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Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered the appeal, in which the Appellant contended that exceptional circumstances existed that would merit a waiver of the time limit, allowing his application to be admitted. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that, in such an instance, it is the applicant¡¯s responsibility to convince the tribunal of such circumstances. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT found that the Appellant did not overcome this hurdle before Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT and held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT did not err in rejecting the Appellant¡¯s contentions that he had exceptional circumstances. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT further held that ignorance of the law is no excuse and the Appellant¡¯s reliance on erroneous advice...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Appellant had failed to demonstrate that the contested decision had adverse effects on his terms and conditions of employment, in particular his health insurance and benefits. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Appellant had brought no relevant arguments to challenge Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s finding that there was no administrative decision within Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s jurisdiction being contested. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the appeal and affirmed the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judgment.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered Ms Comerford-Verzuu¡¯s appeal and the Secretary-General¡¯s cross-appeal, regarding whether Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT was correct in holding that the contested decision was dated 2 August 2005 and that the request for administrative review was time-barred. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT found that the OIOS reply of 2 August 2005 was the administrative decision of which Ms Comerford-Verzuu was seeking a review. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the subsequent correspondence was unwarranted and did not extend the time limit for seeking administrative review of the first administrative order. Accordingly, the time limit for seeking administrative...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered Ms Worsley¡¯s appeal and the Secretary-General¡¯s cross-appeal. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that there was no evidence that OSLA¡¯s decision to not represent Ms Worsley was based on her disability. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that Ms Worsley did not show how OSLA¡¯s actions affected her rights or her case, as she was simply repeating arguments that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT previously considered in its judgment. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the appeal and cross-appeal and affirmed the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judgment with regard to its decision that the right of staff members to receive assistance from OSLA does not amount to a right to be represented by OSLA.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Appellant had neither standing to challenge a decision which he alleged did not comply with the stipulations of his service contract nor the right to request the implementation of an arbitration procedure before Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT. However, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT had committed an error in concluding that the Appellant had manifestly abused the process. The appeal was partially upheld and the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judgment partially vacated regarding the payment of USD 500.00 for abuse of procedure.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Appellant¡¯s application was submitted to Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT after the expiration of the response period; the response period began on the date on which she received a letter from the Management Evaluation Unit informing her that her request for a management evaluation was not receivable because, as a judge, she was not a staff member or a former staff member within the meaning of the Staff Rules. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Appellant¡¯s claims that the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judge erred on a question of fact, by considering the letter as the decision that concluded the management evaluation, and that it erred on a...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered Mr Al Sayyed¡¯s appeal and found that the decision to terminate his service, effective from close of business 15 December 2007, and as communicated to him on 30 November 2007, was superseded by the action he took on 4 December 2007, an action reinforced by him on 7 January 2008. Under these circumstances, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA did not err in dismissing Mr Al Sayyed¡¯s appeal against his termination on the basis that there was no termination decision capable of review. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the appeal.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that only circumstances beyond an applicant¡¯s control that prevented them from timely exercising the right of appeal may be considered ¡°exceptional circumstances,¡± justifying a waiver of the statutory time limit. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that an applicant¡¯s initial mistaken belief that decisions were lawful cannot be deemed to constitute exceptional circumstances justifying a waiver of the time limit to appeal those decisions, especially when they had every means of obtaining information from the Administration. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT was not persuaded by the Appellant¡¯s arguments upon appeal and did not find any...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that, given the absolute restriction on its judicial discretion with respect to time limits, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT ought not to have entered into a review of the possible existence of exceptional circumstances justifying an extension of the time limit. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the complaint was filed beyond the time limit for administrative review or management evaluation and beyond the threshold for receivability established by the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s Statute and Rules of Procedure. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the appeal.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Appellant had not established any error in fact or law emerging from the impugned judgment. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that the Appellant did not challenge the competitive procedure¡¯s final administrative act since he only began to contest the Administration¡¯s actions when the selected candidate was laterally moved, and another rostered candidate was appointed as a replacement. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Appellant¡¯s rights as a staff member were linked to the administrative decision that completed the selection procedure and that, as such, any breach of his rights could only be caused by that...