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Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT Judgment was inconsistent in finding parts of the application irreceivable but not addressing what was to happen to the balance of the claim which was receivable. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that to the extent that the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT held that some of the Appellant¡¯s claims were not receivable as they were not filed within time after management evaluation, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT did not err in fact or law and Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT upheld such conclusions. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that there were errors by Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT in respect of which the appeal had to be allowed, which were: (1) the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT decision not to receive the application in respect of claims that were made after management evaluation and within the time limit; and (2) the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT decision not to receive the application because of the Appellant¡¯s use of the word ¡°negligence¡± in relation to the Secretary-General¡¯s actions or omissions. On the error relating to negligence, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the preferable analysis of the issue was that there was no independent cause of action in the tort of negligence available to staff members in the Appellant¡¯s circumstances and such a claim was thereby irreceivable, with the proper remedy being to sever that impugned cause of action but to receive the balance of the application which was within jurisdiction. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT allowed the appeal in part, set aside the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s finding of irreceivability and remanded the matter to the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT for decision on its merits based on and limited to those matters referred to in the Appellant¡¯s second management evaluation request.