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Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT had correctly found that the application was not receivable. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the appeal and affirmed the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judgment.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that only circumstances beyond an applicant¡¯s control that prevented them from timely exercising the right of appeal may be considered ¡°exceptional circumstances,¡± justifying a waiver of the statutory time limit. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that an applicant¡¯s initial mistaken belief that decisions were lawful cannot be deemed to constitute exceptional circumstances justifying a waiver of the time limit to appeal those decisions, especially when they had every means of obtaining information from the Administration. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT was not persuaded by the Appellant¡¯s arguments upon appeal and did not find any...

The Secretary-General appealed. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT erred in law when it found that there was a breach of Mr Elobaid¡¯s due process rights, as Mr Elobaid was correctly apprised of the allegations against him, which could lead to administrative action, and was afforded the opportunity to make representations against the measure taken. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT erred in fact, resulting in a manifestly unreasonable decision, when it assumed that the reprimand originated from Mr Ward, of the Chief Programme Support and Management Services at the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, who...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Appellant did not meet her burden of proving that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT clearly exceeded its jurisdiction or competence when it reassigned the cases. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT decision on assignment and reassignment of judges are matters of case management and the fair and efficient functioning of the tribunal¡¯s processes and within the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s jurisdiction. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that there had been no removal or replacement of Judge Downing, but rather that his term had expired. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT did not clearly exceed its jurisdiction and the appeals were not receivable. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT also noted that it does...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT denied the request for an oral hearing on the basis that the factual and legal issues arising from the appeal were clearly defined and an oral hearing would not assist in the expeditious and fair disposal of the case. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT refused to consider information pertaining to a confidential settlement proposal made to the Appellant. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that while the absence of a response to a staff member¡¯s request may constitute an implied administrative decision, the absence of a decision without direct legal consequences is not an implied decision subject to judicial review. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that in the...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT agreed with the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT finding that it lacked jurisdiction in respect of the staff member¡¯s application to review the determination of the Second Alternate Chair. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that the subject matter jurisdiction of Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT is limited to the review of administrative decisions. The determinations of the Second Alternate Chair do not constitute administrative decisions, and as such, any application to review them before the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT is not receivable. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT highlighted that ST/SGB/2017/2/Rev.1 confers on the Ethics Office only the power to recommend, advise and refer, and Section 10.3 of ST/SGB/2017/2/...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT denied both applications. Regarding the application for interpretation, the Tribunal held that the Majority Judgment was clear and unambiguous in its meaning, leaving no confusion or reasonable doubt about its conclusions or reasons. The Tribunal found that it was a disguised way by the staff member to criticize or disagree with the Judgment. Regarding the application for revision, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT explained that the staff member did not identify a decisive fact that was unknown at the time of the Judgment. Instead, the staff member referred to events that occurred subsequent to the Judgment. As such...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT held that the application was receivable because the time limit for management evaluation had not yet expired and management evaluation was still pending. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT took note of the findings of the JAB Panel, which recommended suspension of action following the Applicant¡¯s request to this end dated 22 June 2009, and of the Deputy Secretary-General¡¯s memorandum by which such suspension was granted. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT noted that both the Panel and the Secretary-General came to the conclusion that the questioned decision was prima facie unlawful and that the Applicant¡¯s reassignment, if implemented, would...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT found that the applicant¡¯s case was limited to the amount of adequate compensation for the failure to adequately and timeously consider his complaint and that his other claims, including with respect to the termination of his appointment, were not properly before it. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT found that the Administration was required¡ªbut failed¡ªto undertake an adequate and timeous initial inquiry into the applicant¡¯s allegations. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT found that the applicant substantiated his claims of emotional distress and injury and must be compensated for it. However, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT found that the applicant failed to show that...

The Respondent submits that the contested decision was expressed in a letter dated 3 August 2001 and the claim is therefore time-barred as the Applicant¡¯s request for administrative review, dated 2 May 2005, was filed out of time. The Applicant avers that her application is receivable as the final decision subject to appeal was expressed in the letter of the High Commissioner for Human Rights dated 30 March 2005. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT found that the contested decision was made on 3 August 2001 and that the Applicant was notified of it, at the latest, on or before 15 April 2002. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT found that the Applicant...