Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵ

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an application for ¡°reconsideration¡± of Judgment No. 2010-Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT-029bis. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that its judgments are final and not subject to appeal except under Article 11 of its Statute, relating to the procedures for revision and correction of material errors and that no appeal against res judicata is admissible. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the application was an appeal against res judicata and, as such, was inadmissible. Noting that Ms. El-Khatib¡¯s appeal was dismissed as non-receivable and without merit, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the application for ¡°reconsideration¡± constituted an abuse of the appeals...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s decision on an Appellant¡¯s request to suspend, waive or extend deadlines is not a judgment made in respect of an appeal against an administrative decision, within the meaning of Article 2 of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT Statute, since no appeal had yet been filed. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held, therefore, that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s decision on the Appellant¡¯s request of extension could not be appealed. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the appeal and affirmed the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judgment.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the appeal was not filed untimely and was, therefore, receivable. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that, whatever the gravity of the irregularity committed by the Administration and the number of points obtained by the Applicant in the 2007 promotion session, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT did not commit an error in providing that the High Commissioner could decide to pay compensation rather than execute the rescission order. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT, in setting the amount of compensation at 8,000 Swiss francs, did not make a manifest error. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held, concerning the conclusion that compensation should be paid for moral damages...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT did not err on a question of law in deciding that the Appellant had to establish that, without the errors committed in the review of her professional career, she would have had a real chance of being promoted. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Appellant had failed to establish that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT erred on a question of fact, resulting in a manifestly unreasonable decision, in deciding that she had failed to demonstrate that the few material errors in her factsheet deprived her of the chance to be promoted. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the appeal and affirmed the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judgment.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an appeal by Secretary-General. The Secretary-General contended that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT erred by failing to recognize that the second contract by which Mr. Castelli¡¯s appointment was extended beyond a year was invalid because it had not been submitted for review by a central review body. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that, unless it is fake or fraudulent, a staff member¡¯s appointment contract gives rise to entitlements upon the signing and acceptance by the staff member of their letter of appointment. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that this is true even where the administration improperly handled the recruitment process. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the appeal was time-barred and, therefore, not receivable. However, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that, even if the appeal was receivable, there did not appear to be valid grounds for contesting the decision to withdraw the offer of appointment or for requesting compensation for loss of earnings. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT also noted that the request for the removal of the defense brief from the file, as it contained information relating to the informal dispute resolution process, could have been taken into consideration since Article 15 of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT RoP provides that such information shall remain confidential and never...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT rejected the Secretary-General¡¯s interlocutory appeal against the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT order as not receivable, finding that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT had discretionary authority in case management and the production of evidence in the interest of justice. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT had decided on a measure of inquiry, the necessity of which it had sole authority to assess. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that it was not in the interest of the internal system of justice to consider an appeal against a simple measure of inquiry.

In reviewing the Appellant¡¯s appeal, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT found that the decision to terminate the Appellant¡¯s position was based on generalized reasons, as opposed to specific facts, and found no real justification for the decision. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that this was inconsistent with the jurisprudence of the former Administrative Tribunal, which provides that an Administration must act in good faith and not make decisions based on erroneous, fallacious, or improper motivation. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that when an administrative decision concerns termination, it shall set an amount of compensation that the respondent may elect to...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered the Secretary-General¡¯s appeal. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that the exclusion of the right to appeal a decision on the suspension of action on an administrative is an exception to the general principle of law and must be narrowly interpreted. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that this exception can only be applied to jurisdictional decisions ordering the suspension of implementation of an administrative decision when a management evaluation is ongoing. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT accordingly held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT exceeded its competence when it ordered the suspension of the present action until the judgment on the merits of the Appellant¡¯s...

In considering the Appellant¡¯s appeal, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT found that the Standing Committee could not reject the request unless it disregarded the provisions of Article 33(a) of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵJSPF Regulations. However, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that it was not in a position to rule on the actual possibility for the Appellant to perform the duties of her respective position and held that the Standing Committee should reconsider the Appellant¡¯s request. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT rescinded the Standing Committee¡¯s decision and remanded the Appellant¡¯s request to the Standing Committee for review.