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Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an appeal by the Secretary-General against the judgment on the merits (Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT/2011/054) and two further appeals by both the Secretary-General and the Applicant of the judgment on compensation (Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT/2011/131). Relying on its previous holding in Bertucci (2011/Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT/114), Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT erred in finding that the Administration violated the Applicant¡¯s due process rights, as no actual prejudice was found. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the established facts, as admitted by the Applicant, clearly demonstrated that he engaged in the sexual harassment of local employees and used his position of...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Appellant had failed to demonstrate that the contested decision had adverse effects on his terms and conditions of employment, in particular his health insurance and benefits. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Appellant had brought no relevant arguments to challenge Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s finding that there was no administrative decision within Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s jurisdiction being contested. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the appeal and affirmed the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judgment.

The Secretary-General appealed and Mr Marsh filed a cross-appeal, challenging the legality of the interview process and the compensation award. With respect to the first issue, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT found that the records showed a proper and professional proceeding during the interviews and the report of its outcome was based on evaluations objectively motivated, and Mr Marsh was accorded the objective consideration and equal treatment to which all candidates are entitled. With respect to the second issue, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that not every violation of due process will necessarily lead to an award of compensation...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that there was no valid claim of unfair treatment and discrimination by the Appellant against the former Chief of ATS and Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT therefore correctly limited its consideration to the interview process. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Appellant was merely repeating arguments that were adequately considered by Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT and that there were no reasons to reverse Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s judgment. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the appeal and affirmed the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judgment.

The Appellant contested the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT finding that he was afforded full and fair consideration for the position of Chief and argued that he suffered unfair and discriminatory treatment. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that if the Administration does not comply with a Tribunal¡¯s order to disclose the reasons for an administrative decision, as such, the Tribunal cannot automatically conclude that the decision was arbitrary, but it is entitled to draw an adverse inference from the refusal. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT affirmed the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT finding that the Administration¡¯s decision must be deemed unlawful, as the Secretary-General refused to comply...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT was correct in finding that the statement dated 26 November 2003 was neither a decision to terminate the Appellant¡¯s appointment nor a disciplinary measure. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the statement was merely a publicly stated opinion which had no legal consequences on the Appellant who, in addition to having already been informed on 29 October 2003 that his contract would not be renewed beyond 30 November 2003, had also declared that he would not be able or willing to continue working for Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵODC after his contract expired. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT accordingly dismissed the appeal and affirmed the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered Ms Comerford-Verzuu¡¯s appeal and the Secretary-General¡¯s cross-appeal, regarding whether Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT was correct in holding that the contested decision was dated 2 August 2005 and that the request for administrative review was time-barred. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT found that the OIOS reply of 2 August 2005 was the administrative decision of which Ms Comerford-Verzuu was seeking a review. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the subsequent correspondence was unwarranted and did not extend the time limit for seeking administrative review of the first administrative order. Accordingly, the time limit for seeking administrative...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered the Appellant¡¯s appeal. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that, contrary to the Appellant¡¯s contention, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT was not required to ascertain whether the closure of the Centre was a consequence of mismanagement or of any other factor since the primary purpose was not to get rid of the Appellant. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT found that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT did not fail to exercise its jurisdiction by not ascertaining whether the closure of the Centre was the result of serious mismanagement and irregularities. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT also found that the Appellant failed to submit sufficiently clear and convincing evidence that the desire to retaliate against him...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an appeal by the Secretary-General. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held, in agreement with the Secretary-General, agreed that there were no grounds to award compensation. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that there was no administrative decision being contested in this case, as both parties accepted the decision to promote Ms Kamal and she had not identified any illegality that could lead to an award of compensation. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT found that the delay in completing the selection process could not be considered a valid ground for compensation, since the circumstances of the case did not show any negligence or violation of specific...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an appeal, in which the Appellant claimed that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT committed procedural errors in allowing the Secretary-General to embark on a de novo fact-finding inquiry and that the disciplinary measure of separation was disproportionate. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that it was within the competence of Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT to hold oral hearings as well as to order the production of evidence for fair and expeditious disposal of the proceedings. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Administration bears the burden of establishing that the alleged misconduct, for which a disciplinary measure has been taken against a staff member, occurred and...