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As a preliminary matter, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT rejected an application by the Staff Union of the ICTY for leave to file a friend-of-the court brief under Article 17 of its Rules of Procedure on the scope of review of the Secretary-General¡¯s decision in disciplinary proceedings and the standard of proof in disciplinary proceedings, on the basis that the facts and legal issues were not so complex that the brief would assist it. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT, in exercising judicial review, may interfere with the exercise of the Secretary-General¡¯s discretion in disciplinary proceedings against a staff member on the ground...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that there was no dispute that the Appellant had a fixed-term appointment, which had no expectancy of renewal or of conversion to any other type of appointment. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT had correctly dismissed most of the allegations brought by the Appellant since he had failed to raise them in a request for administrative review or management evaluation. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the appeal and affirmed the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judgment.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT affirmed that the circumstances of the allegation of unsatisfactory conduct in the present case created the obligation to initiate a preliminary investigation. However, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT erred in awarding damages to Mr Abboud while finding that he had not suffered any economic loss and that no actual damage existed. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT rescinded the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s judgment to the extent that it awarded damages to Mr Abboud.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the investigation into the management and administrative practices in general or of disciplinary cases is usually a matter within the discretion of the Administration but may still be subject to judicial review. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that if a staff member is dissatisfied with the outcome of an administrative decision, they may request judicial review which may result in the affirmation or recission of the decision. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT erred in finding the application not receivable, as the Appellant challenged an administrative decision, claiming non-compliance with the terms of his...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an appeal by the Secretary-General limited to the question of compensation. On the issue of the Secretary-General¡¯s appeal being time-barred, as raised by Mr. Kasyanov, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s judgment on merits for the case was not a final judgment; while it made substantive findings, it left the issue of remedy to be resolved in the future. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judgment on merits only became final when Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT issued the judgment on compensation. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that, when the judgment on merits was appealed, a party could challenge the judgment on compensation and the judgment on...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an appeal against Order No. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT/NBI/O/2010/023 by the Secretary-General. Applying the principle that a party in whose favour a case has been decided is not permitted to appeal against the judgment on legal or academic grounds, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Order had no practical effect following the withdrawal of the request for suspension of action. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the appeal was moot as it was academic and sought an opinion regarding the issues raised in the appeal. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the appeal.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that it was open to Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT to consider the preliminary issue of whether the Appellant had legal standing even to challenge the administrative decision not to advertise the vacancies. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held there was no error in the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s decision that the Appellant was not entitled to contest the administrative decision since he was not an eligible candidate for any of the vacant posts. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Appellant had no stake in the administrative decision as his rights and terms were not affected by the fact that the posts were not advertised. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the appeal failed on the ground that...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that none of the reasons for the delay asserted by the Appellant justified a 17-month late appeal. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that it would consider only the time issues because the case was so clearly out of time. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that any alleged error by Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT in considering the merits was moot. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the appeal and affirmed the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judgment.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s judgment in Rosca was no longer good law, having been overruled by Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT in Costa. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that time limits prescribed for administrative review and management evaluation (in the new system) could not be waived under Article 8(3) of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT Statute, due to a specific prohibition in this respect contained in Article 8(4) of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT Statute, as interpreted by Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT in Costa and affirmed by Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the application was time-barred and the delay in filing could not be condoned. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the appeal and affirmed the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judgment.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT concurred with Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT that the case was time-barred and not receivable. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that, while the Appellant referred to an accident that prevented her from filing on time, she did not mention this to Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT and raised it for the first time before Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that, while Article 2. 5 of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT Statute allows it to admit further evidence in exceptional circumstances, it would not admit evidence that was known to the party and could have been presented to Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the appeal and affirmed the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judgment.