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Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an appeal by the Secretary-General. The Secretary-General raised the argument, inter alia, that Ms Lamb¡¯s retroactive appointment was disrupted when she resigned and separated and, therefore, she had no contractual relationship with the Organisation obliging it to place her preferentially in vacant posts as someone holding a permanent appointment. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT concluded correctly that (1) Ms Lamb¡¯s employment ended in mid-2013 by her own initiative and (2) there was nothing in the documentation relating to Ms Lamb¡¯s resignation to support her assertion that it was...

As a preliminary matter, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered the Appellant¡¯s daughters applications for intervention which argued that they had been deprived of their right to education due to their mother¡¯s arbitrary separation from service, as their mother lost her only main source of income, including the education grant, and could not support their education. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that, pursuant to Article 3(1) of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT Statute, the daughters did not fall within the categories of persons who had the standing to intervene, and denied the applications for intervention. On the merits, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Appellant failed...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT did not commit any errors of law or fact in finding that the applications were not receivable ratione materiae. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Local Salary Survey Committee (LSSC) does not constitute a technical body and therefore does not exempt the Appellants from the mandatory first step of requesting a management evaluation. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the appeals and affirmed the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judgments.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT did not commit any errors of law or fact in finding that the applications were not receivable ratione materiae. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Local Salary Survey Committee (LSSC) does not constitute a technical body and therefore does not exempt the Appellants from the mandatory first step of requesting management evaluation. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the appeal and affirmed the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judgment.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Appellant¡¯s application regarding the implied decision conveyed in a conversation with his colleague was, indeed, not receivable ratione materiae. However, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that a later letter of response from the Administration effectively re-set the clock for the Appellant to file his request for management evaluation. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the express decision in the letter, containing the rejection of the Appellant¡¯s complaint and the reasons, therefore, was not a mere confirmation of the previous implied administrative decision, but a new, appealable decision. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the Appellant¡¯s motion to file additional pleadings on the basis that there were no exceptional circumstances to justify the filing. On the merits, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT calculation of the three-time periods of participation in the contributory health insurance plan was not correct. However, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that even the correct calculation did not result in the required 10 years of participation, but only 9 years, 10 months, and 14 days. Turning to consider the period of 11 May to 30 June 2009, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that a staff member who had expressly conceded in her application that a...

The Appellant challenged Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA DT¡¯s finding that his application was not receivable ratione materiae. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the appeal was not receivable ratione materiae as he did not make a timely request for management evaluation. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the appeal and affirmed the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA DT judgment.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an application for revision of judgment No. 2019-Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT-914 from Mr Oglesby. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Mr Oglesby failed to establish the required grounds for a revision of judgment, namely the discovery of a decisive fact that was, at the time the judgment was rendered, unknown to Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT and the party applying for revision. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that it had concluded in the impugned judgment that it was unable to apply the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵ Charter or the UDHR directly, or strike down clear Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵJSPF Regulations. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT opined that it was within the combined powers of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵJSPF, the Secretary-General and the General...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT rejected the Appellant¡¯s unsubstantiated allegations of bias and conflict of interest against the judge who signed the impugned judgment. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered that: (1) the Appellant did not provide any evidence of his suitability for conversion to a continuing appointment; (2) his appeal was based solely on the impossibility of the retroactive extension of his fixed-term appointments; and (3) he had been made aware that his fixed-term appointment would be extended pending the appropriate assessment of his performance under the rebuttal process. Accordingly, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT was correct...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an appeal of Order No. 079. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that, regardless of whether Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT may have committed an error of law, fact, or procedure, Article 2(2) of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT Statute precluded an appeal to Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT if Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT acted within its jurisdiction or competence. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT acted within its jurisdiction or competence. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the appeal was not receivable. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the appeal and affirmed the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT Order.

