Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵ

AAF appealed.

The Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT agreed with the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT that the Secretary-General had not committed any procedural errors which would have render the contested decision unlawful.

The Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the shortcomings under Section 2.2 of ST/SGB/2019/3 could only be regarded as substantial procedural irregularities (rendering the refusal to implement flexible working arrangements unlawful) if the lack of providing such reasoning had impacted the staff member¡¯s due process rights, namely his or her possibility of challenging the administrative decision before the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT. As the Secretary-General had...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an appeal by the Secretary-General. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that it was satisfied that the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s conclusion that Ms Frechon was incapable of further service, based on the findings of the Medical Board, was not tantamount to Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT having stepped into the shoes of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵ Medical Director. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that there were no grounds to disagree with the finding of Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT that Ms Frechon¡¯s contract was, in fact, terminated for medical reasons. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the procedure which should have been invoked was that set out in ST/AI/1999/16. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT was correct in rescinding the decision to...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an appeal by the Secretary-General against judgment Nos. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT/2011/209 (on liability) and Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT/2012/062 (on relief). Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that there was no evidence to support the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s conclusion that, had the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵ Staff Pension Committee (Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵSPC) not proceeded with its determination, Ms Shanks would more likely than not have been found fit to resume her duties. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the only valid conclusion available on the medical evidence was that Ms Shanks was not entitled to return to work on a part-time basis since she was not able to obtain medical clearance permitting it. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that...

On the decision to postpone the separation on medical grounds, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that a staff member had a right to be compensated for a service-incurred injury. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT found that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA DT erred in law in determining the decision to postpone the Appellant¡¯s separation on medical grounds until the end of the disciplinary process was lawful. Noting that the Appellant did not provide any evidence in support of his claim of psychological suffering (or harm), Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT did not award moral compensation. On the issue of the SLWOP, given the nature and seriousness of the allegations against the Appellant, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA DT...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Appellant failed to identify grounds for his appeal. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Appellant¡¯s case was fully and fairly considered. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA DT correctly based its conclusion about the legality of the termination decision on the medical assessment by the medical board and without medical findings of its own. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the decision to terminate the Appellant¡¯s appointment on medical grounds was a reasonable and valid exercise of Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA¡¯s discretion. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Appellant did not meet the burden of proof of demonstrating an error in the impugned judgment such as...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an appeal by the Secretary-General. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT exceeded its competence in reviewing Mr Omwanda¡¯s EOD date, as it was not subject to a timely request for management evaluation. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Mr Omwanda knew or ought to have known from his Letter of Appointment the date from which his appointment was effective, that he had been re-employed, not reinstated, and that its terms applied regardless of any period of former service. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT was statutorily barred from hearing Mr Omwanda¡¯s application. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT upheld the appeal and vacated the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judgment.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered appeals from both Mr. Sirhan and the Commissioner-General. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA DT exceeded its competence and erred in fact and law by rescinding the decision to terminate Mr. Sirhan on medical grounds. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the decision to convene a Medical Board more than one month after Mr. Sirhan¡¯s service-incurred injury in order to examine his fitness for continued service with Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA was reasonable. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA DT erred in law in interpreting the Area Staff Rules as requiring Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA to provide injured staff members adequate time for recovery before deciding to appoint a...

According to former staff regulations 9.1 and 9.3, the decision to offer an agreed termination is within the discretion of the Secretary-General. In accordance with the ¡°note on agreed termination¡±, a guideline used by Administration to ensure equal treatment, the applicant was not in a situation in which the Organization may have considered that an agreed termination was in the interest of the good administration. In fact, his health problems were not grave enough to prevent the proper exercise of his functions in accordance with the recommendations of the Medical Joint Service. Neither did...

The Applicant¡¯s fixed term-appointment came to an end as a result of her service-incurred injury. The Applicant¡¯s fixed-term appointment was in fact terminated and it is disingenuous for the Respondent to argue that ¡°it was allowed to run until the end of the term and was not renewed on medical grounds.¡± The administrative decision not to renew the Applicant¡¯s fixed-term appointment due to the Applicant¡¯s inability to resume her professional activities with ICTR in Arusha was informed by improper motive. The applicable procedural rules that should have been followed by the Respondent in this...