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The circumstances of the Applicant's severe illness, travel difficulties and the security issues in Sudan were all worthy considerations duly taken into account by the Organization during efforts made to accommodate the Applicant and achieve partial resolution as aforementioned. On receipt of the Applicant¡¯s management evaluation request, it was also within the discretion of the Respondent based on staff rule 11.2(c) to extend the 60- day deadline. That discretion, however, does not extend to the Tribunal. The Tribunal has no jurisdiction to waive the management evaluation request deadlines...

The Applicant was terminated without being given the statutory three months¡¯ notice. Without that notice, the regulatory framework provides that compensation in lieu of the three months¡¯ notice had to be paid. For reasons similar to those stated in Ahmed, the grant of SLWFP to the Applicant for part of the period neither supplants nor equates to the Respondent¡¯s obligation to have given the Applicant his due notice on 10 September 2010. The Staff Regulation and Rules requires the staff member to either be given notice or payment in lieu of that notice. The Applicant in this case received...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an appeal by the Secretary-General on the matter of the interest. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT has the power to award interest but erred in ordering the payment of interest at the rate of eight per cent per annum. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT allowed the appeal in part, set aside the award of interest from the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judgment, and awarded interest at the US Prime Rate applicable at the date that the entitlements became due. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that if the judgment was not executed within 60 days, five per cent should be added to the US Prime Rate from the date of expiry of the 60-day period to the date of payment of the...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT did not exceed its competence in ordering the payment of interest from the due date of the relocation grant, but that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT had erred in setting the interest rate at 8 per cent. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that both Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT and Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT must have the power to award interest in the normal course of ordering compensation. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT affirmed the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judgment and Order No. 30 to the extent that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT awarded interest on the relocation grant and replaced the interest rate of 8 per cent with the United States prime rate applicable on 4 May 2008 (5 per cent).

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT observed that the Appellant did not challenge the reasoning of Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT, but appealed on the ground that the administrative policy in place should be changed because she was promoted but her gross income was reduced. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that the Appellant¡¯s pay calculations also took into account other deductions and increases such that her net income increased. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the real issue before it was whether Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT made a reversible error in fact or law such that it must allow the appeal. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that the Appellant did not disagree that, on its face, the calculations of her salary were made...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that the staff members had accepted the lump-sum calculated by the ICTY travel unit while reiterating their disagreement with the calculation. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT erred in finding that by accepting a lump-sum payment for home leave travel, the staff members forfeited any right to contest the calculation of the amount of the lump sum payment. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT remanded the case to Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT for consideration on the merits.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that there were exceptional circumstances in this case that required a waiver of the time limit, with respect to A/RES/63/253. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the JAB showed inconsistency in its treatment of the cases of Tabari and Shehadeh; both cases were decided on the same day by the same panel, but in Tabari¡¯s case there was a split verdict with the majority view being that there was no administrative decision that Tabari could appeal. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Appellant successfully demonstrated the manner in which the anomaly had arisen and noted that the Internal Review Panel took no action to...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an appeal by Secretary-General. The Secretary-General contended that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT erred by failing to recognize that the second contract by which Mr. Castelli¡¯s appointment was extended beyond a year was invalid because it had not been submitted for review by a central review body. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that, unless it is fake or fraudulent, a staff member¡¯s appointment contract gives rise to entitlements upon the signing and acceptance by the staff member of their letter of appointment. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that this is true even where the administration improperly handled the recruitment process. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that the Appellants did not refer to any article of the Regulations that provides that the full retirement benefit may be restored after a participant opts to commute a portion of the retirement benefit into a lump sum. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Appellants were bound by their decision to accept one-third of their pension as a lump sum and a reduced pension. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Appellant¡¯s decision could not simply be reversed. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT rejected the argument that the Appellants had been discriminated against and that their basic fundamental rights concerning equity, fairness, and justice under...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that the language on overtime was interpreted for around 50 years in one way and then was changed and that there was some ambiguity in the provision. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that it was still unclear on some issues surrounding whether it was proper for Staff Rules to apply differently in different duty stations and that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT should hear evidence on the issue, including on potential differences in application amongst departments in New York. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT vacated the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judgment and remanded it to Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT for further proceedings.