As a preliminary matter, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT granted the Appellant¡¯s motion to file additional pleadings in the form of submission that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT had decided previously that the MICT was a Secretariat entity and was thus precluded from holding to the contrary. On the merits, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Appellant was not eligible for a continuing appointment for three reasons: (1) he did not work for the Secretariat; (2) the MICT had no authority to grant a continuing appointment; and (3) he was not in active service in the Secretariat under a fixed-term appointment throughout the period of consideration. On consideration...

As a first preliminary matter, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered a motion requesting confidentiality in which the Appellant sought to limit the disclosure of personal information relating to her citizenship and immigration status. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the personal data was not pertinent to the case, disclosure of the information would not have taken place without the Appellant¡¯s own motions and Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT would not have asked her to disclose such information. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT denied the motion. As a second preliminary matter, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered a motion to respond to the Respondent¡¯s observations on a motion. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that its RoP did...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that there was no difficulty in principle regarding the admissibility of the secretly recorded conversation based on the way it was procured, even though it may have involved an element of entrapment; however, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT was concerned that the probative value of the evidence depended upon the credibility of a person who did not testify before the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that the content of the contemporaneous emails which supported the transcript of the telephone conversation remained hearsay unless it was confirmed by the authors or recipients of the emails and that none of the authors or...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the ISA JAB decision was correct in its finding that the appeal was receivable and not time-barred. However, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Special Agreement and the resulting Staff Rules did not comply with the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT Statute, which required a neutral first instance process, and that, accordingly, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT was unable to exercise its jurisdiction as a second level tribunal. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT remanded the matter to the JAB to ensure compliance with the jurisdictional requirements of the Special Agreement and Article 2(10) of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT Statute, specifying that the Appellant¡¯s appeal should be reconsidered and...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that while there may have been an error in the misfiling of the Appellant¡¯s rebuttal, this did not result in procedural unfairness that affected the decision. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that there was no procedural unfairness to the Appellant as she had had the opportunity to file for leave to respond before Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT and she did not do so and that in any case, this did not affect the ultimate decision on receivability. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that only the Secretary-General, of which the Management Evaluation Unit forms part, has the authority to extend or waive the time limits for management evaluation and the...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Appellant did not demonstrate that the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judgment was defective or that the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT erred in considering that the selected candidate met the minimum educational requirements and the work experience required for the job. Emphasizing the broad discretion of the Secretary-General and that it was not the role of Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT to substitute its own decision for that of the Secretary-General, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT was not manifestly unreasonable in deciding that the recommendation approved by the Secretary-General was based on an entire process and the experience of the candidates. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held...

On the termination decision, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT affirmed Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s decision that an individual contracted under an ICA was not a staff member and therefore had no standing before Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT referred the matter of the lack of judicial recourse for individual contractors to the attention of the President of the General Assembly for consideration and possible action. On the decision to recover monies, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that, while management evaluation was not required to appeal the imposition of a disciplinary measure, such an argument was not valid in this case because the recovery of monies was not a disciplinary...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that there was no evidence before Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT that the EOD date or the refusal to amend it had a direct impact or legal consequence on the Appellant¡¯s terms of appointment or contract and therefore, it was not an administrative decision. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT erred in finding the application was receivable based on the relevant administrative decision being the refusal to amend the EOD date. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT was correct in dismissing the application as beyond its temporal jurisdiction, as the Appellant¡¯s application to Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT was filed more than three years after the impugned decision and...

The present case concerned the reimbursement of medical expenses incurred by a locally recruited staff member outside his duty station while travelling on private business. It was not disputed that since the Applicant was on private business at the time he fell ill, his case did not fall under any of the exceptions of sec. 6.3 of the Medical Insurance Plan (¡°MIP¡±). The Tribunal found that the MIP Rules clearly provide that only reasonable and customary expenses at the duty station are covered by the MIP and are, thus, considered as ¡°recognized expenses¡± unless one of the exceptions set out in...

The Tribunal found that the provided reason for not renewing the Applicant¡¯s appointment was not properly based on facts and, consequently, that the contested decision was unlawful. To determine remedies, through a subsequent judgment, the Tribunal instructed the parties to file final submissions on the matter taking into account its findings in the instant Judgment.