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Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Appellant¡¯s application was submitted to Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT after the expiration of the response period; the response period began on the date on which she received a letter from the Management Evaluation Unit informing her that her request for a management evaluation was not receivable because, as a judge, she was not a staff member or a former staff member within the meaning of the Staff Rules. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Appellant¡¯s claims that the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judge erred on a question of fact, by considering the letter as the decision that concluded the management evaluation, and that it erred on a...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Appellant had neither standing to challenge a decision which he alleged did not comply with the stipulations of his service contract nor the right to request the implementation of an arbitration procedure before Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT. However, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT had committed an error in concluding that the Appellant had manifestly abused the process. The appeal was partially upheld and the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judgment partially vacated regarding the payment of USD 500.00 for abuse of procedure.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT correctly stated that the former Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵ Administrative Tribunal considered and rejected all of the Appellant¡¯s other pleas and that for this reason, the matter of interest was res judicata. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT also noted that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT ordered the Secretary-General to make a payment of USD 25,000 as compensation for the excessive and inordinate delays and the emotional harm and to arrange for a Medical Board to consider outstanding invoices. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT found that, as the Secretary-General did not appeal, he had therefore accepted the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s decision and financial award. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s decision...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered Ms Worsley¡¯s appeal and the Secretary-General¡¯s cross-appeal. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that there was no evidence that OSLA¡¯s decision to not represent Ms Worsley was based on her disability. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that Ms Worsley did not show how OSLA¡¯s actions affected her rights or her case, as she was simply repeating arguments that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT previously considered in its judgment. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the appeal and cross-appeal and affirmed the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judgment with regard to its decision that the right of staff members to receive assistance from OSLA does not amount to a right to be represented by OSLA.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered a writ of mandamus from Ms Wesslund, who requested that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT order Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT to accept her applications. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that because it did not have inherent or original jurisdiction outside its capacity as an appellate body, it considered the motion for writ of mandamus to be an appeal against Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT Order No. 100 (NY/2013). Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the appeal was received beyond the deadline for appeal. Noting that Ms Wesslund did not apply to Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT for an extension or waive of the applicable time limits, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the appeal of the Order was not receivable ratione temporis. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an appeal limited to the claim that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT ordered inadequate compensation for the losses he sustained as a result of various acts and omissions on the part of the Administration. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT found that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT took due regard for the arguments the Appellant brought in his appeal and that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT, having regarded the parameters of what it could compensate the Appellant for, made adequate provisions for the Appellant¡¯s economic and social losses in its overall award to him. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the appeal and upheld the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judgment.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an application for revision of judgment No. 2010-Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT-084 filed by the estate of Mr Sanwidi. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the estate of Mr Sandwidi did not present new evidence but merely expressed disagreement with the judgment. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT denied the application for revision.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered Mr Elguindi, Ms Onogi and Ms Sheryda¡¯s separate appeals. With respect to Mr Elguindi¡¯s claim, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT did not find that the manner in which Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵJSPF apportioned his monthly pension sum to be unreasonable, capricious or an abuse of discretion. With respect to Ms Onogi¡¯s claim of procedural defects, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT was not persuaded that there were procedural flaws on the part of Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵJSPF such as to render the exercise of its discretion unreasonable or unlawful. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT also did not find merit in Mr Elguindi¡¯s claim of ¡°double-dipping¡± in his opposition to Ms Onogi¡¯s claim for relief from Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵJSPF...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered Mr El Khatib¡¯s application for revision of judgment No. 2011-Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT-142. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Mr El Khatib did not identify any fact unknown at the time of the impugned judgment which could justify its review. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that what he actually sought was a discussion of the amount of compensation awarded to him, an option not granted by the Statute. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the petition did not meet the statutory requirements. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the application for revision.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the exclusion of the right to appeal a decision to suspend the execution of an administrative decision constitutes an exception to the general principle of the right to appeal and must, therefore, be narrowly interpreted; Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the exception applied only to jurisdictional decisions ordering the suspension of an administrative decision pending management evaluation. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that no jurisdictional decision, which, as in matter before it, ordered the suspension of a contested administrative decision for a period beyond the date on which the management evaluation was...