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Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT preliminarily held that the appeal was time-barred. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that even if the appeal was not time-barred, it would be dismissed on merits. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT was satisfied that the established facts showed that the Appellant engaged in misconduct warranting a disciplinary measure. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the imposed sanction was proportionate to the offence. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT further held that the Appellant did not demonstrate any violation of her due process rights. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the appeal and affirmed the impugned decision to demote the Appellant.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered the Appellant¡¯s appeal and found that she did not demonstrate that her request for an extension of time was reasonable. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT found that the evidence about negotiations being contemplated, needed, or underway was previously refuted on appeal. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that the Appellant had the time and the assistance of legal counsel to advance her application and did not avail herself of those opportunities. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT accordingly dismissed the appeal.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered the appeal and affirmed Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵJSPF¡¯s decision. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT found that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵJSPF submitted credible evidence that demonstrated that the Cameroon divorce decree was invalid and that the deceased at no time commenced proceedings to dissolve his marriage to his first wife apart from the USA divorce proceedings, which were terminated by his death. In drawing this conclusion, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT found it unnecessary to address the additional reliefs sought by the Appellant. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT accordingly affirmed Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵJSPF¡¯s decision to award the widow¡¯s benefit to the former staff member¡¯s first wife and denied all reliefs...

In reviewing the Appellant¡¯s appeal, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT found that the decision to terminate the Appellant¡¯s position was based on generalized reasons, as opposed to specific facts, and found no real justification for the decision. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that this was inconsistent with the jurisprudence of the former Administrative Tribunal, which provides that an Administration must act in good faith and not make decisions based on erroneous, fallacious, or improper motivation. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that when an administrative decision concerns termination, it shall set an amount of compensation that the respondent may elect to...

The former staff member appealed and Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered whether he could compel Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵICEF to pay to the Fund its contribution without making the corresponding contribution himself. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT found that, as the former staff member¡¯s secondment was with the World Bank, he should have availed himself of the provisions of Article 13 of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵJSPF Regulations relating to the transfer of pension rights and he failed to do so. Under these circumstances, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that if the former staff member made his own contribution to the Fund, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵICEF would have been duty-bound to make its corresponding contribution...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT confirmed the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵJSPB¡¯s interpretation of Article 24 of the Regulations to the effect that the 2007 amendment to Article 24 of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵJSPF Regulations only applies to staff members who prior to 2007 had been ineligible to restore previous contributory service. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held, therefore, that the amended Article 24 did not apply to the staff member as he had been eligible to restore previous contributory service but had failed to do so in a timely manner.

On appeal, the Appellant asserted that the Commissioner-General erred in not following the JAB¡¯s recommendation. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the JAB did not assess the totality of the evidence when making its recommendation. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT specifically held that the JAB¡¯s recommendation that no clear policy or instruction prevented the Appellant from giving the individual the authorization to use the DSA Facility did not take into account that there was a clear policy to inform his supervisors, which the Appellant failed to do. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT accordingly dismissed the appeal.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT stated that an Application for Interpretation is not receivable if its actual purpose is to have Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT re-examine its decision, even though its judgments are final and without appeal, or to have it comment on its decision. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the applications made under subparagraphs (a) to (g) of paragraph 30 of the appeal, with the purpose of either calling into question the decision or having Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT issue comments on the decision, were not receivable. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the use of the word ¡°annul¡± would not lead to confusion in the mind of a party in good faith because the language of...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered the Secretary-General¡¯s appeal. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that the exclusion of the right to appeal a decision on the suspension of action on an administrative is an exception to the general principle of law and must be narrowly interpreted. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that this exception can only be applied to jurisdictional decisions ordering the suspension of implementation of an administrative decision when a management evaluation is ongoing. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT accordingly held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT exceeded its competence when it ordered the suspension of the present action until the judgment on the merits of the Appellant¡¯s...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT referenced the Shanks jurisprudence (judgment No. 2010-Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT-026bis) where it held that the authority of a final judgment - res judicata - cannot be so readily set aside. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that there are only limited grounds as enumerated in Article 11 of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT Statute for review of a final judgment and an allegation of an error in law is not one of them. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the application to set aside and remand the previous judgment.