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The Tribunal carefully examined all the correspondence between the parties and was not persuaded by the Respondent¡¯s argument that the contested administrative decision was conclusively made and communicated to the Applicant on 28 June 2016. The Tribunal was of the view that the correspondence between the parties did not bear out the said argument and found that the Respondent had not apprised himself of all relevant facts on 28 June 2016 when he rejected the claim for an education grant and reimbursement of mother tongue tuition. In the prevailing circumstances, the Tribunal held that the...

How to measure a loss of change. The Tribunal finds that, as stated in Niedermayr, the assessment of loss of chance is an inexact science, and the Tribunal must assess the matter in the round and arrive at a figure deemed to be fair and equitable having regard to the number of imponderables present in the case, including the chances of being selected. The Tribunal should take into account two matters: (a) the nature of the irregularity and (b), thereafter in the assessment, all the imponderables, noting all the while that this is an inexact science (Niedermayr). The Tribunal notes the...

The Tribunal held that the uncontested evidence before it was that the General-Assembly endorsed the Secretary-General¡¯s recommendation for the abolishment of 80 Language Assistant posts, including the one encumbered by the Applicant. The Tribunal found and held that the decision not to renew the Applicant¡¯s fixed-term appointment was lawful as it was a proper implementation by the Secretary-General of the General Assembly¡¯s decision. In his submissions, the Applicant had indicated that the Organization had abolished his post, but later hired him as an Individual Consultant (IC). He contended...

Functus Officio: A final decision cannot be reopened, and once the duties and functions of an office are fully discharged, there is no legal competence for reconsideration of the decision by that office. The Dispute Tribunal ceased to have any jurisdiction over the Applicant¡¯s case once the initial judgment was rendered and without the case being remanded by the Appeals Tribunal, the Dispute Tribunal cannot examine the application any further.

Noting that the Applicant had conceded that his application was filed after the time limit set out in art. 8.1(d)(i)(b), the Tribunal concluded that the application was not receivable rationae temporis because the Applicant failed to comply with the 90-day filing deadline set out in art. 8.1(d) of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT Statute. The Tribunal then deliberated on the Applicant¡¯s assertion that his application is receivable because the interpretation of art. 8.1(d)(i)(b) is unfair to staff members as it favours an administration that has failed to address management evaluation requests in violation of staff...

Functus Officio: A final decision cannot be reopened, and once the duties and functions of an office are fully discharged, there is no legal competence for reconsideration of the decision by that office. The Dispute Tribunal ceased to have any jurisdiction over the Applicant¡¯s case once the initial judgment was rendered and without the case being remanded by the Appeals Tribunal, the Dispute Tribunal cannot examine the application any further.

Granting an application for revision: As consistently held by the Appeals Tribunal, ¡°the review procedure [of revision] is of a corrective nature and thus is not an opportunity for a party to reargue his or her case¡± (see Sanwidi 2013-Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT-321, para. 8. Moreover, an application for revision of a judgment is only receivable if it fulfills the strict and exceptional criteria established under art. 12.1 of the Dispute Tribunal¡¯s Statute and art. 29 of its Rules of Procedure, namely (see James 2016-Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT-680, para. 13): ¡°¡­ Accordingly, an application for revision of judgment is only receivable if...

The impugned decision of 21 April 2015 clearly: a) emanated from the Administration and b) produced direct legal consequences for the terms and conditions of the Applicant¡¯s appointment. As such, the decision was capable of being subject to management evaluation as well as capable of being reviewed by the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT. The Applicant had until 90 days from 8 June 2015 to file an application before Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT. The Applicant did not do so until 1 March 2016. The application is, therefore, late by almost six months. The Applicant did not demonstrate exceptional circumstances that would warrant waiving the time...

The Tribunal held that MONUSCO¡¯s 17 October 2014 inter-office memorandum unambiguously informed the Applicant of the mission¡¯s decision to end his appointment, which at this point was a continuing appointment, by separating him from service on 24 October 2014. The Tribunal held that the 17 October 2014 inter-office memorandum was an administrative decision because it had a direct and adverse impact on the Applicant¡¯s contractual status and had direct legal consequences for him. The Tribunal concluded that the FPD/DFS response of 31 October 2016 was a reiteration of the 17 October 2014 decision...

The Tribunal is required to factually find that the decision that is impugned before it is in the process of being administratively reviewed. A preliminary finding to this effect is a prerequisite for litigation before this Tribunal. The record before the Tribunal did not show that a request for management evaluation had been filed by the Applicant. The Applicant was given the opportunity to address this situation and correct it, but did not. The application therefore was found incompetent and the only option open to the Tribunal was to summarily dismiss it for want of management evaluation.

