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Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an appeal by the Secretary-General and a cross-appeal by Mr Bertucci. Recalling that compensation in the absence of actual injury is without legal basis, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT erred in law. However, acceding in part to the cross-appeal by Mr Bertucci, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that when the disciplinary procedure does not bear out allegations against a staff member that may have been considered during a preliminary investigation, entitlements that may have been lawfully withheld pursuant to administrative instruction ST/AI/2004/3 must be paid in full, including interest. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the award...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an appeal by the Secretary-General limited to Case 2. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that it did not matter that the start date of the contract was not mentioned in the offer itself, as the emails showed that this date was clearly given as an essential condition for the offer and that it was only subject to minimal change. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT distorted the facts by failing to recognise that, in this case, the start date was an essential condition for the offer and that, by continuing to contest it, Mr Sprauten had never unconditionally accepted the offer made to him. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT committed...

i. Prima facie unlawfulness: The Tribunal found that prima facie unlawfulness had been established because the Applicant identified anomalies in the processes used by Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵON. ii. Particular urgency: The Tribunal noted that the selection decision had been communicated to the selected candidate by Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵON before the Applicant filed her application. As the contested decision had been implemented, the element of particular urgency had not been met. iii. Irreparable damage: The Tribunal found that the Applicant established irreparable damage in that there would be harm to her reputation and career...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT affirmed that the circumstances of the allegation of unsatisfactory conduct in the present case created the obligation to initiate a preliminary investigation. However, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT erred in awarding damages to Mr Abboud while finding that he had not suffered any economic loss and that no actual damage existed. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT rescinded the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s judgment to the extent that it awarded damages to Mr Abboud.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT had before it: an application for interpretation of judgment No. 2010-Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT-043 on the issue of to which Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT Registry Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT remanded Ms Mezoui¡¯s case; two appeals from Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT Order Nos. 71 (GVA/2010) and 73 (GVA/2010); and a motion for joinder and fast-track hearing. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the application for interpretation was a ruse to have Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT interfere with Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s assignment of venue. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that venue was a matter for the trial court¡¯s discretion, with which it would not interfere. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that it would not, generally, entertain interlocutory appeals. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT denied the application for...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an appeal against judgment No. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT/2010/146 on compensation by the Secretary-General. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that once a judgment on the merits has been vacated and no liability on the part of the Administration has been established, a judgment on compensation cannot stand if it would be contrary to the final decision on the merits of the case. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that an appeal against the judgment on compensation was not necessary if the legal basis for the award of compensation by Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT no longer existed. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the appeal (as unnecessary) and vacated the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judgment.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT correctly found that it did not have jurisdiction to conduct a de novo investigation of the Appellant¡¯s formal complaint of harassment; rather its task was to determine if there was a proper investigation into the allegations. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT awarded adequate compensation to the Appellant for the infringement of his rights with regard to the harassment complaint. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT did not make any errors of procedure in deciding upon the weight to be given to written statements tendered by the Appellant. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that it was not persuaded that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT made any errors of...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Appellant had failed to show how Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT exceeded its jurisdiction or competence or failed to exercise its jurisdiction. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Appellant had not identified an error on a question of law. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that it had no reason to disagree with Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s holding that no institutional prejudice, or retaliation, played a part in the non-renewal of the Appellant¡¯s contract. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that the decision to take the Appellant¡¯s portfolio away from him had been taken before he had made any report of wrongdoing. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that the Appellant¡¯s non-selection for the 11 posts involved...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT was not persuaded that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT erred in its judgment. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that, at the time of receipt of his settlement offer, the time limit to file the application to Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT had already run for approximately three weeks and nothing prevented the Appellant from filing his application or applying for a waiver or extension of the time limit. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the exceptional suspension of time limits provided for under Article 8(1) of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT Statute and provisional Staff Rule 11. 1 applied only to informal dispute resolution conducted through the Office of the Ombudsman. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the settlement...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that, except for the Appellant¡¯s own assertion, it found no evidence to show that he was a genuine whistle-blower. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that it was not a case of retaliation following a report of possible misconduct, but instead a disagreement between the Appellant and management regarding work matters which was properly addressed in the context of the performance assessment process. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the non-renewal of the Appellant¡¯s contract was not retaliatory but based on his performance rating which had been reviewed and confirmed after a rebuttal opportunity was given to the Appellant. