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Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT did not commit any errors when it found that Ms. Wenz¡¯ application was irreceivable ratione materiae and that therefore, it did not have to address the question of whether the application was also irreceivable ratione temporis. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT correctly found that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵICEF¡¯s participation in mediation efforts did not automatically extend the time limit for filing a request for management evaluation. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT found no fault in the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s finding that the Secretary-General was not estopped from raising the issue of receivability. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the appeal and affirmed...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an appeal by the Secretary-General. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Secretary-General was correct to bide his time and to await the outcome on the merits before determining whether an appeal was necessary. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the appeal of the Secretary-General was not time-barred. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT erred in concluding that Mr. Arango was a former staff member for the purposes of founding jurisdiction over the instant application: At the time of the contested decision not to select him Mr. Arango had been separated from service for more than two years, was no longer a staff member in the...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA DT erred in law by not taking account of evidence implying strongly that there had been an administrative decision by Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA not to pay allowances to those who claimed them as their entitlement, and therefore concluding wrongly that there was no evidence of an administrative decision affecting the Appellant¡¯s rights. However, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA DT¡¯s Judgment dismissing the Appellant¡¯s claim had to be upheld on grounds of lateness of their request for management evaluation. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the appeals and upheld the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA DT Judgment.

The Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT did not err in deciding that Ms. Xing¡¯s candidacy was given a full and fair consideration, in finding that the administrative instruction on gender parity (ST/AI/1999/9) did not apply in this case, and in not granting Ms. Xing¡¯s request to amend her application. The Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT has not been shown to have erred in requiring credible evidence of a clear and compelling nature of Ms. Xing¡¯s allegations of ulterior motives, which was absent.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that, although the appeal was technically inadequate because the Appellants had failed to specifically identify the errors allegedly committed by the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA DT, it had previously recognised that if an appellant was not legally represented some latitude may be allowed in the interests of justice. Accordingly, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that it would review the merits of the appeal. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA DT erred on a question of fact that resulted in a manifestly unreasonable decision by failing to consider the full application and the question of when the Appellants received notification of the...

Mr. Hammond¡¯s appeal is defective, as it does not address the issue of receivability or the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s finding that his application contesting his 2016-2017 performance appraisal was not receivable. Mr. Hammond¡¯s application was not receivable as the reclassification decision was taken by the General Assembly. It is not erroneous to call the reclassification of Mr. Hammond¡¯s P-4 post to an FS-6 post a ¡°conversion¡± or an ¡°abolishment¡± because, in effect, this classification resulted in Mr. Hammond¡¯s P-4 being abolished and replaced by, or converted into, an FS-6 post.

The Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT erred in fact in concluding that the ABCC had solely and exclusively rested upon the MSD¡¯s medical report, and the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT exceeded its competence in stating that the time limit under Article 12 of Appendix D would only start to run from the moment when the psychological symptoms were so severe that the patient acknowledged that his/her syndrome no longer allowed him/her to fulfill his/her professional obligations. In the light of the facts that the Applicant was able to return to his high level of functioning at work after he had been transferred out of HATIS on 1 December 2013, that...

The impugned Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA DT Order clearly comes within its competence to issue appropriate case management orders. It did not exceed its competence or jurisdiction in issuing Order No. 123, and Mr. Zaqqout is not prevented from attacking the interlocutory order later if he appeals the final judgment of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA DT on the merits.

Contrary to the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s finding, Mr. Kollie¡¯s letter of 7 June 2007 to the ABCC cannot be regarded as a request under Article 17 of the Appendix D to convene a medical board and reconsider the Secretary-General¡¯s decision. Nor can the emails of 25/27 July 2017 and 24 August 2017 be regarded as a review of the 16 May 2017 decision of the Secretary-General or an administrative decision under Article 2(1)(a) of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT Statute. The emails of 25/27 July 2017 constituted an implied appealable decision by the ABCC to reject Mr. Kollie¡¯s claim for reimbursement of his out-of-pocket expenses. But...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that while the SAB may satisfy the requirements of a neutral first instance process, its decision is only advisory or recommendatory. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the facts did not disclose whether the Secretary-General of IMO had the power to amend the powers of the SAB retrospectively to permit the SAB to make a decision rather than a recommendation or, more pertinently, by subsequent fiat, to convert a recommendation of SAB into a decision. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the source of the Secretary-General¡¯s power to introduce interim measures was not clear and that there may be other constraints upon his...