The Tribunal concluded that the Respondent failed to notify the Applicant of the overpayment and that this failure was a breach of its obligation under section 2.3 of ST/AI/2009/1. Although the Applicant failed to report the overpayment, the Tribunal found that he was not negligent in his duty to report because he was caught up in a perilous security situation at the time he received his pay slip at the end of November 2015, which may have caused him to not advise the Respondent of the overpayment. The Tribunal noted further that ST/AI/2009/1 does not make the Respondent¡¯s obligation to notify...

Since there was no written agreement or any other signed document that clearly showed the Respondent¡¯s undertaking to pay the Applicant USD10, 790, the Tribunal determined whether there was an implied in-fact contract by examining the parties¡¯ intentions based on their conduct and other circumstances to establish if there was mutual assent and consideration. The Tribunal concluded that all the elements of a binding, valid and enforceable contract existed between the parties because: (i) there was mutual assent leading both parties to jointly inform the Tribunal that they had established the...

The Tribunal found that the Applicant¡¯s claim in respect of recoveries from his pension, affirmed by the Management Evaluation Unit on 14 April 2015 was not receivable. The Tribunal held that the Applicant had until 13 July 2015 to file an application challenging the decision but he failed to do so. With regard to the Applicant¡¯s request for retroactive dependency benefits of his adopted children, the Tribunal held that the Applicant was required to request management evaluation of that decision within 60 calendar days, but he did not do so. Consequently, the application was rejected as it was...

After being presented with the allegations of misconduct on 9 July 2014, the Applicant responded on 21 August 2014. The decision to impose a disciplinary sanction on the Applicant was communicated to him on 4 December 2014. Thus, a review of the entire case against the Applicant and communicating to him of the outcome took a little over three months. This time frame was not unreasonable and did not constitute a breach of due process. On the facts before the Tribunal, the Applicant did not adduce any evidence to give the Tribunal a basis for reviewing the Secretary-General¡¯s exercise of...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered the Secretary-General¡¯s appeal. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed Mr Rajan¡¯s motion for the appeal to be heard on an expedited basis as it had become moot as the ordinary case management constraints meant it could not have been heard any earlier. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT made an error of law in holding that the Secretary-General was obliged to prove that Mr Rajan had the intention to mislead the Organisation. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that there was no doubt that Mr Rajan misrepresented the true situation more than once. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that it was Mr Rajan¡¯s responsibility to ascertain that he was providing accurate...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an appeal by the Secretary-General. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s finding that there was no legal basis for the Administration to assert that Mr Muwambi was subject to the requirement of clearance by a central review body, constituted an error of law since such clearance was a requirement clearly established by the legal framework of the Organisation. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that, given the discontinuation since 30 June 2015 of the practice of temporarily reassigning staff affected by downsizing in a peacekeeping mission to allow them to apply for vacant positions, practice on which Mr Muwambi¡¯s...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the summary dismissal decision was unlawful because the due process rights under IMO¡¯s Staff Regulations and Staff Rules were substantially violated. The Appellant had been charged with misconduct in the form of fraudulent activities undertaken to gain diplomatic accreditation, namely giving instructions to append an electronic signature to an official IMO communication without authorization or instruction by that colleague and misrepresenting his contractual status as internationally recruited in that communication. Noting that the Secretary-General of IMO considered the...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Appellant¡¯s fixed-term appointment was lawfully terminated in accordance with the amended terms of her appointment and that her appeal had no merit. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Appellant failed to meet the burden of proof of the alleged improper motivation for the decision. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵFCCC advertised nine fixed-term positions at the G-5 level, but that the Appellant did not apply for any of them, her aim being to secure a P-2 level position. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT found no fault in Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s conclusion that the Administration had no duty to seek a suitable position for the Applicant beyond the...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT rejected the argument that the written test should have been prepared by the Hiring Manager, and not the direct supervisor of the position. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held, in agreement with the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s conclusion, that the Appellant had failed to show that the Hiring Manager¡¯s intervention in the preparation of the written test resulted in her non-selection for the contested post. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Appellant¡¯s claim was fully and fairly considered by Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT found no fault in Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s finding that the design, conduct, and evaluation of the written test did not constitute a violation of the Appellant¡¯s right...

ArÄ¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA DT¡¯s decision not to hold an oral hearing was a shortcoming since the parties had not agreed to the case being decided on the papers and the facts needed to be established by witnesses and/or further documentary evidence. On the question of bias and its possible bearing on the outcome of the selection process, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA DT should have engaged in a thorough examination of the facts, rather than drawing an inference. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the inference drawn by Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA DT, that it was realistic to conclude that not all of the posts could be filled by suitable candidates...