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Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an appeal by the Secretary-General against the judgment on the merits (Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT/2011/054) and two further appeals by both the Secretary-General and the Applicant of the judgment on compensation (Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT/2011/131). Relying on its previous holding in Bertucci (2011/Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT/114), Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT erred in finding that the Administration violated the Applicant¡¯s due process rights, as no actual prejudice was found. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the established facts, as admitted by the Applicant, clearly demonstrated that he engaged in the sexual harassment of local employees and used his position of...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an appeal by the Secretary-General. Noting the absence of a written record, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that it could not confirm if the procedure under Article 17 (Oral Evidence) of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT RoP was complied with, whether the witnesses made a declaration under Article 17(3) of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT RoP before giving their statements, or whether the witnesses were cross-examined by the opposing party under Article 17(1) of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT RoP. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT set aside the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judgment and remanded the case to Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT for a fresh hearing based on the pleadings already on record in a matter consistent with the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT judgment.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered the appeal, in which the Appellant contended that exceptional circumstances existed that would merit a waiver of the time limit, allowing his application to be admitted. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that, in such an instance, it is the applicant¡¯s responsibility to convince the tribunal of such circumstances. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT found that the Appellant did not overcome this hurdle before Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT and held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT did not err in rejecting the Appellant¡¯s contentions that he had exceptional circumstances. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT further held that ignorance of the law is no excuse and the Appellant¡¯s reliance on erroneous advice...

The Appellant appealed the amount of damages awarded by Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT and claimed additional compensation for the excessive delay of more than four years, from the date she requested an administrative review to the date of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judgment. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Appellant had been adequately compensated and noted that, unless she could show that she was singled out to work more than her similarly placed colleagues, it would be difficult to conclude that the Chief demanding a higher work output from the Appellant constituted harassment. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the appeal and affirmed the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judgment.

The Secretary-General¡¯s appeal and Mr Cabrera¡¯s cross-appeal centred on the issue of whether placing a staff member on SLWFP violates their due process rights. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that, in this case, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT created a new class of special leave, where the staff member was actually suspended with full pay. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT did not agree with the Secretary-General¡¯s contention that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT erred in concluding that the Office of Internal Oversight Services¡¯ investigation was not a preliminary investigation, as Mr Cabrera was put on leave using all the reasons under which he could be suspended. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT found that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered Ms Comerford-Verzuu¡¯s appeal and the Secretary-General¡¯s cross-appeal, regarding whether Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT was correct in holding that the contested decision was dated 2 August 2005 and that the request for administrative review was time-barred. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT found that the OIOS reply of 2 August 2005 was the administrative decision of which Ms Comerford-Verzuu was seeking a review. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the subsequent correspondence was unwarranted and did not extend the time limit for seeking administrative review of the first administrative order. Accordingly, the time limit for seeking administrative...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an appeal by the Secretary-General. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held, in agreement with the Secretary-General, agreed that there were no grounds to award compensation. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that there was no administrative decision being contested in this case, as both parties accepted the decision to promote Ms Kamal and she had not identified any illegality that could lead to an award of compensation. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT found that the delay in completing the selection process could not be considered a valid ground for compensation, since the circumstances of the case did not show any negligence or violation of specific...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT was correct in finding that the statement dated 26 November 2003 was neither a decision to terminate the Appellant¡¯s appointment nor a disciplinary measure. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the statement was merely a publicly stated opinion which had no legal consequences on the Appellant who, in addition to having already been informed on 29 October 2003 that his contract would not be renewed beyond 30 November 2003, had also declared that he would not be able or willing to continue working for Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵODC after his contract expired. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT accordingly dismissed the appeal and affirmed the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT...

The Appellant contested the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT finding that he was afforded full and fair consideration for the position of Chief and argued that he suffered unfair and discriminatory treatment. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that if the Administration does not comply with a Tribunal¡¯s order to disclose the reasons for an administrative decision, as such, the Tribunal cannot automatically conclude that the decision was arbitrary, but it is entitled to draw an adverse inference from the refusal. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT affirmed the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT finding that the Administration¡¯s decision must be deemed unlawful, as the Secretary-General refused to comply...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that there was no valid claim of unfair treatment and discrimination by the Appellant against the former Chief of ATS and Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT therefore correctly limited its consideration to the interview process. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Appellant was merely repeating arguments that were adequately considered by Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT and that there were no reasons to reverse Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s judgment. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the appeal and affirmed the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judgment.