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Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an appeal by the Secretary-General. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT properly reviewed the contested decision in accordance with the applicable law and established the critical facts of the case. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT had a broad discretion to determine the admissibility of evidence and the weight to be attached thereto and that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s conclusion was consistent with the evidence. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s conclusion that the impugned decision was unlawful was correct, albeit for different reasoning. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the facts underpinning the administrative decision to issue the staff member a...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT had before it an appeal by the Secretary-General. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT erred in law and fact leading to a manifestly unreasonable decision when it held that Mr Siddiqi had not threatened to kill identified staff members but only had made an unspecified threat to kill ¡°some¡± staff members. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the statements of the three witnesses rendered clear and convincing evidence that the Appellant did not only utter an unspecified threat but that he had threatened to kill identified staff members. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT also erred in law and fact when it concluded that threat was not serious...

On the delay before Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT agreed that the delay was unfortÄ¢¹½ÊÓƵATe but held that the Applicant had not demonstrated that it was a procedural error affecting the outcome of the case. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT erred in exercising its case management discretion when it refused the request for an oral hearing, but that this error did not affect the decision of the case. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT did not err as there was clear and convincing evidence that the Applicant had committed sexual harassment. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the disciplinary sanction of separation from service with compensation in lieu of notice and...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Appellant was not a staff member, as he was not supported by the Secretary-General in terms of Staff Regulation 4. 1 and was not subject to the Secretary-General¡¯s authority, but rather he was elected by the General Assembly. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT did not err in dismissing the application as not receivable ratione personae. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT correctly distinguished ILOAT judgment No. 3359, noting that the ILOAT¡¯s jurisdiction ratione personae is broader than Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s jurisdiction, in that it may be invoked by ¡°officials¡±, which includes judges. Noting that the current...

The Secretary-General appealed Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s finding that the contested decisions to abolish Ms Nouinou¡¯s post, the consequent decision not to renew her two-year fixed-term appointment, and the refusal to re-assign her for two months under a zero-dollar incumbency, where she had been selected for a short-term position, were unlawful. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT made a grave error in law in terms of the basic legal position, which defined the subject of the litigation before it and the appeal. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that there was no administrative decision to terminate Ms Nouinou¡¯s contract prior to its expiration and...

The Secretary-General appealed the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judgment as it related to the non-renewal decision only. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that a shifting onus of proof was appropriate where the non-renewal decision was based on a lack of funds. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT found nothing objectionable with the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s reference to the burden or onus of proof resting with the Secretary-General in the circumstances of the case. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT did not err in concluding that the Secretary-General failed to establish by evidence that the financial situation of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵ body which had engaged Ms Loose at the time of the separation was still...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an appeal by Mr Ahmad and a cross-appeal by the Secretary-General. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT was correct to hold that Mr Ahmad¡¯s appointment was not terminated. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT should not have rescinded the decision placing him on SLWFP. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT had correctly held that the SLWFP decision had been rendered moot because the employment relationship had ceased and the special leave had been consumed. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT was correct to reject Mr Ahmad¡¯s claim for compensation as there was no direct link between the SLWFP decision and the termination indemnity. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an appeal by Mr Hamdan and a cross-appeal by the Secretary-General. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT was correct to hold that Mr Hamdan¡¯s appointment was not terminated. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT should not have rescinded the decision placing him on SLWFP. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT had correctly held that the SLWFP decision had been rendered moot because the employment relationship had ceased and the special leave had been consumed. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT was correct to reject Hamdan¡¯s claim for compensation as there was no direct link between the SLWFP decision and the termination indemnity. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an appeal by Mr Garbo and a cross-appeal by the Secretary-General. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT was correct to hold that Mr Garbo¡¯s appointment was not terminated. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT should not have rescinded the decision placing him on SLWFP. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT had correctly held that the SLWFP decision had been rendered moot because the employment relationship had ceased and the special leave had been consumed. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT correctly rejected the Appellant¡¯s claim for compensation as there was no direct link between the SLWFP decision and the termination indemnity. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the appeal was receivable on the basis that the Appellant was not challenging the new scheme for education grant introduced by the General Assembly, but rather the manner in which it was implemented in her specific case and the way in which the Secretary-General interpreted General Assembly Resolution 70/244. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT did not err in deciding that the Appellant did not have an acquired right to all of the previous education benefits she had enjoyed. On the question of the Appellant¡¯s access to a discretionary consideration of her claims on exceptional grounds, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT...