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Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that it was not persuaded that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA DT erred in procedure or otherwise exceeded its jurisdiction such as to warrant reversal of the judgment. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that there was no reason to differ from Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA DT¡¯s findings that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA had no reason to refer the Appellant to a medical board and that the issue was not relevant as the Appellant did not contest that he was unfit for service, nor did he allege that his health problems were related to his service with Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT further noted that, as the Appellant was over sixty years of age, he was not eligible for a disability benefit. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the decision not to refer the Appellant to a medical board was reasonable and a valid exercise of Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA¡¯s discretion, as there was no error of fact resulting in a manifestly unreasonable decision and the Appellant did not meet his burden of proof of demonstrating an error such as to warrant the judgment¡¯s reversal. On the issue of placing the Appellant on SLWOP, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT agreed with Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA DT¡¯s finding that it was reasonable and therefore lawful. On the decision to defer payment of separation benefits, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT agreed with the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA DT¡¯s finding that the decision was not unreasonable and there was no mala fides on the part of the Administration. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the delay in the payment of the separation benefits was entirely attributable to the Appellant. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Appellant¡¯s claim of conflict of interest was raised for the first time on appeal and as such, not receivable. The appeal was dismissed and the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA DT judgment affirmed.