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Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an appeal by the Secretary-General against judgment No. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT/2012/159; an appeal by the ¡°Applicant¡± (anonymity granted) against judgment No. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT/2013/079; and a cross-appeal by the Secretary-General of judgment No. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT/2013/079. On receivability, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered the Secretary-General¡¯s case that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT erred on the issue of receivability as the non-disciplinary issues contested by the Applicant were never submitted for management evaluation. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT, in deciding that the non-disciplinary issues had been submitted for management evaluation, erred in law and in fact...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an appeal by the Secretary-General. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT failed to show proper consideration for judicial economy and efficiency by choosing to proceed with a hearing on the merits of Mr Cooke¡¯s application in full knowledge of an appeal by the Secretary-General and ignoring the possibility that its judgment on Receivability might be reversed, as it was. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that when it determines that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT improperly received an application and reverses or vacates a judgment on receivability, any judgment on the merits is null and void ab initio. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT clarified that this did not...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered the Secretary-General¡¯s appeal. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT rejected the Secretary-General¡¯s submission that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT erred in ¡°double-counting¡± by using the same element of Mr Andersson¡¯s high chance of promotion to justify both its award of CHF 10,000 in lieu of rescission, as well as its award of CHF 4,000 for moral damages. The claim for moral damages was related to the reparation of an injury, that could not be regarded as covered by the payment of CHF 10,000 awarded as an alternative to rescission. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT also rejected the Secretary-General¡¯s submission that Mr Andersson only fleetingly referred to...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Appellant had not established any error in fact or law emerging from the impugned judgment. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that the Appellant did not challenge the competitive procedure¡¯s final administrative act since he only began to contest the Administration¡¯s actions when the selected candidate was laterally moved, and another rostered candidate was appointed as a replacement. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Appellant¡¯s rights as a staff member were linked to the administrative decision that completed the selection procedure and that, as such, any breach of his rights could only be caused by that...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judgment was not manifestly unreasonable in concluding that the date upon which the Appellant was on notice that he had received a response from the Management Evaluation Unit (MEU) or that it was his responsibility to read the MEU response as soon as possible. On the question of whether Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT erred in law and/or failed to exercise its jurisdiction in declining to consider the case on the merits, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that, in the absence of a prior written request for a suspension or waiver of the time limit for filing his application, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT was not competent to consider the issue...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT agreed with Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT and its conclusion that the application was not receivable ratione materiae. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that a request for management evaluation must be submitted prior to bringing an application before Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT further noted that, even if the Management Evaluation Unit (MEU) had failed to resolve the Appellant¡¯s complaints about the contested decision, she still had the opportunity to file a timely application with Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT for judicial review after she receive the response from the MEU but had chosen not to do so. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT exceeded its competence and jurisdiction in addressing...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that there had been a policy change in 1997 which meant that staff members who requested pension as a result of an accident suffered in the service of the Organisation post-1997 were granted it with the proviso that it would only be paid until they retired. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that, as the Appellant¡¯s accident occurred long after the policy change in 1997, the changed policy was applicable. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that as the Appellant had reached retirement age at the time of the incapacitating injury, his appeal had to be dismissed. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the appeal.

The Tribunal, referring to O¡¯Hanlon, (which was not before the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT), stated that, ¡°This Tribunal interpreted the Inter-Organisation Agreement Concerning Transfer, Secondment or Loan of Staff Among the Organisations Applying the United Nations Common System of Salaries and Allowances to require that service in the releasing Organisation will be counted as service in the receiving Organisation. The Inter-Organisation Agreement interpreted that O¡¯Hanlon was remarkably similar to Article 5. 1 of the IAMA, which pertains to service credits for staff who transfer under the IAMA. Under the rationale...

Noting the Secretary-General¡¯s contention that administrative review by ICAO is the equivalent of management evaluation under Article 7(3) of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT Statute, and Article 7(3) must be interpreted in the same manner as Article 8(3) of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT Statute, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT agreed that Article 7(3) prohibited Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT from waiving the deadline by which the Appellant was required to seek administrative review. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that it did not have jurisdiction or competence to address the merits of the substantive claims of the Appellant since AJAB did not consider the merits of those claims as the neutral first instance...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an appeal by the Secretary-General. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that it could not sustain the conclusion of Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT that Mr Koutang¡¯s actions did not amount to misconduct. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the sanction imposed was not unreasonable, absurd, or disproportionate and, as such, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that it was a reasonable exercise of the Administration¡¯s broad discretion in disciplinary matters. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT erred in finding the sanction disproportionate and in substituting its opinion for that of the Administration. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT allowed the appeal and vacated the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judgment.