Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵ

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT erroneously awarded the Appellant moral damages because she did not produce any corroborating evidence to support the contention that harm had occurred. However, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the award for moral damages would stand since the Secretary-General had not appealed the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judgment. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that there is no corroborating evidence to support the Appellant¡¯s claim for damages to ¡°restore her professional, physical and emotional suffering¡± and for ¡°irregularities and ignorance. ¡± The appeal could not succeed on those claims. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT also held that a referral for accountability is...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered the content of the Appellant¡¯s appeal, the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA DT judgment, and the Appellant¡¯s request for compensation for material and moral damages and costs. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT found that the Appellant¡¯s appeal was defective in that it failed to identify any of the five grounds of appeal set out in Article 2(1) of the Statute as forming the legal basis of his appeal. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT also held that there was no error in the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA DT¡¯s findings that the Administration¡¯s decision not to confirm the Appellant¡¯s appointment was solely based on his performance and that his allegations of harassment and discrimination...

The only issue in contention in this appeal is whether the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT erred on a question of law or fact when it found that the harm to the Appellant was sufficiently evidenced to justify an award of compensation for moral damages. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT found that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT based the award of compensation for harm both on the evidence produced by the individual and what it described as ¡°pre-existing distress that the individual was already suffering from¡± which ¡°was exacerbated by the unlawful decision to refuse his request¡± to investigate the allegations of discrimination. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT was to determine whether Mr. Kebede...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an appeal by the staff member arguing that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT erred in not awarding compensation in lieu of remand to ABCC as an alternative remedy. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT found no error in the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judgment not awarding in-lieu compensation. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that since the Secretary-General concurred with the remand in question, the claim became moot. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that a claim of gross negligence against the Administration is a separate action that could not be included in this claim. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Appellant had not demonstrated that the delay had any impact on her physical or mental well-being, rejecting her...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an appeal by the Secretary-General. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that there was no sufficient evidence before Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT to justify its findings of ¡°moral injury¡±. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT erred when it awarded compensation on a claim of ¡°moral injury¡± without the support of evidence, apart from the testimony of the Appellant. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT upheld the appeal and vacated the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judgment regarding the award of compensation for moral harm.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered the Secretary-General's appeal, specifically as to whether Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA DT¡¯s decision to award special allowances for extra duties performed and compensation for moral damages was an error in law or fact, resulting in a manifestly unreasonable decision. With respect to the allowance for extra duties, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that it is settled in its jurisprudence that the Agency has discretionary powers to pay the special allowances, which must be exercised reasonably in accordance with their substantive legal requirements. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that there was no room for Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA DT to substitute its decision...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered the Appellant¡¯s appeal, requesting compensation for moral damages, compensation for costs for legal representation, and request for interest. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT referred to Article 9(1)(b) of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT Statute, which states that compensation may only be awarded for harm suffered that is supported by evidence. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT agreed with the ICJ Registrar that the ICJ was not responsible for the delays, but rather demonstrated good faith in bringing about an arrangement favourable to the Appellant. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT accordingly rejected the Appellant¡¯s request for compensation. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT also referred to Article 9(2) of...

Both parties appealed. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT erred by finding a valid contract of employment between Ms Al Hallaj and ESCWA since no letter of appointment was issued, only an offer of employment. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that a quasi-contract was formed, considering that Ms Al Hallaj had unconditionally accepted and had fully fulfilled all the conditions specified in the offer of employment. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT agreed with Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT that the ESCWA Administration committed two major errors, in breach of its quasi-contractual obligations. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the ESCWA Administration failed in its due diligence to specify clearly and...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the ICJ had breached its duty to protect the staff member against harassment by another staff member. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that, once senior management had become aware of the incidents, it should have envisaged that similar incidents could happen in the future, and it failed to take the appropriate measures to protect its staff. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT awarded USD 12,500 to compensate the staff member for the harm suffered, and especially the harm to her reputation during the course of the investigations. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT also awarded 3,630 Euros in legal fees.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered both an appeal from the Secretary-General and an appeal from Mr Ross. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered Mr Ross¡¯s request for consideration by a full bench and held that he had no standing to make such a request and that the case did not raise any significant question of law in relation to the evidentiary standard of proof of moral damages. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that any irregularity (procedural or substantive) in promotion cases will only give rise to an entitlement to rescission or compensation if the staff member has a significant or foreseeable chance for promotion. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT did not err...