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Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an application of the Secretary-General for interpretation of judgment No. 2012-Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT-240. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the application did not fulfil the requirements of Article 11 of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT Statute and was therefore manifestly inadmissible. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the judgment clearly stated that the utilisation of foreign tax credits constituted a reimbursable payment method and the tax unit had calculated the relevant reimbursable amount at USD 15, 239. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT rejected the Secretary-General¡¯s application and ordered the Secretary-General to pay Ms Johnson USD 15,239 with interest, stating that the...

On the Appellant¡¯s claims of discriminatory and arbitrary practices, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT did not find that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT committed any error of law or procedure of any factual error such as to result in a manifestly unreasonable decision and Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s findings demonstrated that it took cognisance of all relevant information. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that there was no error by Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT in holding that it was for the High Commissioner to determine the relative importance of the criteria to use for promotion. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT did not err in law or fact when it determined that the Appellant was afforded proper consideration and in finding...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that there had been a policy change in 1997 which meant that staff members who requested pension as a result of an accident suffered in the service of the Organisation post-1997 were granted it with the proviso that it would only be paid until they retired. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that, as the Appellant¡¯s accident occurred long after the policy change in 1997, the changed policy was applicable. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that as the Appellant had reached retirement age at the time of the incapacitating injury, his appeal had to be dismissed. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the appeal.

The Tribunal, referring to O¡¯Hanlon, (which was not before the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT), stated that, ¡°This Tribunal interpreted the Inter-Organisation Agreement Concerning Transfer, Secondment or Loan of Staff Among the Organisations Applying the United Nations Common System of Salaries and Allowances to require that service in the releasing Organisation will be counted as service in the receiving Organisation. The Inter-Organisation Agreement interpreted that O¡¯Hanlon was remarkably similar to Article 5. 1 of the IAMA, which pertains to service credits for staff who transfer under the IAMA. Under the rationale...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judgment was not manifestly unreasonable in concluding that the date upon which the Appellant was on notice that he had received a response from the Management Evaluation Unit (MEU) or that it was his responsibility to read the MEU response as soon as possible. On the question of whether Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT erred in law and/or failed to exercise its jurisdiction in declining to consider the case on the merits, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that, in the absence of a prior written request for a suspension or waiver of the time limit for filing his application, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT was not competent to consider the issue...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT agreed with Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT and its conclusion that the application was not receivable ratione materiae. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that a request for management evaluation must be submitted prior to bringing an application before Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT further noted that, even if the Management Evaluation Unit (MEU) had failed to resolve the Appellant¡¯s complaints about the contested decision, she still had the opportunity to file a timely application with Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT for judicial review after she receive the response from the MEU but had chosen not to do so. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT exceeded its competence and jurisdiction in addressing...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered appeals from both Mr Schoone and the Secretary-General. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that, for the reasons set forth in judgment Nos. 2013-Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT-357 (Malmstrom et al. ), 2013-Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT-358 (Longone) and 2013-Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT-359 (Ademagic et al. ), the delegation of authority granted to the ICTY Registrar could not be construed so as to grant him the authority to convert staff members¡¯ fixed-term appointments into permanent appointments. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT recalled that in those three cases it had held that the decision-making authority to grant permanent appointments was properly vested in the Assistant Secretary-General for...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an appeal by the Secretary-General. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that it could not sustain the conclusion of Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT that Mr Koutang¡¯s actions did not amount to misconduct. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the sanction imposed was not unreasonable, absurd, or disproportionate and, as such, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that it was a reasonable exercise of the Administration¡¯s broad discretion in disciplinary matters. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT erred in finding the sanction disproportionate and in substituting its opinion for that of the Administration. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT allowed the appeal and vacated the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judgment.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT did not err on questions of fact by ignoring or failing to examine what the Appellant considered to be evidence, which constituted mere allegations and unsubstantiated argumentation on his part. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Appellant did not support his submission by any grounds which would bring the issue within the remit of Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT. Noting that the Appellant relied upon the statements and observations which he had brought before Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that a litigant¡¯s past allegations and arguments cannot be considered evidence per se. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that it was not the task of Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT (or Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT)...

Noting the Secretary-General¡¯s contention that administrative review by ICAO is the equivalent of management evaluation under Article 7(3) of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT Statute, and Article 7(3) must be interpreted in the same manner as Article 8(3) of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT Statute, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT agreed that Article 7(3) prohibited Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT from waiving the deadline by which the Appellant was required to seek administrative review. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that it did not have jurisdiction or competence to address the merits of the substantive claims of the Appellant since AJAB did not consider the merits of those claims as the neutral first instance...