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Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT erred in finding that the erroneous requirement for a perfect command of English vitiated the entire recruitment process, noting that it was a typographic error and corrective measures were taken by conducting a manual review of the personal history profile of each candidate. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT erred in its finding that the selection process was unlawful and lacked transparency. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the need for the factual determination of all of the evidence related to the roster, placement, and removal of candidates required that the instant case be remanded to the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Appellant was not a staff member, as he was not supported by the Secretary-General in terms of Staff Regulation 4. 1 and was not subject to the Secretary-General¡¯s authority, but rather he was elected by the General Assembly. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT did not err in dismissing the application as not receivable ratione personae. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT correctly distinguished ILOAT judgment No. 3359, noting that the ILOAT¡¯s jurisdiction ratione personae is broader than Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s jurisdiction, in that it may be invoked by ¡°officials¡±, which includes judges. Noting that the current...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the appeal was entirely without merit. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT upheld the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT finding that the application was not receivable as the Appellant had waived the relevant right and therefore did not have standing. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT affirmed, albeit for different reasons, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s final legal conclusion that the Applicant¡¯s application was not receivable ratione materiae. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that there was no reviewable administrative decision in the Appellant¡¯s application. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT had no primary legal or factual basis from which it could conclude that the Applicant had properly sought judicial review of a...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT rejected the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA Commissioner-General's submission that the appeal was defective because it failed to identify any of the grounds of appeal prescribed by Article 2(1) of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT Statute. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Appellant¡¯s ground of appeal was without merit. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Commissioner-General was obliged to calculate the Appellant¡¯s retirement benefits in accordance with the new Staff Rule and did so correctly. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA DT did not commit any error of fact and law in arriving at its decision. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the appeal and affirmed the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA DT judgment.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Appellant did not fall under any of the categories of potential applicants and had no legal standing before Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that, accordingly, the Appellant had no standing before Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT and therefore Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT had no competence to address the merits of her claims. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the appeal and affirmed the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judgment.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an appeal by the Secretary-General. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT exceeded its competence in reviewing Mr Omwanda¡¯s EOD date, as it was not subject to a timely request for management evaluation. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Mr Omwanda knew or ought to have known from his Letter of Appointment the date from which his appointment was effective, that he had been re-employed, not reinstated, and that its terms applied regardless of any period of former service. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT was statutorily barred from hearing Mr Omwanda¡¯s application. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT upheld the appeal and vacated the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judgment.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the decision to separate the Applicant was arbitrary, discriminatory, constituted an abuse of authority, and was unlawful. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT was not obliged to set an in-lieu compensation amount, as the decision concerned a lateral transfer, not an appointment, promotion, or termination. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT upheld Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s finding that Ms. Koduru¡¯s testimony was not compelling enough to serve as a basis for an award of moral damages. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT rejected Ms. Koduru¡¯s request for costs. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT dismissed the appeal and the cross-appeal and affirmed the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judgment.
Accountability referral: The Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT...

Ms Rockcliffe filed an application for execution of Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT judgment No. 2017-Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT-807. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the crux of the matter for determination was whether Ms Rockcliffe¡¯s appointment to and her removal from, the Budget Working Group (BWG) in 2018 fell within the scope of Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT¡¯s order in the judgment. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that, although Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT had not explicitly addressed the issue of conflict of interest in its judgment, it impliedly rejected it by means of applying the law in force at the time. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that it was egregious that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵJSPF re-submitted that the previous decision not to give Ms Rockcliffe...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered Mr Newland¡¯s application for interpretation of judgment No. 2018-Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT-820. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that, given that Mr Newland had already been paid Special Post Allowance, Hazard pay, and outstanding interest, the only questions requiring determination were whether he was entitled to payment of Rest and Recuperation (R&R), free tickets, and the relocation grant. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT accepted that there was a degree of uncertainty regarding these questions. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Mr Newland¡¯s claim that he was entitled to the payment of R&R was unsustainable, as it was not an accruable benefit or entitlement. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT...

Noting that the Appellant, the innocent party, lost her employment, her career prospects within the Organisation, and the offending managers remained entrenched in their positions, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that there was a substantial variation or a striking disparity between the award made by Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT and the award that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered ought to have been made. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that, given that an order of reinstatement was unlikely to be implemented, a more generous award was justifiable in the circumstances. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT did not err in law or fact in denying moral damages, as there was no corroborating...