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Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT upheld the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT ruling that the 2010 decisions were time-barred and not receivable ratione temporis. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT acted ultra vires or in excess of its competence and jurisdiction by considering whether the Appellant had shown exceptional circumstances justifying a waiver of the filing deadline, and thus held that the relevant paragraphs of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judgment were obiter dicta and should be stricken. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT erred in holding the Appellant¡¯s motion or request for waiver of the deadline as not receivable ratione temporis on the basis that while it was not timely, that did...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT rejected the request for an oral hearing. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that there was no merit in the Appellant¡¯s claim that he should be considered a Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵ staff member because he worked with Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵOPS for over three years. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT concluded that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT correctly decided that the application was not receivable ratione personae. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the appeal and affirmed the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judgment.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Appellant was not a staff member, as he was not supported by the Secretary-General in terms of Staff Regulation 4. 1 and was not subject to the Secretary-General¡¯s authority, but rather he was elected by the General Assembly. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT did not err in dismissing the application as not receivable ratione personae. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT correctly distinguished ILOAT judgment No. 3359, noting that the ILOAT¡¯s jurisdiction ratione personae is broader than Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s jurisdiction, in that it may be invoked by ¡°officials¡±, which includes judges. Noting that the current...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Appellant did not fall under any of the categories of potential applicants and had no legal standing before Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that, accordingly, the Appellant had no standing before Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT and therefore Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT had no competence to address the merits of her claims. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the appeal and affirmed the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judgment.

On the termination decision, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT affirmed Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s decision that an individual contracted under an ICA was not a staff member and therefore had no standing before Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT referred the matter of the lack of judicial recourse for individual contractors to the attention of the President of the General Assembly for consideration and possible action. On the decision to recover monies, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that, while management evaluation was not required to appeal the imposition of a disciplinary measure, such an argument was not valid in this case because the recovery of monies was not a disciplinary...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an appeal by Mr. Rugerinyange. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that Mr. Rugerinyange sought to challenge an administrative decision directly affecting the terms of his new contract as an individual contractor. Therefore, even if the administrative decision of placing him on administrative leave with pay referred to facts which had occurred while he was still a staff member, as he claimed, it affected the new contract and his new capacity as an independent contractor. As such, he had no legal standing before the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT. Accordingly, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the appeal and affirmed the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT Order.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an appeal by the Secretary-General. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Secretary-General was correct to bide his time and to await the outcome on the merits before determining whether an appeal was necessary. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the appeal of the Secretary-General was not time-barred. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT erred in concluding that Mr. Arango was a former staff member for the purposes of founding jurisdiction over the instant application: At the time of the contested decision not to select him Mr. Arango had been separated from service for more than two years, was no longer a staff member in the...

The Tribunal noted that the case was one of the cases provided for under Section 4.2 of ST/SGB/2009/11 on transitional measures. At the outset, the Tribunal declared the application irreceivable with respect to any claim which had not been raised previously in the request for review to the Secretary-General. The Tribunal further raised ex officio the issue of the receivability ratione personae of the application since the decision not to select the Applicant to the post was taken when the Applicant was a former staff member. The Tribunal noted that article 3, paragraph 1 (b), of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT...

Paragraph 19 of the APPC Procedural Regulations of June 2006 states that only staff members who have served for a minimum of one year in their post are eligible to apply for vacancies. The Applicant claims that the contested decision dated 29 February 2008 to appoint 12 staff members to vacant posts affects her rights since these vacant posts were not advertised. However, in accordance with the above-mentioned provision, at the time the 12 staff members were appointed, the Applicant was not eligible to any of these posts as she had been appointed only in September 2007. Therefore, without it...

Paragraph 19 of the APPC Procedural Regulations of June 2006 states that only staff members who have served for a minimum of one year in their post are eligible to apply for vacancies.The Applicant claims that the contested decision dated 29 February 2008 to appoint 12 staff members to vacant posts affects his rights since these vacant posts were not advertised. However, in accordance with the above-mentioned provision, at the time the 12 staff members were appointed, the Applicant was not eligible to any of these posts as he had been appointed only in September 2007. Therefore, without it...