Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵ

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s finding that the challenge to the decision by the Secretary-General not to waive Mr Dolgopolov¡¯s immunity was not receivable on the ground that it was an executive/political decision is incorrect. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held, however, that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT was correct in finding Mr Dolgopolov¡¯s applications not receivable, but for other reasons. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Mr Dolgopolov¡¯s applications were not receivable, because he did not refer the impugned decision regarding his request to sue the Ukrainian Ambassador to management evaluation, and the decision in respect of G-4 visa restrictions imposed by the...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT was not able to detect any errors in the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT Judgment, which is in accord with the consistent jurisprudence of Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT.

The evidence of procedural errors and irregularities supported the Dispute Tribunal¡¯s findings of fact that lead to the justifiable conclusion that, had the irregularities not occurred, Mr Russo-Got had a foreseeable and significant chance of selection given his qualifications. The approach adopted by Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT and by which Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT assessed Mr.; Russo-Got¡¯s chances of being selected for the post as one in five was reasonable. In the absence of errors of fact or law by Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT defers to its discretion in awarding and quantifying the pecuniary damages.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT erred in considering that the recruitment exercise was the same and the cancellation of RFR 104637 was just a preparatory step of the selection process because Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT ignored the difference in the requirements and in the legal framework applicable to those very distinctive ways of contracting and in which each of these contracts is deployed. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT also erred in fact when it found that certain Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT precedents were applicable to the present case because the facts in the present case are not materially identical to those in the cited Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT precedents.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s interpretation of the totality of the evidence on the record was reasonable. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT had correctly found that Mr Russo-Got was Candidate A for the P-3 test and Candidate F for the P-4 test and that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵOPS had submitted contemporaneous documentation showing that he was not recommended because he had failed the written assessment for the two tests. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT properly reviewed the contested decisions in accordance with the applicable law.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an application for revision of Judgment No. 2020-Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT-1008. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered Ms. Fosse¡¯s claim that SCBD/Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵEP is an organisational unit within the Secretariat, and as such, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT purportedly erred when it deemed her transfer to that unit in effect caused her to relinquish her lien on the Chief of OSS post, which is located within the Secretariat. However, the Tribunal reasoned Ms. Fosse¡¯s application was inter alia rejected by the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT because she had not submitted her claim for constructive dismissal for management evaluation. Therefore, in the absence of this jurisdictional...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT denied both applications. Regarding the application for interpretation, the Tribunal held that the Majority Judgment was clear and unambiguous in its meaning, leaving no confusion or reasonable doubt about its conclusions or reasons. The Tribunal found that it was a disguised way by the staff member to criticize or disagree with the Judgment. Regarding the application for revision, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT explained that the staff member did not identify a decisive fact that was unknown at the time of the Judgment. Instead, the staff member referred to events that occurred subsequent to the Judgment. As such...

Noting that an appeal against an interlocutory order would only be receivable in instances when it is clear and manifest that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT exceeded its jurisdiction or competence, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT actually rejected the Secretary-General¡¯s appeal on the basis that it was moot. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT had since disposed of the underlying case by Order No. 169; (NBI/2020) because the former staff never filed an application with the tribunal, even after being granted an extension.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT disagreed with Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT and found the procedure laid down in the Staff Regulations and Rules was not properly followed, as such the Secretary-General¡¯s exclusion of the staff member from the selection process was not legal, rational, procedurally correct, or proportionate. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT firstly held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT erred when it ruled that the invitation e-mail respected the advance notice requirement. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT reasoned that the day of the event (the receipt of the email) cannot be counted in computing the number of days required to give advance notice for a test. As such, by requiring at least five working...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT disagreed with Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA DT and found the supervisor¡¯s request to the Agency to grant the staff member a special allowance also constituted an implicit request from the staff member himself. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT reasoned that not only did the supervisor act upon the express request of the staff member when he sent the recommendation to the Agency, but it was also apparent and self-understood that both the staff member and the supervisor were a party to the process. Additionally, in this particular case, it is the staff member who followed up with the Agency regarding the status of the supervisor¡¯s request...