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Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵJSPF¡¯s contention that Ms. Larriera had known since 2003 that she was not recognized as a widow by Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵJSPF, interpreted as having the meaning that she should have timely filed her request for review and subsequently her appeal to Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT at that time, was without merit. In the absence of an explicit decision by the Administration denying her the entitlement, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ms Larriera could not and ought not to be expected to presume that such a decision was taken. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ms. Larriera¡¯s request for review was receivable ratione materiae and that Ms. Larriera¡¯s appeal was...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the ISA JAB decision was correct in its finding that the appeal was receivable and not time-barred. However, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Special Agreement and the resulting Staff Rules did not comply with the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT Statute, which required a neutral first instance process, and that, accordingly, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT was unable to exercise its jurisdiction as a second level tribunal. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT remanded the matter to the JAB to ensure compliance with the jurisdictional requirements of the Special Agreement and Article 2(10) of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT Statute, specifying that the Appellant¡¯s appeal should be reconsidered and...

This case was presided by Judge Halfeld, and Judge Murphy drafted the majority opinion. The Majority (Halfeld, Murphy, Raikos and Knierim) dismissed the appeal and held that the appeal was not receivable. Without deciding on the issue whether the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT has an inherent right to hold a non-party in contempt, the Majority found that the appeal did not meet the requirements of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT Statute. The Majority explained that it had jurisdiction ratione materiae to hear and pass judgment on an appeal pursuant to Article 2(1) of the Statute in which it is asserted that the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT has: (a) exceeded its...

On the request for the oral hearing, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the matter could be considered just as well on written submissions and that it was not persuaded that an oral hearing was necessary in the interests of justice. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Appellant¡¯s complaints were about the content of the orders made, not about whether Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT was empowered to make such orders, and as such, his appeal was not receivable and had to be dismissed. Noting that the case would be dismissed, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT made the following observations on the merits of the appeal: (1) Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT was entitled to determine issues of receivability in...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT remanded the case to the SAB, directing that the appeal be reconsidered by a neutral first instance process that issues a final decision. Citing Dispert & Hoe, Spinardi, Sheffer, Fogarty, and Fogarty et al., the Tribunal explained that the SAB must satisfy the requirement under Article 2 (10) of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT Statute, which requires that the first instance process produce a final decision on the appeal and not a recommendation to the Secretary-General, as was the case under the then IMO Staff Regulations and Staff Rules (SRSR). The Tribunal also called into question whether the IMO Secretary...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the appeal, finding it not receivable. The Tribunal explained Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT decisions on applications for suspension of action are not subject to appeal, pursuant to Article 2(2) of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT Statute. The Tribunal also noted that this case did not fall under the narrow exceptions when appeals against interlocutory orders are allowed, i.e. when it is alleged that the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT has exceeded its competence or jurisdiction. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT did not find any excess of jurisdiction in the instant case and therefore deemed the appeal irreceivable.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA DT erred in law by not taking account of evidence implying strongly that there had been an administrative decision by Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA not to pay allowances to those who claimed them as their entitlement, and therefore concluding wrongly that there was no evidence of an administrative decision affecting the Appellant¡¯s rights. However, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA DT¡¯s Judgment dismissing the Appellant¡¯s claim had to be upheld on grounds of lateness of their request for management evaluation. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the appeals and upheld the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA DT Judgment.

The Tribunals do not have reviewability of ICSC decisions, they do have jurisdiction to review the Secretary-General¡¯s mechanical power in implementing such decisions on narrow grounds for legality. The ICSC decision to adjust the salary scale and post-adjustment allowance multiplier was not a reviewable decision. The Secretary-General¡¯s implementation of that decision was an administrative decision as it was not a general policy but had adverse individual impact per staff member via their payslips and was therefore receivable. While receivable the ICSC decision remained not reviewable for...

The Tribunals do not have reviewability of ICSC decisions, they do have jurisdiction to review the Secretary-General¡¯s mechanical power in implementing such decisions on narrow grounds for legality. The ICSC decision to adjust the salary scale and post-adjustment allowance multiplier was not a reviewable decision. The Secretary-General¡¯s implementation of that decision was an administrative decision as it was not a general policy but had adverse individual impact per staff member via their payslips and was therefore receivable. While receivable the ICSC decision remained not reviewable for...

The Tribunals do not have reviewability of ICSC decisions, they do have jurisdiction to review the Secretary-General¡¯s mechanical power in implementing such decisions on narrow grounds for legality. The ICSC decision to adjust the salary scale and post-adjustment allowance multiplier was not a reviewable decision. The Secretary-General¡¯s implementation of that decision was an administrative decision as it was not a general policy but had adverse individual impact per staff member via their payslips and was therefore receivable. While receivable the ICSC decision remained not reviewable for...