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Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an appeal by the Secretary-General limited to the question of compensation. On the issue of the Secretary-General¡¯s appeal being time-barred, as raised by Mr. Kasyanov, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s judgment on merits for the case was not a final judgment; while it made substantive findings, it left the issue of remedy to be resolved in the future. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judgment on merits only became final when Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT issued the judgment on compensation. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that, when the judgment on merits was appealed, a party could challenge the judgment on compensation and the judgment on...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT, applying Bertucci (2010-Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT-062), rejected as not receivable an interlocutory appeal against Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s decision that the determination by the Ethics Office, that no retaliation occurred, constituted an administrative decision falling within Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s jurisdiction. The alleged lack of jurisdiction of Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT was not clearly established in this case: the question of whether there was an administrative decision required adjudication on the merits of the case and could not be the subject of an interlocutory appeal. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT further held that the appeal against Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s order for production of the OIOS...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s decision on an Appellant¡¯s request to suspend, waive or extend deadlines is not a judgment made in respect of an appeal against an administrative decision, within the meaning of Article 2 of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT Statute, since no appeal had yet been filed. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held, therefore, that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s decision on the Appellant¡¯s request of extension could not be appealed. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the appeal and affirmed the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judgment.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT concurred with Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT that the case was time-barred and not receivable. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that, while the Appellant referred to an accident that prevented her from filing on time, she did not mention this to Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT and raised it for the first time before Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that, while Article 2. 5 of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT Statute allows it to admit further evidence in exceptional circumstances, it would not admit evidence that was known to the party and could have been presented to Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the appeal and affirmed the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judgment.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that when the new system was created, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT was not given powers to hear a matter already finally decided by the former Administrative Tribunal. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT accordingly held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT was correct in finding that it did not have the power to review the decision of the former Administrative Tribunal. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT further held that the Appellant exhausted her avenues of appeal and that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT correctly found that it had no jurisdiction to hear another appeal. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the appeal and affirmed the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judgment.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered whether the impugned decision was a contestable administrative decision. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that what constitutes an administrative decision will depend on the nature of the decision, the legal framework under which the decision was made, and the consequences of the decision. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the requirement for Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵ Office at Nairobi (Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵON) staff members to possess MIP cards or a Grounds Pass in order to access medical services on credit was for the overall effective administration of the Organisation¡¯s staff medical insurance plan. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that this requirement was of general...

The Secretary-General claimed that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT had no power to award interest. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT found that both Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT and Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT have the power to award interest in the normal course of ordering compensation. The very purpose of compensation is to place the staff member in the same position he or she would have been in had the Organisation complied with its statutory obligations. In many cases, interest will be by definition part of compensation. To say that the tribunals have no jurisdiction to order the payment of interest would, in many cases, mean that the staff member could not be placed in the same position...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Appellant failed to explain how Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT exceeded or failed to exercise its jurisdiction or competence, erred on a question of law or procedure, or erred on a question of fact, resulting in a manifestly unreasonable decision. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT recalled that the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT Statute precluded Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT from suspending or waiving the deadlines for management evaluation. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT was therefore correct in concluding that the application was not receivable and to reject it on that basis. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the appeal and upheld the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT Judgment.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Appellant had only presented arguments challenging the Administration¡¯s behaviour and the decision to terminate her contract with Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵMIK. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Appellant had failed to demonstrate how Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT, by judging the application not receivable and dismissing it on this ground, could have exceeded its jurisdiction, failed to exercise it, made an error of law or procedure, or made an error of fact that resulted in a manifestly unreasonable decision. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT had correctly dismissed the application as not receivable since the request for administrative review had...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the appeal was not filed untimely and was, therefore, receivable. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that, whatever the gravity of the irregularity committed by the Administration and the number of points obtained by the Applicant in the 2007 promotion session, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT did not commit an error in providing that the High Commissioner could decide to pay compensation rather than execute the rescission order. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT, in setting the amount of compensation at 8,000 Swiss francs, did not make a manifest error. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held, concerning the conclusion that compensation should be paid for moral damages...