Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵ

On the delay before Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT agreed that the delay was unfortÄ¢¹½ÊÓƵATe but held that the Applicant had not demonstrated that it was a procedural error affecting the outcome of the case. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT erred in exercising its case management discretion when it refused the request for an oral hearing, but that this error did not affect the decision of the case. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT did not err as there was clear and convincing evidence that the Applicant had committed sexual harassment. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the disciplinary sanction of separation from service with compensation in lieu of notice and with termination indemnity was proportionate and lawful. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that as the Appellant¡¯s actions were not work-related in a strict sense, it would have been better for Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT to have relied on Staff Regulation 1. 2(a) and 1. 2(f). Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Secretary-General¡¯s determination that the Appellant¡¯s behaviour amounted to serious misconduct was a reasonable exercise of his discretion. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that it was a reasonable exercise of the Secretary-General¡¯s discretion to determine that the Appellant¡¯s behaviour rendered him unfit for further service with the Organisation. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the main requirements of due process were met and that any other possible procedural irregularities during the disciplinary investigation, such as the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s decision not to hold an oral hearing, were of no consequence given the kind and amount of evidence proving the misconduct, applying the no-difference principle. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT rejected the Appellant¡¯s claim for compensation. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the appeal and affirmed the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judgment.