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Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered a writ of mandamus from Ms Wesslund, who requested that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT order Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT to accept her applications. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that because it did not have inherent or original jurisdiction outside its capacity as an appellate body, it considered the motion for writ of mandamus to be an appeal against Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT Order No. 100 (NY/2013). Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the appeal was received beyond the deadline for appeal. Noting that Ms Wesslund did not apply to Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT for an extension or waive of the applicable time limits, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the appeal of the Order was not receivable ratione temporis. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the exclusion of the right to appeal a decision to suspend the execution of an administrative decision constitutes an exception to the general principle of the right to appeal and must, therefore, be narrowly interpreted; Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the exception applied only to jurisdictional decisions ordering the suspension of an administrative decision pending management evaluation. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that no jurisdictional decision, which, as in matter before it, ordered the suspension of a contested administrative decision for a period beyond the date on which the management evaluation was...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an application for revision of judgment No. 2010-Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT-084 filed by the estate of Mr Sanwidi. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the estate of Mr Sandwidi did not present new evidence but merely expressed disagreement with the judgment. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT denied the application for revision.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered Mr El Khatib¡¯s application for revision of judgment No. 2011-Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT-142. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Mr El Khatib did not identify any fact unknown at the time of the impugned judgment which could justify its review. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that what he actually sought was a discussion of the amount of compensation awarded to him, an option not granted by the Statute. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the petition did not meet the statutory requirements. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the application for revision.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered Mr Elguindi, Ms Onogi and Ms Sheryda¡¯s separate appeals. With respect to Mr Elguindi¡¯s claim, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT did not find that the manner in which Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵJSPF apportioned his monthly pension sum to be unreasonable, capricious or an abuse of discretion. With respect to Ms Onogi¡¯s claim of procedural defects, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT was not persuaded that there were procedural flaws on the part of Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵJSPF such as to render the exercise of its discretion unreasonable or unlawful. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT also did not find merit in Mr Elguindi¡¯s claim of ¡°double-dipping¡± in his opposition to Ms Onogi¡¯s claim for relief from Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵJSPF...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered Mr Al-Mulla¡¯s application for revision of judgment No. 2012-Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT-226. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that the application for revision was signed more than six months beyond the time limit. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the application for revision.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that only circumstances beyond an applicant¡¯s control that prevented them from timely exercising the right of appeal may be considered ¡°exceptional circumstances,¡± justifying a waiver of the statutory time limit. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that an applicant¡¯s initial mistaken belief that decisions were lawful cannot be deemed to constitute exceptional circumstances justifying a waiver of the time limit to appeal those decisions, especially when they had every means of obtaining information from the Administration. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT was not persuaded by the Appellant¡¯s arguments upon appeal and did not find any...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an appeal limited to the claim that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT ordered inadequate compensation for the losses he sustained as a result of various acts and omissions on the part of the Administration. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT found that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT took due regard for the arguments the Appellant brought in his appeal and that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT, having regarded the parameters of what it could compensate the Appellant for, made adequate provisions for the Appellant¡¯s economic and social losses in its overall award to him. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the appeal and upheld the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judgment.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an appeal by the Secretary-General. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the payment of interest awarded by Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT on the payment of Mr Ahmed¡¯s accrued vacation days was undue, noting that any delay in the separation formalities was entirely attributable to him and, as such, he could not be compensated for the delay in payment. On the compensation in lieu of notice, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT upheld the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judgment and held that the matter was properly before Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT and could not be construed as res judicata. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT agreed with Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT that the Administration made a commitment to pay Mr Ahmed compensation in lieu of notice and...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered the Applicant¡¯s application for revision of judgment No. 2012-Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT-209. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the request filed by the Applicant constituted a disguised way to criticise the judgment or to expose grounds to disagree with it, a recourse against a final judgment that is not provided for in the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT Statute. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the issuance of another judgment during the same session as which the Applicant¡¯s case was decided did not constitute a new fact, but rather law and that there was no possibility for a revision based on law. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the application was submitted almost one year...