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Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the additional documents filed by the Appellant were inadmissible in that they were not relevant to the central issue in the present case. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT was correct in finding that the Appellant failed to identify a specific decision that had a direct and adverse impact on his contractual rights and thus did not identify an administrative decision capable of being reviewed. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT was correct in concluding that there was no evidence of the Appellant having requested management evaluation of any administrative decision, nor any evidence of having submitted...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the staff member¡¯s retirement benefit from the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵJSPF including the monthly periodic pension benefit was not subject to taxation and/or payment of statutory deductions and that therefore, any challenge with respect to the application and meaning of the words ¡°gross¡± and ¡°net¡± was merely semantic. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the ASHI premium was a voluntary payment that was deducted by the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵJSPF at the behest of a beneficiary and therefore could not be treated as or deemed to be a statutory deduction. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the appeal.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Standing Committee correctly determined that the applicable rules provide that the pension participant is required to inform Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵJPSF in writing of the benefit election made and of any commutation elected and that there was no provision for third party advisement. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Standing Committee¡¯s reliance on Article 30(b) of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵJSPF Regulations as a rationale for its finding that a deferred retirement benefit became payable to Ms. Assebe upon her separation from service was flawed on the basis that she did not elect for a deferred retirement benefit. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that there was nothing arbitrary about the impugned decision of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵJSPF, as it was based on reports by the Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund between July 2011 and February 2013. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that good reason had been established for the CEO to decide on 31 July 2011 as the proper date for the suspension of the two-track system in Argentina, notwithstanding that there were previous statements regarding the reliability of the consumer price index (CPI) data in Argentina. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that it was satisfied that such a decision was a proper...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that the Appellant was not bringing a claim that he did not receive the benefits and entitlements which pertained to a temporary appointment, but rather his allegation was that the General Assembly resolutions which gave rise to the rules and administrative issuances regulating his employment did not adhere to the principle of equal pay for equal work and were contrary to a myriad of international human rights instruments to which the Organisation was bound to adhere. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the policy change for staff members on temporary contracts was binding on the Secretary-General, who...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that, while it may be argued that the Appellant did not request her transfer to Amman, she consented to it, and the transfer was effected for her personal convenience. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the text of Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA Area Staff Rule 107. 9 was clear and that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA DT correctly concluded that she was not entitled to the payment which she sought. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that, contrary to the Appellant¡¯s submissions, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA DT did not exclude her evidence. Recalling the broad discretion of Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA DT to ascertain the weight to attach to the evidence before it, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA found that the Appellant¡¯s evidence...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that there was no error in the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA DT decision that the Appellant did not challenge a discretionary administrative decision that breached the terms of his appointment, rather, he was challenging the rule providing for the manner in which separation benefits should be calculated, including the applicable interest rate. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Appellant did not challenge an appealable administrative decision in that he did not contest a unilateral decision taken by the administration in a precise individual case. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA DT correctly held that the publication of interest...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT had before it an appeal against both Order No. 63 (GVA/2014) and Summary judgment No. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT/2014/061. On the Appellant¡¯s additional filings and motions to submit additional pleadings, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that there were no exceptional circumstances that warranted the inclusion of any of the additional material in the appeal and denied the motions. On the Appellant¡¯s motion requesting Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT to intervene in matters which fell outside the scope of the appeal, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT denied the motion. On the Appellant¡¯s appeal of Order No. 63 (GVA/2014), Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT rejected the appeal on the basis that her appeal grounds did...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered appeals by both Mr Aliko and the Secretary-General. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT correctly concluded that Mr Aliko¡¯s application contesting the decision refusing his request to change nationality for Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵ purposes was time-barred. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT did not err in rejecting as not receivable Mr Aliko¡¯s claims against the decisions on his ineligibility for education grant and on education grant recovery. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that it was lawful for the Administration to use Mr Aliko¡¯s pending entitlements to recover part of his indebtedness to the Organisation. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT erred in concluding...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT erred in unilaterally establishing new starting points for the time to run for the purpose of filing claims with the ABCC that were contrary to the express text of Article 12 of Appendix D to the Staff Rules. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that this was a case where the staff member failed to appreciate the filing deadlines. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that ignorance of the law was no excuse for missing deadlines. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that it was open to the ABCC to find that the Appellant¡¯s explanation for her delay did not constitute exceptional circumstances justifying the waiving of the four-month time limit prescribed...