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The Applicant became aware of her de-rostering in 2017 and it became apparent in 2020, after three years of enquiries that she was in fact de-rostered. She only requested management evaluation on 6 June 2021, several months beyond the 60-day deadline. The Tribunal also found that the impugned decision did not constitute an "administrative decision" as defined in United Nations Administrative Tribunal Judgment No. 1157, Andronov (2003). The change of rostering status complained of did not involve a final decision taken with direct legal consequences for the Applicant¡¯s rights and obligations...

The Tribunal recalls that there is a procedure to challenge administrative decisions which a staff member deems to be in violation of his or her contractual rights. The Applicant, who is represented by professional counsel, cannot bypass the applicable procedures to indirectly introduce decisions, which were not timely challenged, into these proceedings to argue that they form part of a pattern of abuse against her. To allow this tactic would result in an upset of the administrative legal order of the Organization. The Tribunal notes that Applicant disagrees with Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵICEF¡¯s evaluation of her...

The Tribunal concluded that the application was not receivable both ratione temporis and ratione materiae. With regard to ratione temporis, the Tribunal noted that the Applicant became aware of the contested decision on 31 May 2019. She then ought to have requested management evaluation by 30 July 2019. She however, submitted her request on 30 December 2019, five months late, and outside the 60-day period. The Tribunal thus held that her request for management evaluation was time-barred and therefore, the application was not receivable. The Tribunal emphasized that it was not competent to...

The Tribunal concluded that based on the Applicant¡¯s admission and testimonies of other witnesses during the investigation and at the hearing, it had been established by clear and convincing evidence that the Applicant physically assaulted another staff member on 20 March 2016. On whether the facts amounted to misconduct, the Tribunal found that the Applicant¡¯s action violated staff rule 1.2(g) and constituted workplace harassment, which is prohibited by staff rule 1.2(f). Accordingly, the Applicant¡¯s action amounted to misconduct. With regard to whether the sanction was proportionate to the...

The act of cheating in which the Applicant engaged did not necessitate the use of her Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDP email address. Therefore, the use of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDP email address is a distinct and separate from assisting AA in cheating. Considering that the Applicant was a senior staff member, that she had a personal interest in the outcome of the tests in that the person she assisted was her partner, and that the assistance that she provided was significant as she provided AA with full written answers to the test questions, which he then almost completely copied and submitted, the nature and gravity of the Applicant¡¯s...

Concerning the corrective measures: To the extent that the fact-finding panel¡¯s investigation resulted in a finding of actions on the part of the Applicant that called for corrective measures in the form of training and counselling, the Respondent¡¯s actions were procedurally proper. The cautionary corrective measure of providing training and counselling for the Applicant was appropriately taken in accordance with ST/SGB/2008/5 in circumstances where, although there was no misconduct, the Applicant¡¯s manner of performing his duties caused a staff member to feel harassed. Concerning the decision...

Therefore, the facts resulting from this investigation were not established to a sufficient standard that would permit the Administration to later rely on them to act against the Applicant once he became a staff member. Accordingly, the Tribunal is not satisfied that Administration acted as a reasonable decision maker in deciding to terminate the Applicant¡¯s fixed-term appointment and finds the contested decision unlawful and decides to rescind it. The contested decision is rescinded. Under art. 10.5(a) of its Statute, the Respondent may elect to pay the Applicant compensation in lieu of the...

If the scope of understanding of what the mandatory enrollment-related fees are under sec. 3.1(a) were to be limited in accordance with the Respondent¡¯s submissions, this should therefore have been reflected in the relevant legal framework. This is, however, not the case. Under the plain meaning rule, if the Respondent, namely the Secretary-General, wants the situation to be regulated as contended by his Counsel, this should therefore also clearly and unambiguously follow from the relevant legal framework, in particular ST/AI/2018/1/Rev.1, which the Secretary-General has promulgated himself...

It follows from the case record that the reasons for rejecting the Applicant¡¯s return-to-work plan on 13 May 2019 were only presented to the Applicant in the Respondent¡¯s reply submitted by Counsel for the Respondent. This was evidently a procedural error. The scope of this irregularity was exacerbated by the statutory requirement of sec. 2.2 of ST/SGB/2019/3, which demands ¡°the manager ¡­ to establish that the requested accommodations represent a disproportionate or undue burden on the workplace¡± (italics added). The Applicant¡¯s manager was not Counsel for the Respondent before the Dispute...

The Tribunal found that the Applicant had not satisfied his burden of proof to show through clear and convincing evidence that his separation was unfair and that the Administration did not violate any term of the Applicant¡¯s contract of employment. The Applicant challenged the fact that he was separated on ground of retrenchment before the General Assembly had approved the Budget to abolish his post. The record showed that this issue was already adjudicated upon in favour of the Applicant under Order No. 086 (NBI/2019). In accordance with the Tribunal¡¯s earlier final finding on the matter, it...