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According to the available record, the applicant never received a letter of appointment and no such letter was ever signed by an authorized official. He did not, therefore, become a staff member of the United Nations within the meaning of article 3, paragraph 1, of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT Statute. It follows that the applicant has no access to the system of administration of justice in its present state. It is noted that the General Assembly has requested the Secretary-General to investigate the option of granting access to non-staff personnel. Outcome: the application was rejected.

According to former staff regulations 9.1 and 9.3, the decision to offer an agreed termination is within the discretion of the Secretary-General. In accordance with the ¡°note on agreed termination¡±, a guideline used by Administration to ensure equal treatment, the applicant was not in a situation in which the Organization may have considered that an agreed termination was in the interest of the good administration. In fact, his health problems were not grave enough to prevent the proper exercise of his functions in accordance with the recommendations of the Medical Joint Service. Neither did...

The Applicant withdrew her application and therefore Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT closed the proceedings.

Since the applicant, in a timely manner, addressed his requests to competent officials within the former system of internal justice and followed the advice received from them, it was beyond his control that he did not file his request for administrative review within the time limits; therefore, exceptional circumstances are given. In view of the provision of the letter of appointment quoted above, no termination was possible without keeping a thirty days notice period. The decision to terminate the appointment with immediate effect is in noncompliance with the applicant¡¯s terms of appointment...

No exceptional circumstances justifying a waiver of time limits prescribed in former staff rule 111.2 (a) could be found. The Applicant having served for long time in the Organization, she had ample opportunity to become familiar with the applicable rules. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect the applicant to be acquainted with the rules on time limits. The Applicant was not induced into error by MEU response as to the outcome she could expect from a procedure before the Tribunal. The transition to the new justice system cannot be said to have affected the Applicant¡¯s ability to timely...

The Tribunal reiterated a general principle of procedural law that the right to institute legal proceedings is based on a legitimate interest in initiating and maintaining legal action. Access to the court is denied to those who are obviously no longer interested in the proceedings they once instituted. This applies to the Applicant who did not respond to any of the Tribunal¡¯s requests.

Under the given circumstances, the application for an extension of time could not be considered as an application on the merits. No exceptional circumstances for an extension of time could be found. Lack of legal counsel normally does not constitute an exceptional circumstance. Since the Applicant had learned one month before the end of the time limit that OSLA would not take her case, it was appropriate and reasonable for the Applicant to submit an application by herself within the time limits.

In accordance with former staff rule 111.2 (a) (i), the Applicant had only one month as of the receipt of the Secretary-General¡¯s reply to submit an appeal to the JAB. The Tribunal noted that the Applicant received the reply to her request for review on 31 January 2008 and that the JAB received her appeal only on 31 March 2008. Hence, the Tribunal considered that the Applicant¡¯s appeal was late. The Tribunal examined the record of facts and concluded that no exceptional circumstances existed, which may justify a waiver of the time limits for the submission of the statement of appeal to the JAB...

In cases deemed suitable to be decided by summary judgment, usually an oral hearing is not necessary. In non-disciplinary cases, it is a matter of judicial discretion to hold an oral hearing or to abstain from it. The mandate of Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT is confined to the review of administrative decisions. Although the definition of this term may be disputed, it is beyond question that administrative decisions must by essence be taken by the Administration. Since the decisions of former Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT are judicial decisions, they cannot be contested before Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT. The provisions on transitional measures apply to pending...

The mandate of Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT is confined to the review of administrative decisions. Although the definition of this term may be disputed, it is beyond question that administrative decisions must by essence be taken by the Administration. Since the decisions of former Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT are judicial decisions, they cannot be contested before Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT. The provisions on transitional measures apply to pending Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT cases only. They do not include the power to revise Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT judgements. Cases closed by judgments of former Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT are res iudicata.

