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Both parties appealed. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT erred by finding a valid contract of employment between Ms Al Hallaj and ESCWA since no letter of appointment was issued, only an offer of employment. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that a quasi-contract was formed, considering that Ms Al Hallaj had unconditionally accepted and had fully fulfilled all the conditions specified in the offer of employment. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT agreed with Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT that the ESCWA Administration committed two major errors, in breach of its quasi-contractual obligations. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the ESCWA Administration failed in its due diligence to specify clearly and...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an appeal by the Secretary-General. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Secretary-General discharged his burden to establish the facts of misconduct by clear and convincing evidence in relation to all the allegations of wrongdoing regarding the special education grants. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the evidence proved not only fraud in the form of false accounting, but also the uttering of forged and falsified documents to the Organisation. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the staff member¡¯s behaviour constituted serious misconduct by which she enriched herself by approximately USD 50,000 at the expense of the Organisation...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA DT¡¯s finding that, while ASC No. A/04/2010 did not provide a right to Mr Abusondous to receive an AAA, he did have an expectation that the Agency would ¡°properly exercise its discretion to grant an AAA and [would] be fair in its dealings with him¡±, was correct. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT found no fault with the reasoning that the Agency¡¯s justification of the decision not to appoint Mr Abusondous as Officer-in-Charge and not to grant him an AAA, namely that the Agency would not have been able to meet the 120-day maximum period to fill the vacancy, was not a reasonable ground for the denial...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s conclusion that the application was non-receivable ratione materiae was correct, since the Appellant had failed to challenge the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵTSO CHRO¡¯s response, the original administrative decision of 6 May 2015, by requesting a management evaluation. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the appeal and affirmed the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judgment.

The Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA Commissioner-General appealed. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the decisions not to grant Mr Abu Lehia sick leave for the specific time periods (28 March to 3 April 2016, 4 April to 17 May 2016, and 18 May 2016 to 7 June 2016) were not reasonable, given the specific factual circumstances of the case at hand and that these decisions were not a valid exercise of the Agency¡¯s discretion. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT affirmed Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA DT¡¯s findings and conclusions about illegality. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Commissioner-General failed to demonstrate any error in the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA DT¡¯s finding that the Agency¡¯s decision not to grant Mr Abu Lehia...

Both parties appealed. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT was correct regarding the non-receivability ratione materiae with respect to the first three decisions. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT, however, disagreed with Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s finding that the Administration had unlawfully delayed check-out, including his final payments and the submission of the required forms for his pension, since the period of three and a half months which was taken by the Administration to investigate and proceed with Mr Nchimbi¡¯s ¡°check-out¡± was not unreasonable in the given circumstances. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT upheld the Secretary-General's appeal and dismissed Mr Nchimbi¡¯s...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT denied the request for an oral hearing since the factual and legal issues of the appeal were clearly defined. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT rejected to annex a medical report as evidence since the Appellant had not filed a motion, finding that the admission of documents was not in the interest of justice and the efficient and expeditious resolution of the proceedings. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the appeal was not receivable ratione materiae, considering that the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT Statute, in unequivocal terms, provides that the decision of Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT on an application for suspension of action shall not be subject to appeal. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the...

The Secretary-General appealed. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT erred on a question of law when it concluded that the procedure was flawed on the basis that it was not sufficient for the Assistant Secretary-General/Controller to countersign and approve the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵCB recommendation and that a separate and reasoned decision was necessary for the regularity of the administrative procedure. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT erred in law in finding that there was a procedural delay and, therefore, granting compensation. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT granted the appeal and vacated the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judgment insofar as it awarded compensation for the procedural...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered the Appellant¡¯s appeal, requesting compensation for moral damages, compensation for costs for legal representation, and request for interest. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT referred to Article 9(1)(b) of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT Statute, which states that compensation may only be awarded for harm suffered that is supported by evidence. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT agreed with the ICJ Registrar that the ICJ was not responsible for the delays, but rather demonstrated good faith in bringing about an arrangement favourable to the Appellant. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT accordingly rejected the Appellant¡¯s request for compensation. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT also referred to Article 9(2) of...

As a preliminary matter, in response to the Appellant¡¯s request for interim measures, in which she requested that the Secretary-General complied with the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judgment insofar as it had not been appealed against, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT denied the motion on the basis that execution should have been requested before Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT. On the Appellant¡¯s motion to strike assertions and evidence, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that the Appellant was supplementing her appeal, and denied the motion. On the merits, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the appeal was limited to the request for further compensation, as per the Appellant¡¯s Power of Attorney document, and...