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The Secretary-General appealed, asserting that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT exceeded its competence in ordering suspension of the decision not to renew Mr Onana¡¯s appointment until it determined the substantive application on its merits. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted the exclusion of the right to appeal a decision to suspend the execution of an administrative decision constitutes an exception to the general principle of the right to appeal and must therefore be narrowly interpreted; this exception only applies to jurisdictional decisions ordering the suspension of an administrative decision pending a management evaluation. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered Mr James¡¯ appeal and the Secretary-General¡¯s cross-appeal. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT affirmed Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s finding that Mr James was not eligible for the P-3 position both because he did not take the required examination and because of the lack of required qualifications. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT accordingly dismissed Mr James¡¯ appeal that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT erred in not awarding him compensation for loss of opportunity. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT allowed the cross-appeal and set aside the order for compensation for distress. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that the compensation was not requested, there was no evidence of damage or injuries, and Mr James acknowledged on appeal...

The Secretary-General appealed. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the Secretary-General¡¯s appeal against the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s interpretation of judgment. It found that the appeal was not receivable because the interpretation of a judgment is not a fresh decision or judgment within the meaning of Article 2. 1 of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT Statute.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered the Appellant¡¯s appeal and found that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT erred when it decided to give Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵHCR the option to either pay compensation in lieu of reinstating the Appellant or quash the contested administrative decision. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that Article 10. 5(a) of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT Statute was not applicable as the Appellant was serving under an indefinite appointment governed by Rule 104. 12(c) of the Staff Rules (100 Series). Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT expressed that the contested administrative decision did not concern his appointment, promotion, or termination but his placement between assignments. For this reason, Article 10.5(a)...

In considering the Appellant¡¯s appeal, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT found that the Standing Committee could not reject the request unless it disregarded the provisions of Article 33(a) of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵJSPF Regulations. However, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that it was not in a position to rule on the actual possibility for the Appellant to perform the duties of her respective position and held that the Standing Committee should reconsider the Appellant¡¯s request. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT rescinded the Standing Committee¡¯s decision and remanded the Appellant¡¯s request to the Standing Committee for review.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered the Appellant¡¯s appeal and affirmed the decisions of Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵJSPB Standing Committee. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT found that the Appellant¡¯s first ground of appeal had no merit, noting that the Appellant had prior notice of her separation and could have exercised her right to restore her participation prior to the time of her separation in accordance with Section F. 1 of the Pension Fund¡¯s Administrative Rules, which she failed to do. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵJSPF Standing Committee had no discretion to make an exception in this case and the Standing Committee¡¯s decision not to restore the Appellant¡¯s prior...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT affirmed the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT findings that there was no flaw in the procedure used by the Staff Management Coordinating Committee to select the staff representative on the IJC. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT also affirmed the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judgments rejecting the staff member¡¯s allegations of conflict of interest on the part of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judges. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT further rejected the staff member¡¯s request that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT judges recuse themselves from the hearing of the appeal, noting the limited role of the IJC in the appointment of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT judges and the lack of any professional relationship between the person appointed as a staff representative and...

From the moment that the new Executive Secretary took up his functions at ESCWA, the Deputy Executive Secretary was no longer competent to decide, on 8 August 2007, to reassign the Applicant. Indeed, there is no documentary evidence that he had received delegation of authority from the Executive Secretary to take the contested decision, which is thus illegal. However, on 16 August 2007, the Executive Secretary confirmed the decision taken on 8 August 2007 by his Deputy. This new decision is legal but it does not have the effect of regularizing ex post facto the decision of 8 August 2007...

The Tribunal¡¯s findings were that the Respondent had sufficiently substantiated his allegations against the Applicant. It also found that due process had been afforded to the Applicant. Given that the Applicant failed to abide by staff regulation 1.2 (b) and former staff rule 110.1, the Tribunal concluded that the decision to summarily dismiss the Applicant was proportionate to the nature of the charges.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT found that the Applicant, requested on two occasions to make the necessary corrections to her application, had failed to do so. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT dismissed the application finding that the Applicant is no longer interested in pursuing her case.

None.

The facts alleged as justifying termination could not make the contract void but only voidable. The Administration is barred from arguing that there was no contract because it affirmed the contract when it was in full possession of the relevant facts by proceedings under staff regulation 9.1.Cancellation and effect of staff regulation 9.1: Under the general law the parties are bound by any condition in the contract relating to cancellation, rescission or repudiation. The only mode by which separation can be effected is pursuant to regulation 9.1 or pursuant to disciplinary procedures. These...

Receivability: Although the applicant accepted the assignment, this does not mean that all decisions taken by the Administration with respect to the applicant must be deemed correct and lawful. The Organization¡¯s decision to base its calculation of the applicant¡¯s salary on her net income constitutes an administrative decision affecting her contractual right to proper remuneration and the case is therefore receivable. Salary calculation: ST/IC/2007/24 and ST/AI/2000/1 articulate that all G-level staff will be receiving an SPA to the P-2 level. Pursuant to provisional staff rule 3.10(d), the...

Break in service: The Tribunal has not found a policy on mandatory breaks in service and no document has been produced recording it. The respondent has failed to demonstrate a consistent application of the practice of enforced separation between temporary contracts. Further, there was a deliberate delay in progressing the appointment of the applicant which was to her detriment. Compensation: The applicant is to be placed in the position as if there had been no such break in service in May 2008. The manner in which the applicant was treated, aggravated by the exercise of an abuse of power...

The Respondent had sufficiently substantiated his allegations against the Applicant. It also found that due process had been afforded to the Applicant. Given the gravity of the allegations, the Tribunal decided that the decision to summarily dismiss the Applicant was proportionate to the nature of the charges.

The applicant had a real and substantial chance of appointment of around 50 percent and that the appointment would have lasted until his 2010 retirement date. USD2,000 nominal compensation awarded for loss of the chance to work in New York.

There was sufficient material before the Secretary-General, after a fair and impartial investigation, to reach a finding of serious misconduct. The sanction of summary dismissal was fair and proportionate to the seriousness of the offences. The applications are dismissed.

The Tribunal takes note that the Applicant has failed to file his application within the deadline given to him in the Tribunal¡¯s Order of 22 January 2010 and even beyond. It also notes that the Applicant has not provided any reasonable explanation as to why he did not comply with the Order of the Tribunal. By his behaviour and attitude the Applicant has displayed a singular blatant ignorance of a court order. His conduct is one of contempt of the Tribunal. This attitude does not befit persons who like the Applicant come to seek justice and a vindication of their rights before the Tribunal.

The Tribunal is entitled to examine the entire case before it. In other words, the Tribunal may consider not only the administrative decision of the Secretary-General imposing disciplinary measures but also examine the material placed before him on which he bases his decision in addition to other facts relevant to the said material. The rush by the investigators to produce a prejudiced report dripping with innuendos, riddled with ridiculous findings and which completely and unjustly tars the Applicant with a brush of criminality must be loudly condemned by this Tribunal.

The question of waiver of time limits applicable to transferred cases is governed by Article 8.3 of the Statute rather than by Staff Rule 111.2(f). A request for an administrative review or management evaluation is mandatory in the present case. With regard to section 1.4 of ST/SGB/2009/11, the Applicant cannot be considered to have satisfied the requirement to submit a request for management evaluation as provided for in Article 8 paragraph 1 (c) of the Statute.