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Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered whether Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT erred in concluding that the decision not to renew the Appellant¡¯s appointment and to separate her from service on the basis that she failed to sign the letters of appointment containing the extensions of her fixed-term appointment was lawful. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that when a performance shortcoming is identified, remedial actions may be put in place and if the shortcoming is not rectified, a PIP shall be prepared. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT further noted that, in the absence of any explicit provision establishing otherwise, the rebuttal process does not have the effect of suspending the...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT found that the appeal raised significant questions of law about the power of the Organisation to unilaterally alter or reduce the compensation of staff members of the Organisation. For that reason, the President of Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT in terms of Article 10(2) of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT Statute elected to refer the appeal for consideration by the full bench of Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT recalled that an administrative decision is a unilateral decision of an administrative nature taken by the administration involving the exercise of a power or the performance of a function in terms of a statutory instrument, which adversely affects...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered the Secretary-General's appeal and the staff members¡¯ cross-appeal. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT first considered the receivability of the appeal and held that the applications were receivable because the contested decision would have an adverse impact on the staff members. With respect to the merits of the appeal, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that the salary entitlements of staff members are statutory in nature and may be unilaterally amended by the General Assembly. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT further noted that an individual loss caused by a unilateral variation of a validly concluded contract poses no legal obstacle to the exercise of...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered the Appellant¡¯s appeal, requesting that the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA DT judgment be vacated. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT agreed with Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA DT and upheld its findings that the Agency was entitled, under the provisions of paragraph 2 of FTI 01/2016, to fill the concerned post by means of a lateral transfer of current staff members. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT also agreed with, and upheld, the ruling that it was not within the remit of Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA DT to pronounce on the exercise of the Agency¡¯s discretion in deciding on the lateral transfers unless there is evidence that the discretion was exercised arbitrarily or unlawfully. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT found that there...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered the appeal and held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA DT¡¯s judgment was correct. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT found that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA DT did not err in holding that the Agency¡¯s decision to deny the Appellant a fifth year of SLWOP was both lawful and reasonable. Further, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Appellant did not establish any grounds of appeal in this regard. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT also reiterated that the Appellant did not have an unconditional right to EVR and that the Agency had duly considered his request in accordance with the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA Area Staff Rules and other relevant administrative issuances. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT also held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA DT rightly rejected the...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered whether Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA DT correctly concluded that the application was non-receivable ratione materiae. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT found that the Appellant failed to reference the grounds of appeal he relied upon, pursuant to Article 2(1) of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT Statute. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that, because the Appellant did not identify the defects or grounds that rendered the impugned decision erroneous, the appeal must fail for this reason alone. In considering the rest of the appeal, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT also found that the Appellant knew, or reasonably should have known, that his allowance request had been refused since 2009. Moreover, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT referred to Article 2(1) of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT Statute and held that the Appellant did not show any errors in the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA DT judgment and her claims on appeal could not succeed. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT further found no fault in Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA DT¡¯s finding that there was no retaliation against the Appellant and that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA DT did not err on a question of law or fact, resulting in a manifestly unreasonable decision, nor did it commit an error in procedure, such as to affect the decision of the case. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that it was within the discretion of the Agency to close the case against the PMO and that the Agency has no authority to...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered the Secretary-General's appeal, specifically as to whether Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA DT¡¯s decision to award special allowances for extra duties performed and compensation for moral damages was an error in law or fact, resulting in a manifestly unreasonable decision. With respect to the allowance for extra duties, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that it is settled in its jurisprudence that the Agency has discretionary powers to pay the special allowances, which must be exercised reasonably in accordance with their substantive legal requirements. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that there was no room for Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA DT to substitute its decision...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Appellant failed to challenge the decision that denied the reclassification of her post from a G-8 to a P-2 position within the deadlines of the ICAO Staff Rules 111. 1(7) and 111. 1(5), confirming AJAB¡¯s finding. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that there is no obligation of the ICAO Secretary-General to provide a staff member with guidance on the appeals procedure and to advise regarding the time limits. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that it does not have jurisdiction to address the merits of the claims the Appellant raises on appeal against the decision that her post was incorrectly classified at the G-8 level...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered the appeal. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA¡¯s disciplinary system provides that the Commissioner-General may only impose such disciplinary measures on current staff members. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT accordingly found that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA DT erred in finding that the Commissioner-General was entitled to impose the disciplinary measure of a fine after the Appellant¡¯s employment ended and held that the disciplinary measure had to be rescinded. With respect to the Appellant¡¯s request for compensation, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that it may only award compensation for harm in cases where the individual presented evidence, other than...