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Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that the Appellant merely repeated arguments submitted before Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT and recalled that an appellant has the burden of satisfying Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT that the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judgment was defective and must state the grounds upon which he or she relies, and that merely stating disagreement or repeating previous arguments was insufficient. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Secretary-General¡¯s reports and memoranda lacked the legal authority vested in properly promulgated administrative issuances. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted the relevant administrative instruction on the staff selection process (ST/AI/2010/3) was silent on the requirement for...

On the Appellant¡¯s argument that the selected candidate was ineligible for consideration or selection on the basis that his tenure on the roster had expired (as per former administrative instruction ST/AI/2006/3/Rev. 1) and in the absence of specific guidelines, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT took note of the human resources practice of recognising as eligible all rostered candidates whose names were on the roster on the date of the opening of the vacancy announcement for the post. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT properly concluded that, given the existence of this practice, the successful candidate¡¯s eligibility was covered by...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an appeal by the Secretary-General. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT had correctly stated that even if it could be argued that the profile of the Broadcast Technology Officer (BTO P-4) post had changed due to the drafting of new Terms of Reference (TOR) by Ms Hermann, the only viable course of action in the circumstances for the purposes of filling it would have been a regular, competitive selection process and not a comparative review as happened in this case. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT was correct in finding that the so-called comparative review between Ms Hersh and Mr Tobgyal for the only post...

On the alleged procedural error of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT not allowing an oral examination of witnesses, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that it was well within the competence of Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT to manage its cases as it saw fit and that the Appellant had not demonstrated how the procedure affected or violated her due process rights; Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed this ground of appeal. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held, affirming the finding of Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT, that the Appellant failed to establish that the decision to remove her from her post in Budapest constituted a disguised disciplinary measure. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT found no merit in the ground of appeal that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT failed to consider that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵHCR...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an application for interpretation by Mr Shkurtaj on the issue of interest. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT referred to Warren (judgment No. 2010-Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT-059) and Mmata (judgment No. 2010-Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT-092) for the holding that interest was to be paid at the US Prime rate from the date on which the entitlement became due. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the interest payable was at the US Prime Rate and that an extra five per cent should be added to the US Prime Rate if the judgment was not executed within 60 days of its issuance. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the date from which interest on the compensation was to be paid at the US Prime Rate was...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an application for revision and an application for interpretation of judgment No. 2011-Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT-112, both filed by Ms Abbasi. On the application for revision, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that it constituted a disguised way to criticise the impugned judgment or to disagree with it, noting that the rules did not allow the use of an application for revision for such a goal or to modify, complete or improve a Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT judgment. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that, even if the ¡°cheating¡± in the written test had been qualified as previously unknown and not due to Ms Abbasi¡¯s negligence, it would not have had a decisive impact on...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered Ms Basenko¡¯s application for revision of judgment No. 2011-Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT-139. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the reference made by Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT to the precedent in Gabaldon (judgment No. 2011-Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT-139) could not be regarded as a decisive fact which was, at the time the judgment was rendered, unknown to Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that it was unable to see any valid ground for revision within the purview of Article 11 of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT Statute. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the application was not receivable. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the application.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an application for revision of judgment No. 2011-Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT-158. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that there was no new fact such as to meet the criteria set out in Article 11 of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT Statute. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Mr Laeijendecker sought to re-argue or reopen issues. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that insofar as Mr Laeijendecker sought interpretation of the impugned judgment, paragraphs 29, 30 and 31 were clear on their face and had to be read in conjunction with paragraphs 27 and 28, and paragraphs 32-35. On the allegation of bias, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Mr Laeijendecker¡¯s submissions amounted to no more than completely...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an application for revision of judgment No. 2011-Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT-154. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the new evidence was irrelevant because the case was not receivable; neither Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT nor Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT had jurisdiction to hear Mr. Sims¡¯ case. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT denied the application.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an appeal by the Secretary-General. As a preliminary matter, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed Ms Guzman¡¯s Motion to file an Addendum to Answer the Secretary-General¡¯s Appeal, after finding that the material she wished to submit was more properly suited for a hearing on the merits and was not germane to the issue being reviewed by Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT. On the merits, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT found that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s conclusion that the contested decision was not affected by the exclusionary provision of Article 10(2) of its Statute and Article 14 of its Rules of Procedure was not supported by the contents of Ms Guzman¡¯s amended Motion of...