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Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an appeal by Mr Wu and a cross-appeal by the Secretary-General. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the cross-appeal was receivable, despite it being a default judgment and the Secretary-General not having been allowed to participate in the proceedings or to file a reply. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the application was not receivable ratione materiae on the basis that he had not made a timely request for management evaluation. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that therefore Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT had no jurisdiction to address the merits of the claims in the application and those claims were not properly before Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT for consideration. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that neither Article 11 of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT Statute nor Article 2(7)(b) of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT Statute conferred any jurisdiction to hear an application for revision of a judgment of the former Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵ Administrative Tribunal. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the application before Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT was not receivable because Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT had no jurisdiction to hear the application. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that, while it confirmed the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s conclusion, it found that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT, in reaching its conclusion, relied on the wrong reasons and failed to follow the binding jurisprudence of Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the appeal.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held, without examining the merits, that a staff member cannot create a platform to re-open the possibilities of challenging an administrative decision not impugned at the time it was issued for reasons that did not exist at that time. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the reconsideration sought by the Appellant was based on the analysis of administrative decisions that had no direct or particular effects on him, but on other staff members. On the allegation that a second decision was taken at a later date, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that it was nothing more than a consequence of the earlier decision, which had already been...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that there was no error in Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s finding that the application was moot and thus, not receivable. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s decision to dispose of the issue of compensation as part of another case was a case management decision well within the discretion of Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT and caused no injustice to the Appellant. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT observed that it should never have been called on to review the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s decision since the fact that the application was moot was obvious. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Appellant had manifestly abused the appeals process by filing an appeal that was blatantly frivolous. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT opined that the...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT correctly concluded that applications to the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT, be they from serving or former staff members (such as the Appellant), are only receivable if the applicant has previously submitted the contested administrative decision for management evaluation. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT found no merit in the Appellant¡¯s interpretation of the relevant provisions that, as a former staff member, he was exempted from the requirement for management evaluation. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT upheld the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s consideration that in the event of any ambiguity or contradiction between the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT Statute and the Staff Rules, the former must...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that there was no merit in the appeal as Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT correctly concluded that applications to Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT were only receivable if the applicant had previously submitted the contested administrative decision for management evaluation and that management evaluation was a mandatory first step. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the appeal and affirmed the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judgment.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an application for revision of judgment No. 2011-Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT-154. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the new evidence was irrelevant because the case was not receivable; neither Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT nor Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT had jurisdiction to hear Mr. Sims¡¯ case. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT denied the application.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered the Secretary-General¡¯s appeal of Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT Order No. 233, which contended that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT exceeded its competence in issuing an order as there was no matter for adjudication after Ms Chocobar withdrew her application. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT found that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT, in making its Order in the absence of a case to adjudicate, lacked jurisdiction and exceeded its competence to a significant degree. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that Article 36 of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT RoP did not provide a legal basis for the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT Order, as there was no case before Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT to which Article 36 could apply. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT further noted that Article 36 does not allow Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT to...

As a preliminary matter, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT denied the Appellant¡¯s request for an oral hearing and considered his grounds of appeal. With respect to the claimed errors of procedure, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT found no merit in the Appellant¡¯s arguments. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT was not persuaded that the Appellant suffered prejudice by Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA DT admitting the Commissioner-General¡¯s late reply, failing to translate the reply into Arabic, failing to lift the confidentiality order, or by failing to hold an oral hearing. However, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT found that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA DT exceeded its jurisdiction in finding that the Appellant had an unhealthy working relationship with...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered the Appellant¡¯s submission that she let the deadline elapse primarily because she was confused by the first sentence of the message she received from the Office of the Deputy High Commissioner. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that this circumstance was previously considered by Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT was satisfied that the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s pronouncement was in accordance with the established case law. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT rejected the appeal.