Time limits for contesting administrative decisions are well known and widespread instruments in administrative law, both in national and in international jurisdictions. Compared to the time limits in some national and international systems, the time limits in the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵ justice system remain within a reasonable frame. As for exceptions, ¡°exceptional cases¡± arise from exceptional personal circumstances. Relevant factors for an Applicant¡¯s failure to act within the prescribed time limits are confined to his individual capacities. Factors like the prospects of success on the merits and the...

According to the Organization¡¯s broad discretion to reassign its employees to different functions, provided that the new position is in line with the grade, qualifications and professional experience, the Applicant could have been redeployed in principle. As legally required prior consultations with staff representatives were not held and - in addition - the agency showed lack of good faith by informing the Applicant only by ¡®all staff e-mail¡¯, procedural flaws vitiated the contested decision. Regardless of its significance, non-compliance with legal provisions specified in art. 2.1 Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT...

Although a series of resolutions of the General Assembly authorized the Secretary-General (provided a number of conditions were fulfilled) to reappoint under the I00 series of the Staff Rules mission staff whose service under 300 series contracts had reached the four-year limit, there had never been any legal obligation to do so. Even if the principles of Handelsman were applied to this case, no express promise for converting the appointments could be found. Furthemore the Applicants failed to exhaust internal remedies in a timely manner, since they did not initiate formal proceedings against...

The decision was illegal since the Applicant, as a 15-day mark candidate, had been found suitable and therefore, in application of Section 7.1 of ST/AI/2006/3, the Administration was precluded from considering and selecting 30-day mark candidates. The Administration is bound to strictly adhere to the unambiguous terms of an administrative instruction.The Administration has discretionary power to set down reasonable standards to determine if a candidate has ¡°working knowledge¡± of a certain language, which it did in the present case.The Administration, in its dealing with staff members, has to...

Since the Applicant only pointed out that the non-implementation of the indicated provision had restricted her options to be selected for posts in some duty stations, she failed to identify any such administrative decision. The Tribunal stressed that a selection process involves a series of steps which lead to an administrative decision. It stated that only if the Applicant contested the outcome of a selection process for a specific post (the administrative decision), would the Tribunal be competent to hear and pass judgement on her application.

In the present case, the Administration must be deemed to have made good faith efforts to identify a position for the Applicant, for it actually offered him an adequate position. For a position to be considered adequate, it is not sufficient that it is at the same level than the previous position of the concerned staff member. It is also required that it be in line with his/her skills, qualifications and experience. Anyone alleging that a given decision was based on improper motivation bears the burden of proof. Outcome: The application was rejected. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵADT Judgment No. 910 (1998)

The Tribunal highlights the necessity of management evaluation, quoting Nwuke and Caldarone. It is not enough to merely initiate the procedure. On the contrary, the result of Management evaluation has to be awaited generally, before an application may be submitted to the Tribunal. It is not within the Applicant's discretion to evade management evaluation which is considered useless. Outcome: Application was dismissed.

Two types of interim measures - with different functions, preconditions, restrictions and scope - have to be clearly distinguished. Art. 13 RoP has to be applied exclusively during the pendency of the management evaluation, whereas art. 14 RoP is appropriate only during judicial review in terms of art. 2 and 8 Statute; in short: it is either 13 or 14 ¨C never both. Orders based on art. 13 RoP become ineffective with the end of management evaluation. The present application had to be considered under art. 13 RoP since the contested decision of 12 October 2009 was released under new conditions...

The Tribunal limited its review to the time-bar of the request for review in July 2009. Since former Staff Rules were applicable to this case, the Morsy judgment and the broader definition of "exceptional cases" with reference to art. 8.3 Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT Statute, art. 7.5 Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT RoP had to remain out of consideration. The question whether Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT has jurisdiction to waive time limits under the former system of internal justice - denied in Costa - could be left open, because no "exceptional circumstances" could be accepted. It was the Applicant's free will to await the outcome of the investigations, instead¡¤of...

As the Applicants did not respond at all to the Tribunal¡¯s requests, they therefore must be deemed to have abandoned the legal proceedings they instituted.Outcome: Application was dismissed.