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The Applicant addressed a letter dated 29 May 2009 to the Secretary-General requesting him to ¡°reverse that decision¡± but no mention was made of the non-renewal of the Applicant¡¯s contract because it was only on 30 June 2009 that the Applicant was informed that his contract would not be renewed beyond 30 September 2009. The Applicant sought to establish that he had in fact requested a review of the decision and referred to an email he had sent to the Registrar of the ICTR in which he informed him that he was contesting the decision not to renew his contract. That email was dated 27 April 2009...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT noted that it was established that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAMI decided not to renew the Applicant¡¯s appointment on the grounds of poor performance, while the appraisal performance procedure for the concerned staff member, at least for 2008/2009, had not been regularly completed. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT found that, in light of the case file, the decision under review appeared as prima facie illegal. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT found that the urgency for the Judge to rule on the Applicant¡¯s request was established since the implementation of the contested decision would result in the Applicant being excluded from the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵ staff as of 18 August 2009. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT...

The applicant¡¯s supervisor should have recused himself from the Management Review Group (MRG) that reviewed the performance reports to avoid conflict of interest. However, this procedural irregularity was mitigated by the subsequent report of the Rebuttal Panel. Outcome: Respondent to pay the applicant the equivalent of one-month net base salary for suffering and stress.

From the moment that the new Executive Secretary took up his functions at ESCWA, the Deputy Executive Secretary was no longer competent to decide, on 8 August 2007, to reassign the Applicant. Indeed, there is no documentary evidence that he had received delegation of authority from the Executive Secretary to take the contested decision, which is thus illegal. However, on 16 August 2007, the Executive Secretary confirmed the decision taken on 8 August 2007 by his Deputy. This new decision is legal but it does not have the effect of regularizing ex post facto the decision of 8 August 2007...

The Tribunal examined whether the application contained an administrative decision falling under the purview of Article 2.1 (a) of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT Statute. The Tribunal took the view that the decision taken by the administration to appoint an ad interim DCPM and to reallocate responsibilities and duties pursuant to that appointment was an administrative decision. Nevertheless, for the purposes of Article 2.1 (a) of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT Statute, the Tribunal stated that it is not sufficient for the Applicant to merely establish that an administrative decision was taken in the overall context of the position she...

Reassignments: Staff regulation 1.2 grants broad discretion to the Secretary-General in making reassignment decisions. However, such discretionary power is not unfettered: it is subject to respect for due process, and the absence of bias, discrimination, arbitrariness, or other extraneous motivations. While section 2.4 ST/AI/2006/3.Rev.1 envisages only lateral transfers to vacant posts, it does not preclude other kinds of transfer to be lawfully made. The decision contested in the present case does not contravene the said section 2.4, but falls beyond this provision¡¯s purview and, therefore...

The Tribunal found that there was no evidence that the transfer decision was arbitrary or based on improper motives. Administrative review/management evaluation: Requests for administrative review or management evaluation are mandatory first steps in the appeal process. In the case at hand, the only decision that was the subject of a request for management evaluation, and that is therefore properly before the Tribunal, is the decision to transfer the Applicant laterally from Cairo to Abu Dhabi. The Applicant¡¯s arguments regarding the unlawfulness of the decision to abolish his post and of...

Articles 2(1) and 2(1) (a) of the Statute of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT define a contract of employment to include ¡°all pertinent regulations and rules and all relevant administrative issuances in force at the time of the alleged non-compliance. There is nothing before the Tribunal to evidence that the Applicant signed any LOA in relation to the offer made by the organization to employ him on the terms defined in the reassignment memorandum dated 10 June 2008. The reassignment memorandum contained terms that were not certain, that were qualified and cannot therefore besaid to have been a final and binding...

Outcome: The Tribunal found that the Applicant¡¯s due process rights were observed by the Organization in its handling of the complaint and rejected the application in its entirety. The Tribunal found that the actions of the Organization in handling the complaint, both individually and in aggregate, met the requirements of due process.

The Applicant¡¯s alleged abuse of Buddy qualified as such conduct. Not returning the Applicant to the Canine Unit. It was proper not to return the Applicant to his former job after the disciplinary case against him had been dismissed. Not returning Buddy. Since Buddy was surrendered to the custody of the New York State Police, the United Nations would appear to have transferred back the property rights over Buddy to the New York State Police. Regardless of the outcome of the disciplinary case against the Applicant, it would therefore seem that the Respondent is not able to return Buddy to the...