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Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT rejected the request for an oral hearing since there was no need for further clarification of the issues arising from the appeal. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that it had subject matter jurisdiction to hear the appeal and that the appeal was receivable. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT had correctly concluded that it had no subject matter jurisdiction to receive the application because the application was brought before the wrong tribunal and the application should have been brought before Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA DT. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT had correctly concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to receive the application because...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that it would not lightly interfere with the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s exercise of its jurisdictional powers, conferred on Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT by its Statute, which enables cases to be judged fairly and expeditiously. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the complaints made by the Secretary-General fell squarely within the jurisdiction and competence of Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT, notwithstanding the alleged breach of procedural fairness. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the appeal was not receivable. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the appeal and affirmed the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judgment.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT rejected the request for an oral hearing considering it not necessary and that it would unduly delay the delivery of the judgment. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that appeals against decisions taken in the course of proceedings, including orders imposing interim measures, were non-receivable, even when Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT committed an error of law or fact. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the appeal and upheld the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judgment.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered the three appeals by the Secretary-General against the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT Orders. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the appeals were receivable because: (1) Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT exceeded its jurisdiction under Article 2. 2 of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT Statute by ordering the suspension of the contested decision beyond the date of completion of management evaluation; and (2) Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT exceeded its jurisdiction under Article 10. 2 of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT Statute by ordering, during the proceedings, a suspension of the contested decision as an interim measure in a case of appointment. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Order No. 129 suspended the contested decision beyond...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered the Secretary-General¡¯s appeal. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that, in converting on its own motion an application for suspension into an application on the merits, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT had taken an ultra petita decision, ordering measures not requested of it. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that, in taking the contested decision while a management evaluation was under way, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT had breached the provisions of Article 8 of its Statute, which makes prior management evaluation compulsory whenever one is requested. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that, in ordering the placement of the application for suspension on the list of cases to be considered on the...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT granted the Secretary-General¡¯s appeal on the basis that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT manifestly exceeded its jurisdictional powers by converting an application for suspension of action into an application on merits and inviting the parties to make submissions on the merits. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT took an ultra petita decision by ordering measures for which no claim had been made.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an appeal against Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT Orders No. 082 (NBI/2011) and No. 083 (NBI/2011) by the Secretary-General. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the main motivation for ordering the suspension of action in Order No. 82 was to grant access to justice to the staff member and that the Order could be sustained because a certain degree of discretion had to be awarded to Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT to consider and resolve urgent matters such as interim measures. On Order No. 83, which extended the suspension of action until 12 August 2011, in breach of the five working days restrictive period to render the decision, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that, in considering an appeal filed by a former ICAO staff member, it was reviewing a decision taken by an executive authority (i. e. ICAO Secretary-General) on the basis of the conclusions and recommendations of the AJAB, and not a judgment delivered by a professional, independent court of first instance determining the issue itself through its decision, i. e., Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that to that extent, the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT Statute is only applicable to such an appeal insofar as, and on condition that its provisions are compatible with the judgment of an appeal directed against a decision taken by...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered the Secretary-General's appeal of Order No. 081 (NBI/2011) and two appeals by Mr Nwuke against Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT Order No. 101 (NBI/2011) and judgment No. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT/2012/002. The Secretary-General asserted that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT exceeded its jurisdiction in ordering the suspension of a contested decision without making a finding as to whether the requirements for suspension of action under Article 2(2) of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT Statute had been met. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT did not respect the limit of five working days, as set forth in Villamoran (2011-Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT-160), when it extended the suspension until 17 August 2011 when the...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered the appeal, in which the Secretary-General requested that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT consider the appeal receivable and find that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT exceeded its competence in ordering a suspension of action on the decision not to extend Mr Rawat¡¯s appointment. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that, in imminently executing the administrative order, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT failed to comply with the five-working-day limit, set forth in Villamoran (2011-Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT-160), without giving any reasons for doing so and thus, clearly exceeded its competence. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT consequently held that the appeal against the contested order was receivable and founded. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT rescinded...