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The Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered three appeals by the applicant.

The Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT found that the impugned Order was an interlocutory order and was obviously beyond the competence of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT.

The Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the applicant had not submitted documents to prove being a United Nations staff member and that he had no legal standing before the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT. The Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that there was no evidence of an offer of appointment having been issued to him for either post. Second, he failed to complete the pre-recruitment formalities for both posts. Third, he failed to confirm, within a reasonable time, his interest and...

The Tribunal noted that, firstly, the Applicant does not contest an administrative decision taken by the Secretary-General as the Chief Administrative Officer of the United Nations. Secondly, FAO has not concluded a special agreement with the Secretary-General, under art. 2.5 of the Tribunal's Statute, to accept the terms of the Tribunal's jurisdiction. Consequently, the Tribunal found that it was not competent to examine the present application.

The Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the appeal. The Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT found that AAL was given notice of the need for her to return to the duty station, as well as sufficient opportunity to apply for sick leave. However, she did not request such sick leave, nor did she return to work, leaving no option for the Administration other than to place her on SLWOP. She also failed to provide evidence that there were ¡°compelling personal circumstances¡± so as to engender a decision to allow her to continue to telecommute from outside her official duty station. The Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT further found that the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT did not err in finding that AAL...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered the appeal. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT found that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT did not err in finding that the Appellant¡¯s case did not constitute ¡°exceptional cases,¡± so as to justify a waiver of the time limit, pursuant to Article 8(3) of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT Statute. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT also did not find any exceptional circumstances requiring it to receive additional documentary evidence, pursuant to Article 2(5) of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT Statute, nor did it find that its content would have affected the decision of the case. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT found no reversible error in Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s rejection of the Appellant¡¯s motion for extension of time and its summary dismissal of her...

On an appeal by the Secretary-General, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT erred in concluding that the applications were receivable. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that Article 2(1) of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT Statute limits the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s jurisdiction to hearing appeals against administrative decisions. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT defined an administrative decision as a unilateral decision of an administrative nature taken by the administration involving the exercise of a power or the performance of a function in terms of a statutory instrument, which adversely affects the rights of a staff member and produces direct legal consequences. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that, with the...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered the Secretary-General's appeal and the staff members¡¯ cross-appeal. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT first considered the receivability of the appeal and held that the applications were receivable because the contested decision would have an adverse impact on the staff members. With respect to the merits of the appeal, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that the salary entitlements of staff members are statutory in nature and may be unilaterally amended by the General Assembly. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT further noted that an individual loss caused by a unilateral variation of a validly concluded contract poses no legal obstacle to the exercise of...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT found that the appeal raised significant questions of law about the power of the Organisation to unilaterally alter or reduce the compensation of staff members of the Organisation. For that reason, the President of Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT in terms of Article 10(2) of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT Statute elected to refer the appeal for consideration by the full bench of Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT recalled that an administrative decision is a unilateral decision of an administrative nature taken by the administration involving the exercise of a power or the performance of a function in terms of a statutory instrument, which adversely affects...

This case was presided by Judge Halfeld, and Judge Murphy drafted the majority opinion. The Majority (Halfeld, Murphy, Raikos and Knierim) dismissed the appeal and held that the appeal was not receivable. Without deciding on the issue whether the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT has an inherent right to hold a non-party in contempt, the Majority found that the appeal did not meet the requirements of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT Statute. The Majority explained that it had jurisdiction ratione materiae to hear and pass judgment on an appeal pursuant to Article 2(1) of the Statute in which it is asserted that the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT has: (a) exceeded its...

The Tribunal observed that the Applicant was a staff member of Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA and contested a decision purportedly taken by that agency. The Tribunal further recalled that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA does not fall under the jurisdiction of Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT. Accordingly, the Applicant had no locus standi before the Tribunal. The Application was thus dismissed as non-receivable.