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Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered the Appellant¡¯s appeal of both Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA DT decisions. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA DT gave full consideration to the Appellant¡¯s claim that the transfer was a disguised disciplinary measure following allegations of her corporal punishment of students. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that there was evidence that, prior to her transfer, the Chief, Field Education Programme had dismissed these allegations as unsubstantiated and it was not until almost two months after the transfer that the Jordan Field Office authorised an investigation. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA DT therefore correctly concluded that the Appellant¡¯s...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered the Secretary-General¡¯s appeal, specifically the question of whether Mr Wilson¡¯s circumstances were sufficient to vitiate the Assistant Secretary-General of OHRM¡¯s decision. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT recalled the criteria set out in Sanwidi, 2010-Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT-084 (para. 42), according to which it can interfere with an administrative decision. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT found that there was no basis for Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT to conclude that ¡°no proper consideration was given to [Mr. Wilson¡¯s] individual circumstances and attributes that may have warranted a legitimate exception in this case. ¡± Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT found that there was sufficient basis set out...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT affirmed the findings of Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT that Mr Adundo¡¯s application was receivable. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT then considered the merits of the Secretary-General¡¯s appeal. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that, contrary to the findings by Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT that the guidelines were violated as the duration of the weapons restriction was not mentioned within the communications between the Chief of the Security and Safety Service and Mr Adundo, it was clear that the restriction would remain in force until Mr Adundo was ¡°ready to obey lawful commands¡±, which was for him to attend weapons training for a security breach. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT upheld the Secretary-General¡¯s...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT affirmed Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s finding and held that ¡°the nature of the decision, the legal framework under which the decision was made, and the consequences of the decision¡± all support the conclusion that the Administration¡¯s response to a request for management evaluation is not a reviewable decision. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that the response to a request for management evaluation is an opportunity for the Administration to resolve a staff member¡¯s grievance without litigation and not a fresh decision. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the appeal.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Appellant¡¯s argument regarding the time limits was misconceived since Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT had not declared the application non-receivable because the Appellant had failed to respect the time limits for filing an application, rather it declined jurisdiction on the basis that he had not sought timely management evaluation, i. e. , within the requisite sixty days of the contested decisions, as required by Staff Rule 11. 2(c). Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the exercise of determining the date of an implied administrative decision should be conducted by determining when the staff member knew or should...

Noting that it was clear that the intention was to revisit the earlier decisions by conducting a review of affected staff, to decide the matter afresh, and to issue new notifications, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the June decision went beyond mere reiteration and constituted a fresh administrative decision impliedly substituting the previous decision. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT erred in its findings that the Application was not receivable. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT upheld the appeal, vacated the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judgment, and remanded the case to Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT for consideration on the merits.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered appeals by both the Secretary-General and Mr Auda. Noting that the Administration had not failed to respond, albeit with inordinate delay, and then had set up a second fact-finding panel, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that a decision may only be challenged in the context of an appeal after the conclusion of the entire process and that the step Mr Auda was challenging was preliminary in nature. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the contested issue, namely the decision of the first fact-finding panel to delay, withhold and not submit its report and records, ceased to exist when Mr Auda was notified of the outcome of...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the fact that the non-renewal decision was communicated verbally was, by itself, of no consequence since there is no explicit requirement in law for such notification to be in writing. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that Staff Rule 11. 2(c) does not require a written notification as a prerequisite to contest an administrative decision. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT affirmed the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judgment dismissing the staff member¡¯s application but set aside it's finding that the application was receivable.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that there was no merit to the Appellant¡¯s claims that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT failed to exercise its jurisdiction or erred in law by using the summary judgment procedure to determine the application was not receivable ratione materiae. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the application to Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT did not challenge an administrative decision that was alleged to be in non-compliance with the terms of appointment or the contract of employment of the staff member, rather the Appellant challenged the MEU¡¯s wording in a letter to him acknowledging the receipt of his grievance or complaint. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT did not err in law...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered the receivability of the appeal, whether there was a procedural irregularity, and whether the Appellant was entitled to moral damages. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the appeal was receivable because it was filed in a timely fashion, according to Articles 7 and 29 of the RoP. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT erred in law in finding that the Administration failed to properly notify the Appellant of her non-selection because she knew about her non-selection early enough to timely challenge the decision. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT found that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT erred in law and exceeded its competence in awarding the Appellant compensation as...