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Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Appellant failed to explain how Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT exceeded or failed to exercise its jurisdiction or competence, erred on a question of law or procedure, or erred on a question of fact, resulting in a manifestly unreasonable decision. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT recalled that the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT Statute precluded Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT from suspending or waiving the deadlines for management evaluation. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT was therefore correct in concluding that the application was not receivable and to reject it on that basis. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the appeal and upheld the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT Judgment.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT concurred with Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT that the case was time-barred and not receivable. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that, while the Appellant referred to an accident that prevented her from filing on time, she did not mention this to Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT and raised it for the first time before Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that, while Article 2. 5 of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT Statute allows it to admit further evidence in exceptional circumstances, it would not admit evidence that was known to the party and could have been presented to Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the appeal and affirmed the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judgment.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Appellants each failed to bring themselves under the exceptional circumstances provision of former Staff Rule 111. 2(f). Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that there was no legal difference between exceptional circumstances and exceptional cases. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that a delay can generally be excused only because of circumstances beyond an Appellant¡¯s control. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that no error in fact or in law was made by Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the appeal.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that since the Appellant did not submit her preliminary request for administrative review within the time limit, a time limit which expired before the new Staff Rules came into force, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT had no alternative than to reject her application as not receivable. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the appeal.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that, given the absolute restriction on its judicial discretion with respect to time limits, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT ought not to have entered into a review of the possible existence of exceptional circumstances justifying an extension of the time limit. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the complaint was filed beyond the time limit for administrative review or management evaluation and beyond the threshold for receivability established by the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s Statute and Rules of Procedure. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the appeal.

This judgment is confined to whether the applicant should have access to the report. The applicant was ordered be given access to the panel¡¯s report, subject to an undertaking of confidentiality.

The filing of the incomplete statement of appeal by 31 July 2008 complied with the time limit specified by the Staff Rules. The failure to file the full statement of appeal within one month (as was required by the JAB rules) may (not must) lead to implied abandonment in the absence of explanation and permits restoration of the appeal if an adequate explanation is provided; this does not require exceptional circumstances. The delay was explained by the need to obtain the investigative report and its annexures lying at the centre of the case. What constitutes an adequate explanation will vary...

The Tribunal limited its review to the time-bar of the request for review in July 2009. Since former Staff Rules were applicable to this case, the Morsy judgment and the broader definition of "exceptional cases" with reference to art. 8.3 Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT Statute, art. 7.5 Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT RoP had to remain out of consideration. The question whether Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT has jurisdiction to waive time limits under the former system of internal justice - denied in Costa - could be left open, because no "exceptional circumstances" could be accepted. It was the Applicant's free will to await the outcome of the investigations, instead¡¤of...

The Tribunal limited its review to the time-bar of the statement of appeal to the JAB in Februaiy 2009. Since fonner Staff Rules were applicable to this case, the Morsy judgment and the broader definition of "exceptional cases" with reference to art. 8.3 Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT Statute, art. 7.5 Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT RoP had to remain out of consideration. Neither the lack of knowledge of the English language nor ignorance of law could be accepted as "exceptional circumstances".Outcome: Application was dismissed.

Transferred JAB cases are governed by the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT Statute. Decisions of the Administrative Tribunal on exceptional circumstances are wrong and should not be followed. Ignorance of the law held not relevant. Where the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT Statute is ambiguous, interpretation should preserve rights and uphold justice so far as the language permits. Outcome: The appeal was submitted within time and is receivable.