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Mr. Moulana appealed the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judgment.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵATnoted that the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT dismissed Mr. Moulana's application on the grounds of insufficient evidence, whereas he had not been afforded the opportunity to provide the evidence. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT, by failing to address the Appellant¡¯s requests for the production of documents, including ignoring his motion, violated the Appellant¡¯s due process rights and deprived him of the opportunity to have his motion assessed and possibly granted, following which he could have submitted the pieces of evidence which the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT found he failed to provide. Therefore...

The Commissioner-General appealed.

The Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that insofar as the Agency's decision of 25 April 2019 rejecting the request for an SPOA might not have been unequivocal, that decision was reiterated in the e-mail of 17 June 2019 leaving no doubt that the Agency had decided then to pay Ms. Abou Salah an SPOA of 15 per cent rather than 25 per cent, possibly in breach of her contract. The fact that other persons subsequently sought to intervene on her behalf did not change that.

The Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT found that Ms. Abou Salah¡¯s subsequent correspondence, as well as correspondence written on her behalf...

The Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an appeal by the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA staff members. The Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA DT was incorrect in finding that the reminder letters were not reprimands for the purposes of Appellants being able to challenge the letters¡¯ placement in their official status files. This was because such a reminder could not be considered a neutral action, but rather a warning of any possible disregard of the Agency¡¯s regulatory framework. The Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT found that to the eyes of an average person, such a reminder is undeniably akin to a reprimand.

The Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT agreed with the Appellants that there is no Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the appeal and affirmed the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA DT Judgment. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA DT correctly concluded that the decision-maker had not exercised his discretionary power properly, in that the Agency had unlawfully paid Ms. Jarallah an SPOA of 25 per cent instead of an SOA of 35 per cent which was stipulated in her contract of employment.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT found that a valid and binding contract of employment existed between Ms. Jarallah and the Agency. An integral part of Ms. Jarallah's letter of appointment was the Job Description contained in the vacancy announcement with a reference to the 35...

The Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT first concluded that the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT erred by failing to specify whether the alleged misconduct of sexual exploitation had been established to the required evidentiary standard of clear and convincing evidence. Second, the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT had erred in concluding that the victim was a vulnerable person, that Mr. Stefan was aware of her vulnerability, and that he sexually exploited her vulnerability. The Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT erred when it made this finding without any independent or medical evidence, and that the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT had relied on its own Internet research regarding various...

The Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the ICAO Appeals Board implemented internal changes in its law to satisfy the requirements of Article 2(10) of the Appeals Tribunal Statute. It found that the Appeals Board no longer provided only advice or mere recommendations to the ICAO Secretary General, but rather final decisions and, therefore, was a neutral first instance process. It further found that while it might have been open to ICAO to consider using the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT for resolution of staff member disputes, it was free not to do so and cannot be criticised for doing as it did. It concluded that the Appeals Board¡¯s...

The Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the JAB made considerable internal changes in its law to satisfy the requirements of Article 2(10) of the Appeals Tribunal Statute. It found that the JAB no longer provided only advice or mere recommendations to the ISA Secretary-General, but rather final decisions and, therefore, was a neutral first instance process.

The Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT found that the plain reading of the facts left no doubt that: i) at the time when the contested decision was taken, there was no willingness of abandonment of post by the Appellant; ii) despite his poor mental health condition that was medically...

The Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that there was no reason why the Appeals Tribunal should intervene and modify the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s findings, which were both reasonable and equitable. The Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that while the hiring of the casual workers was not part of Mr. Saleh¡¯s official duties, Mr. Saleh coordinated and supervised the work of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵHCR implementing partner which was responsible for hiring at the warehouse, and Mr. Saleh also had the function of overseeing the warehousing operations. Given these responsibilities, as well as his previous intense involvement in the setting up and management of the warehouse, which...

The Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT correctly found that Ms. Hanjoury was informed on 1 March 2020 that she no longer had FS-5 Administrative Assistant Roster status. This 1 March 2020 email was clear notification of her roster status and the latest date that Ms. Hanjoury knew or reasonably should have known of the challenged decision, based on objective elements that both parties could accurately determine. As a result, Ms. Hanjoury¡¯s request for management evaluation on 6 June 2021 was beyond the 60-day deadline and therefore her application to the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT was not receivable ratione materiae.

The...

The Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an appeal by Mr. Dahoud.

The Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA DT correctly found that the disability benefit paid to Mr. Dahoud in accordance with Area Staff Rule 109.7(1) was different from the termination indemnity paid to certain staff members in accordance with Area Staff Rule 109.9.

The Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT found that despite the Medical Board's conclusion that he had an 8 per cent permanent impairment, this does not necessarily lead to a finding of permanent and total disability, as required by Area Staff Rule 109.7(7), so as to receive the supplemental benefit. Nor does this medical...