has the right to equal pay for equal work (Article 23(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights) applies to Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵ staff. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that budgetary considerations could not trump the requirement of equal treatment. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT declined to grant the relief sought by Ms Chen in her cross-appeal on the basis that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT awarded damages from the correct date. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Administration¡¯s allegation that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT usurped the Secretary-General¡¯s...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an appeal by the Secretary-General. The Secretary-General asserted that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT erred in determining the amount of compensation to be awarded to Mr Kozlov and Mr Romadanov for the irregularity in the proceedings. Relying on Kasyanov (2010-Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT-076) and Wu (2010-Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT-042), Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that it previously awarded compensation in the amount of two months¡¯ net base salary where the decision not to appoint the applicants was procedurally flawed. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT found no reason to depart from this jurisprudence as no pecuniary loss was shown on part of Mr Kozlov and Mr Romadanov. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT also noted...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an appeal by the Secretary-General. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held, in agreement with the Secretary-General, agreed that there were no grounds to award compensation. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that there was no administrative decision being contested in this case, as both parties accepted the decision to promote Ms Kamal and she had not identified any illegality that could lead to an award of compensation. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT found that the delay in completing the selection process could not be considered a valid ground for compensation, since the circumstances of the case did not show any negligence or violation of specific...