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As preliminary matters, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that: (1) an oral hearing would not assist in the expeditions and fair disposal of the case, noting that the issues of jurisdiction and receivability did not require oral testimony and argument for the fair disposal of the appeal; (2) an order for production of documents was not necessary; (3) the Registry would provide an Arabic translation of the judgment; and (4) the Appellant¡¯s in-session motion, viewed by Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT as a veiled motion for additional pleadings and a request for adjournment, was denied for lack of exceptional circumstances, noting that the...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Appellant simply put forward several general complaints related to the alleged merits of her case but did not argue that the judgment was defective or that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA DT committed an error in deciding that her application was not receivable. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the appeal and affirmed the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA DT judgment.

On the question of the non-renewal of appointment, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT correctly concluded that (1) the Appellant¡¯s application was non-receivable ratione materiae, as he had not submitted a request for management evaluation, and (2) that the Appellant¡¯s request for assistance from the Ombudsman did not constitute a request for management evaluation (and that even it did, it would have been time-barred). On the ¡°decision¡± of the Administration to place adverse material in the Appellant¡¯s official status file and to block him from being rehired, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held there was no final, appealable...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT recalled its jurisprudence that where a response to a management evaluation request is not received, a staff member has 90 days from when the response is due to file an application to Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT. If a response is received after the expiration of that 90-day time limit, the receipt of the response does not reset the clock for filing an application with Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that, since the MEU¡¯s response was received after the expiration of the 90-day period, it did not reset the clock for the staff member to file an application. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT therefore initially made no error of law in...

Following an appeal by the Appellant and the Secretary-General, there was a further cross-appeal by the Appellant. As a preliminary issue, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the Appellant¡¯s cross-appeal as not receivable since the Appellant has already had the opportunity to file his own independent appeal and the cross-appeal seemed to be an attempt to complement his appeal. On the Secretary-General¡¯s appeal in Case No. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT/NBI/2015/095 related to the issue settlement agreement, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT erred on a matter of law on the receivability of the application, since it based its finding on the merits as a...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Appellant¡¯s request for management evaluation was time-barred and that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT correctly ruled that his application was not receivable ratione materiae. Whilst the Appellant could and did request further information about the recruitment exercise, such request did not in any way impact the statutory time limit contained in Staff Rule 11. 2(c). In addition, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the additional evidence the Appellant sought to submit on appeal bore no relevance to the case and rejected his request. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the appeal and affirmed the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judgment.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Appellant had demonstrated no exceptional circumstances which would justify Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT exercising its discretion to file additional pleadings. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that an application before Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT without a prior request for management evaluation can only be receivable if the contested administrative decision has been taken pursuant to advise from a technical body, or if the administrative decision has been taken at Headquarters in New York to impose a disciplinary or non-disciplinary measure pursuant to Staff Rule 10.2 following the completion of a disciplinary process. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Appellant was not a staff member, as he was not supported by the Secretary-General in terms of Staff Regulation 4. 1 and was not subject to the Secretary-General¡¯s authority, but rather he was elected by the General Assembly. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT did not err in dismissing the application as not receivable ratione personae. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT correctly distinguished ILOAT judgment No. 3359, noting that the ILOAT¡¯s jurisdiction ratione personae is broader than Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s jurisdiction, in that it may be invoked by ¡°officials¡±, which includes judges. Noting that the current...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the appeal was entirely without merit. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT upheld the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT finding that the application was not receivable as the Appellant had waived the relevant right and therefore did not have standing. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT affirmed, albeit for different reasons, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s final legal conclusion that the Applicant¡¯s application was not receivable ratione materiae. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that there was no reviewable administrative decision in the Appellant¡¯s application. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT had no primary legal or factual basis from which it could conclude that the Applicant had properly sought judicial review of a...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an appeal by the Secretary-General. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT exceeded its competence in reviewing Mr Omwanda¡¯s EOD date, as it was not subject to a timely request for management evaluation. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Mr Omwanda knew or ought to have known from his Letter of Appointment the date from which his appointment was effective, that he had been re-employed, not reinstated, and that its terms applied regardless of any period of former service. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT was statutorily barred from hearing Mr Omwanda¡¯s application. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT upheld the appeal and vacated the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judgment.