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT recalled that an employment contract of a staff member subject to the internal laws of the Organisation is not the same as a contract between private parties and that the issuance of a letter of appointment by the Administration cannot be regarded as a mere formality. The issue before Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT was whether the staff member, who had received an offer of employment, but not a letter of appointment, from the Organisation, should be regarded as a staff member and thus should have access to the internal justice system to contest the legality of the Administration¡¯s withdrawal of the offer of...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judge had sufficient grounds to order the production of the documents withheld by the Administration concerning the selection process that led to the contested administrative decision. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT stated the principle that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT has the right to order the production of any document relevant for the purposes of the fair and expeditious disposal of its proceedings. If the Administration opposes Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s order to produce a certain document in its possession, it may, with sufficiently specific and justified reasons, request Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT to verify the confidentiality of the document in...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an appeal by Ms Rolland and a cross-appeal against the award of damages by the Secretary-General. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the selection process conducted by an interview panel can be rescinded under rare circumstances. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that, in general, when candidates have received fair consideration, discrimination and bias are absent, proper procedures have been followed, and all relevant material has been taken into consideration, the selection shall be upheld. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ms Rolland failed to discharge the burden of proof, by showing through clear and convincing evidence that she was...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that, as a consequence of paragraph 11 of the Inter-Organisation Agreement, the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵ, through Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAMID, undertook to extend the protection of its system of administration of justice to the Appellant in respect of administrative decisions taken by Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAMID during the term of the Loan Agreement. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that under this provision, the Appellant could only appeal against the administrative decisions of WFP before ILOAT. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that, without access to the administration of justice system within the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵ, the Appellant would have no right to an effective remedy from the competent tribunal in...

The Appellant appealed the amount of compensation awarded for loss of chance. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that there was no set way for the trial court to set damages for loss of chance of promotion and that each case turned on its facts. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that it would generally defer to the trial court¡¯s discretion. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT did not accept the Appellant¡¯s argument that the trial court was required to assess the percentage chances that he would have been selected: Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that while it had approved that procedure as one method of assessing damages, it respected the opinion of the trial judge as to how to determine...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that the reason given for the non-renewal of the Appellant¡¯s contract was a restructuring and that the Appellant conceded that the restructuring was properly done. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT agreed with Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT that the opinion expressed by the Appellant¡¯s Chief, that his performance deficiencies and shortcomings could justify the non-renewal of his contract, was immaterial. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Administration provided the Appellant with legitimate reasons for the non-renewal of his appointment. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the appeal and affirmed the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judgment.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an appeal of judgment No. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT/2010/061 on compensation. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that, as it had previously overturned the judgment on the merits (which found in favour of Mr Sanwidi), the foundation for an award of compensation no longer existed and the appeal was moot. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the judgment on compensation was automatically vacated when it overturned the judgment on the merits. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the appeal and vacated the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judgment.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered appeals from both the Secretary-General and Ms Fuentes. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT correctly found her appeal regarding an investigation by OIOS to be time-barred. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT correctly held that it was the special procedure under Administrative Instruction ST/AI/1998/9 and not former Staff Rule 111(2)(a) that applied to appeals of classification decisions and that the Administration had failed to respond to Ms Fuentes¡¯ appeal against the reclassification decision. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed both appeals and affirmed the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judgment.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered Mr Paskolti¡¯s application for revision of former Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵ Administrative Tribunal judgment No. 1459. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Article 11 of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT Statute and Article 24 of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT Rules of Procedure did not confer jurisdiction on Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT to review a judgment of the former Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵ Administrative Tribunal. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the application for revision on the grounds of non-receivability.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an appeal by the Secretary-General and a cross-appeal by Ms Chen. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the principle that everyone, without any discrimination, has the right to equal pay for equal work (Article 23(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights) applies to Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵ staff. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that budgetary considerations could not trump the requirement of equal treatment. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT declined to grant the relief sought by Ms Chen in her cross-appeal on the basis that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT awarded damages from the correct date. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Administration¡¯s allegation that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT usurped the Secretary-General¡¯s...