Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered Mr Al-Mulla¡¯s application for revision of judgment No. 2012-Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT-226. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that the application for revision was signed more than six months beyond the time limit. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the application for revision.
Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that only circumstances beyond an applicant¡¯s control that prevented them from timely exercising the right of appeal may be considered ¡°exceptional circumstances,¡± justifying a waiver of the statutory time limit. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that an applicant¡¯s initial mistaken belief that decisions were lawful cannot be deemed to constitute exceptional circumstances justifying a waiver of the time limit to appeal those decisions, especially when they had every means of obtaining information from the Administration. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT was not persuaded by the Appellant¡¯s arguments upon appeal and did not find any...
Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an appeal by the Secretary-General. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the payment of interest awarded by Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT on the payment of Mr Ahmed¡¯s accrued vacation days was undue, noting that any delay in the separation formalities was entirely attributable to him and, as such, he could not be compensated for the delay in payment. On the compensation in lieu of notice, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT upheld the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judgment and held that the matter was properly before Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT and could not be construed as res judicata. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT agreed with Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT that the Administration made a commitment to pay Mr Ahmed compensation in lieu of notice and...
Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered the Applicant¡¯s application for revision of judgment No. 2012-Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT-209. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the request filed by the Applicant constituted a disguised way to criticise the judgment or to expose grounds to disagree with it, a recourse against a final judgment that is not provided for in the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT Statute. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the issuance of another judgment during the same session as which the Applicant¡¯s case was decided did not constitute a new fact, but rather law and that there was no possibility for a revision based on law. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the application was submitted almost one year...
Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that, given the absolute restriction on its judicial discretion with respect to time limits, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT ought not to have entered into a review of the possible existence of exceptional circumstances justifying an extension of the time limit. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the complaint was filed beyond the time limit for administrative review or management evaluation and beyond the threshold for receivability established by the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s Statute and Rules of Procedure. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the appeal.
Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT did not accept the argument that there was no evidence to indicate that the Appellant received the letter communicating the outcome of the management evaluation on 14 July 2011, noting that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT relied on the Appellant¡¯s statement to ascertain that date. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Appellant failed to show any error on Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s part. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Secretary-General rightly submitted that the deadline for the Appellant to file an application with Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT was 12 October 2011, notwithstanding any ambiguity as to when she actually received the management evaluation response and the appeal failed on...
Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an appeal by the Secretary-General. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that in such a case, where the material facts were not in dispute, no additional investigation was required to establish the misconduct. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT erred in law in finding that the investigative and disciplinary process had not been properly conducted and that Mr Ainte¡¯s due process rights had been violated by the absence of an official investigation. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Mr Ainte had not demonstrated that the Secretary-General failed in any other way to observe his due process rights. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Secretary-General was...
Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an application for revision of judgment. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the alleged error in the factual findings of Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT did not constitute circumstances that warranted revision, because none of them would result in the exclusion of the main reasons stated by Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT in vacating the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judgment and affirming Mr Massah¡¯s separation from service for serious misconduct. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the application was inadmissible since its goal was to litigate the case de novo as a result of counsel not agreeing with the final judgment, an option which was not provided to the parties by the applicable law...
Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered Mr Maghari¡¯s application for revision of judgment No. 2010-Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT-039. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the application was receivable ratione temporis. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the grounds filed did not fall within Article 11(1) of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT Statute and did not constitute a decisive fact which was, at the time the judgment was rendered, known to Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT and to the party applying for revision. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Mr Maghari merely disagreed with the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT decision and sought to reargue his appeal. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the application for revision.
Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an appeal by the Secretary-General limited to the matter of compensation. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the appeal had to be allowed in part because Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT erred in setting the compensation in lieu of reinstatement at two years¡¯ net base salary without considering that Mr Gakumba¡¯s previous fixed-term appointments were one year each. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the expectancy of renewal could not be fixed beyond such a period and therefore reduced the compensation to one year¡¯s net base salary. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT affirmed the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judgment on compensation for non-pecuniary damages and held that no error of law was...
